

UNCLASSIFIED

REDEPLOYMENT

LIBRARY
USA CGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KAN.

Property of
Office of the Chief
Military History
General Reference Branch

OCT -9 1962

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
SPECIAL STAFF, U.S. ARMY

CALL NUMBER

8-3.1
CA 21
C 2

ACCESSION NO _____
PO-REGISTR _____

HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPT FILE

TITLE

OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1945-1946
Redeployment

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: UNCLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: Ltr. EUCOM 11 May 48

OFFICE OF ORIGIN

Office of the Chief Historian
European Command, Frankfurt-AM-Main, Germany
Mildred V. Hester

RETURN TO ROOM

OCS FORM 340
1 SEP 50

B15217

REF
940
.5338
O15
R314
c 1

OCCUPATION FORCES IN
EUROPE SERIES

1945-1946

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN EUROPEAN COMMAND

UNCLASSIFIED



THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

LIBRARY



Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

Call Number _____

CGSC Label 13
1 Jan 85

Edition of 11 Dec 72 is obsolete.

CLASSIFIED BY 10420
DATE 10/1/83
BY 10420
REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
EXEMPTION CODE
AUTHORITY
10420

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN
EUROPEAN COMMAND
STANFORD - AM - MAIN, GERMANY

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander in Chief

APC 757
August 1947

SUBJECT: Occupation Forces in Europe Series


TO : All concerned

1. The War Department has directed that the history of the military occupation of Germany and Austria in World War II be recorded and interpreted as the events transpire. The agency which is responsible for preparing this history is the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command.

2. The Occupation Forces in Europe Series, publication of which was begun in 1947, consists of a series of studies, monographs, and narratives of the history of the occupation. From time to time, the Occupation Forces in Europe Series will include a summary volume giving a narrative history of the occupation. All the studies or volumes published in the Series for the year 1945-46 or a subsequent year make up the official history of the occupation for that year.

3. Each publication in the Occupation Forces in Europe Series is based upon a thorough study of the correspondence, directives, and other documents relating to the subject. It serves also as a digest and summary of the pertinent passages of the reports of operations which are made periodically to the Office of the Chief Historian by all staff divisions and major units of the European Command. Each publication in the Series, before being issued, is reviewed by the staff divisions or subordinate command whose responsibilities indicate a primary interest in the subject matter.

4. All persons to whose attention these publications come are invited to forward to the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, APC 757, their comments and criticisms, in order to make available all facts from which a definitive history may be prepared in the War Department.


LUCIUS D. CLAY
General, USA
Commander-in-Chief

UNCLASSIFIED

07 - 162

~~RESTRICTED~~

8-3.1
CA 21
C 2

0001905

REDEPLOYMENT



Property of
Office of the Chief
Military History
General Reference Branch

FORMERLY

Accession # 804-21
File # 8-3 (1st yr) OC
Volume # _____

Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: UNCLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY

Per Eucom Hqs.
11 May 48

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN
EUROPEAN COMMAND
FRANKFURT - AM - MAIN, GERMANY
1947

REVIEWED

By

Date

John Allen
12 Dec 48

~~RESTRICTED~~
UNCLASSIFIED

JAN 04 2007

PROPERTY OF U.S. ARMY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN
HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN COMMAND
UNITED STATES ARMY

1946 - 1947

Chief Historian Colonel Harold E. Potter, Infantry
Chief Archivist Gillett Griswold

OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY BRANCH

Chiefs

Colonel David E. Kerr, Inf; Colonel Wilbur S. Nye, FA; Colonel A.C.M.
Asoy, CAC; Lt. Colonel William S. McGree, Inf.

Executive Officers

Lt. Colonel Malcolm S. Fakin, FA; Lt. Colonel John R. Ulmer, Inf;
Captain Arthur Gottlieb, CAC.

Chief Historical Consultant

Joseph E. Starr, Ph.D.

Editorial Staff

Laura Toome, M.A.; Madeline E. Lannelle, B.S.; William D. Amis

HISTORIANS

Military Staff

Colonel Leslie E. Jacoby, FA; Colonel Arnold R.C. Sander, Inf; Colonel
Charles E. Morrison, Cav; Lt. Colonel George L. Pitre, Inf; Lt. Colonel
Tremaine E. Field, Inf; Major George C. Penny, AGD; Major Leonard L.
Lerwill, Inf; Major Harold W. Brown, Inf; 2d Lieutenant Martin P.
Detels, Jr., Inf; Staff Sergeant Frivelle Gable, WAC.

Civilian Staff

Linda Bennett; Arthur R. Burnet, A.B.; Charles E. Campbell, A.B.;
Francis Chase, M.S.; Robert W. Coakley, M.A.; Margaret L. Davis, A.B.;
Thomas A. Donovan, A.B.; Sophie R. Dornbusch, M.S.; Ruth McClung
Fleishman; Marcus W. Floyd, A.B.; Marthe Frey, A.B.; Frederic
Gauzert, Ph.D.; Margaret L. Geis, M.A.; Bernard V. Hall, M.A.;
* Mildred V. Hester, A.B.; Margot Hoffman; Virginia G. Kritikos, A.B.;
Elizabeth S. Lay, M.A.; Kordyan Lewandowski, M.A.; Walter S. Long, A.B.;
Jean E. Malcolm, M.A. (Cantab.); Josephine T. Melandy, A.B.; George F.
Muller, M.A.; Albert Norman, B.S.S.; Drusilla J. Norris, B.S.; George
J. Olsewski; Betty O'Regan; John C.E. Smith, B.A. (Cantab.)

(*) Contributors to this volume.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
Chapter	I: PLANNING FOR REDEPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS	1
	General	1
	Development of War Department Policy.	10
	Preparation of the First Draft Plan for the European Theater	17
	Final Planning Prior to V-E Day and Preparation of Theater Plan	35
	Planning for Troop Outflow	31
	Recognition of Morale Factor During Planning	35
Chapter	II: REDEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS PRIOR TO V-J DAY	39
	Readjustment.	39
	Types of Redeployment Procedures.	57
	The Assembly Area Command	58
	The Ports of Embarkation	76
	Shipments Prior to Capitulation of Japan.	82
Chapter	III: V-J DAY AND ITS EFFECTS	85
Chapter	IV: SEPTEMBER THROUGH DECEMBER 1945--CLEARANCE OF EXCESS TROOPS	102
	October Redeployment.	123
	November 1945	134
	December 1945	141
Chapter	V: REDEPLOYMENT OF THE CLOSE-OUT FORCE	155

TABLE OF CONTENTS--(continued)

		Page
CHART I:	Plans for Utilization of Theater Strength following	35
CHART II:	Personnel Readjustment following	39
CHART III:	Process of Personnel Readjustment. following	39
CHART IV:	Indirect Redeployment Flow of Personnel and Equipment following	57
CHART V:	Direct Redeployment Flow of Personnel and Equipment following	57
CHART VI:	AAC Installations following	69
CHART VII:	Redeployment Troop Departures from European Theater following	74
CHART VIII:	ETCUSA Overseas Movement Implementation Chart following	74
FOOTNOTES:	190

Chapter I
PLANNING FOR REDEPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN
THEATER OF OPERATIONS

GENERAL

1. Strategic Concept of Global War.

a. When Germany had been defeated, three new missions confronted the United States Army in the European Theater of Operations. One of these was the partial demobilization of units and troops; the second was the occupation of Germany, and the third, and major concern, was that of sending troops and materials to help win the war in the Pacific area. The Allies were fighting a global war. Their decision to crush Germany first had implied that troops, on completion of their task in Europe, would be transferred to the Pacific Theater and massed against the enemy there. Specifically, the United States forces fighting Japan required reinforcement to the extent of another army headquarters and more than a dozen combat divisions in addition to numerous air and service troops. The European Theater had enough troops to fill all these needs; over three

million troops were in the Theater(1) on V-E Day, with a distribution as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1(2)

Strength of U. S. Army forces in Europe on V-E Day

	<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>Continent</u>	<u>Total</u>
Field Forces	1,000	1,681,000	1,682,000
Air Forces	226,000	230,000	456,000
Communications Zone	96,000	548,000	644,000
Ground Force Reinforcement	34,000	135,000	169,000
Command			
Detachment of Patients	<u>61,000</u>	<u>57,000</u>	<u>118,000</u>
Total	418,000	2,651,000	3,069,000

This total was far greater than that of eventual, or even immediate requirements for the occupation of Germany. The G-3 Division of the European Theater estimated that by 1 July 1946, about 400,000 troops would fill occupational needs and perform service functions throughout the Theater. These troops were to be distributed as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2(3)

Ultimate Occupational Troop Basis

Air	109,930
Ground	193,656
Service	74,561
Overhead & Miscellaneous	<u>26,407</u>
Total	404,554

2. Definitions of Terms. Redistribution of forces to support the Pacific war and to occupy Germany involved the use of many new words and phrases and gave new meanings to certain words and phrases already in use. In order to facilitate the reading of this monograph, definitions

of the more common of these are given below.

a. Redeployment. The entire system of transferring men from the European and Mediterranean Theaters to the Pacific area was known as redeployment. After V-J Day the term redeployment through popular usage came to mean the return of individuals to the Zone of the Interior for discharge.

b. Readjustment. The sorting and transfer of personnel into units of the separate categories for which they were qualified by reason of their adjusted service rating scores, physical profiling, their desire for continued service as volunteers, and consideration of military necessity were known as readjustment procedures. (4)

c. Occupational Troop Basis (OTB). The minimum number of troops which the War Department estimated would be necessary to carry on occupational duties in a given theater was called the occupational troop basis of that particular theater.

d. Redeployment of Supplies. The term redeployment of supplies referred to the entire system of transferring supplies from the European and Mediterranean Theaters to the Pacific areas of war.

e. Point System. Point system was the short designation of the weighted four-point credit system set up to determine each soldier's individual eligibility for discharge.

f. Adjusted Service Rating (ASR) Scores. The adjusted service rating score was a numerical rating based on a correlation of length of service, overseas service, combat service, and of parenthood. It was the

total number of points accumulated by an individual under the point system.

g. Critical Score. That minimum adjusted service rating score, determined by the War Department, at, or above which personnel would be considered as eligible for separation from the service, was known as the critical score.

h. Categorization. Categorization was the process of designating a unit into one of four categories, according to whether the unit was to be demobilized, to be part of the occupational force, or to go to the Pacific area.

i. Separation Center. A separation center was an activity within a personnel center operated by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, under immediate control of the commanding general of the service command in which located, and established to effect separation of personnel from the Army.

j. Reception Station Group. Groups formed in overseas commands and at disposition centers for the purpose of moving surplus personnel from overseas commands and from the United States ports to reception stations were called reception station groups.

k. Availability Date. The availability date was that date by which personnel and impedimenta of a unit were to be prepared for movement to the assembly area. Such movement was directed in movement orders.

l. Domestic Movement Order. A domestic movement order was an order issued by Theater Headquarters directing the movement of units from

the Unit Station to the Assembly Area. A domestic movement order was issued only when movement was necessary prior to the issuance of an Overseas Movement Order.

m. Overseas Movement Orders. Overseas Movement Orders were those orders issued by Theater Headquarters for the movement of units to other Theaters or return to the United States.

n. War Department Movement Directive. A War Department Movement Directive was one issued to this Theater by the War Department. The directive authorized or ordered the movement of units to another Theater or the United States.

o. Warning Order. A warning order was any official advance notice of impending movement, furnished units which had been committed for movement to another Theater or the United States.

p. Readiness Data. The readiness date of a unit was the date established in the overseas movement order by which the personnel and impedimenta of a unit were to be prepared for movement to the staging area. Where impedimenta were to precede personnel separate "impedimenta readiness dates" and "personnel readiness dates" were used.

q. Major Command. As of V-E Day, for purposes of redeployment, major commands were army groups, armies, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, XVIII Corps (Airborne), Communications Zone, Communications Zone Sections (including Advance Sections and United Kingdom Base), Assembly Area Command, and the Ground Force Reinforcement Command.

r. Assembly Areas. Assembly Areas were installations into which units normally moved from their unit stations to be processed preparatory to movement to staging areas. These installations in early redeployment procedures were staging area camps in the area of the port of Le Havre under the control of Normandy Base Section and other camps in the area of the port of Marseilles operated by Delta Base Section. In normal redeployment procedures these installations were organized as the Assembly Area Commands and were under the direct command of the Commanding General, Communications Zone.

s. Staging Areas. A Staging Area was an installation or group of installations in the vicinity of a port where troops were assembled for final processing prior to embarkation.

t. Overseas Movement Division. The Overseas Movement Division was an organization set up at each port of embarkation for control of embarkation and out-loading.

u. Unit Station. Unit Station was the term used to designate the physical location of a unit at the time it received its orders to move to either the assembly or staging area.

v. Authorized Allowance and Equipment. The authorized Allowance and equipment of a unit was the equipment specified by the applicable Tables of Equipment (T/E), and Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O & E), or Special Lists of Equipment (SLOE) as modified by the War Department movement directives.

w. Collecting Point. A collecting point was a depot, maintenance establishment, railhead, or dump where units, when directed by Theater orders turned in all organization equipment, except the minimum essential equipment, to the control of the Supply Service, or the Air Technical Service Command in Europe. The collecting point classified the equipment for reissue or disposition.

x. Combat Serviceable Equipment. Combat serviceable equipment consisted of clothing and equipment which possessed sufficient serviceability to justify its issue or retention by troops being moved to another overseas destination.

y. Impedimenta. Impedimenta was the general term used covering baggage, equipment, and supplies that pertained to a peculiar unit and which came under its control for further shipment.

z. Minimum Essential Equipment. Minimum essential equipment was that part of authorized allowance of equipment needed to preserve the integrity of a unit during movement, without regard to the performance of its combat or service mission. This equipment normally was carried by or accompanied the troops to the assembly area, staging area, and aboard the same vessel with the troops.

aa. Critical MOSs (Military Occupational Speciality Number). Critical MOSs were those military occupational specialty numbers of which a scarcity or shortage existed within the Theater or within the Army as a whole, as published by Theater Headquarters.

bb. Candidate Personnel. In the case of enlisted men the term candidate personnel referred to men who had not volunteered for further service who had adjusted service rating scores equal to, or above, the critical score. In the case of officers the term candidate personnel referred to those officers who did not desire to remain on active duty, who were in excess of Army needs, and who had adjusted service rating scores equal to or above the Theater Eligibility Score.

cc. Essentials. Essentials were officer and enlisted personnel retained in the service because they did not meet the standards for separation by reason of adjusted service rating score, Theater Eligibility Score, physical standards, age, marriage status (females only), or military occupational specialty number.

dd. Theater Eligibility Score. The Theater Eligibility Score was that adjusted service rating score (or scores) established by Theater Headquarters to assist in determining the officers, other than those assigned to the air forces, who might be considered as surplus to the requirements of the Theater.

ee. Personnel Readjustment. Personnel readjustment was the purpose of shifting candidate personnel in Category I, II, and III units to Category IV units and the shifting of essential personnel from Category IV units to Category I, II, and III units.

ff. Categories. All units, according to the type of future service expected of them, were placed into one of the following categories:

Category I, units to be retained for the Army of Occupation; Category II, units to be transferred to active Theaters, either directly or indirectly through the United States, or to be transferred to the United States and placed in the Strategic Reserve; Category III, units to be converted or reorganized (including necessary activation and inactivations); Category IV, units to be demobilized.

gg. Category IV Release List. A Category IV Release list was a listing of Category IV units in the order in which they were to be released for movement to the United States or inactivated or disbanded in the Theater.

hh. Volunteers. A volunteer was an enlisted man with an adjusted service rating score equal to or above the critical score who waived separation under readjustment regulations until after the defeat of Japan.

ii. Reinforcement or Replacement Group. A Reinforcement or Replacement Group was a group of essentials, surplus to the Theater, organized into a temporary unit for the purpose of administration and control during their return to the United States.

jj. Carrier Unit. A carrier unit was an administrative military organization whose sole mission was the preparation and maintenance of those essential records to facilitate separation of personnel and to insure the orderly movement of this personnel to the United States. Carriers were organized in the operation areas and moved to the processing centers where the administrative details required for shipment and for expediting

separation were accomplished. From these processing centers units moved daily to ports.

kk. R-Day. R-Day was 12 May 1945 and was the day designated by the War Department for the beginning of full redeployment and readjustment.

DEVELOPMENT OF WAR DEPARTMENT POLICY

3. Early War Department Plans.

a. During the summer of 1944 the War Department prepared a series of studies(5) dealing with all phases of postwar activities. Certain of these papers established broad principles of readjustment, redeployment, and related topics, and in general set forth the basis upon which were formulated what were known as the "Readjustment Regulations." The first of this series of directives, the "Plan for Readjustment of Military Personnel after the Defeat of Germany," dated 30 August 1944(6) contained in detail the plan later released to the press and discussed in paragraph 4, below.

b. As soon as Germany surrendered, the War Department planned to issue messages to the commanding generals of Theaters and major commands outlining each general's new mission and the proposed new troop basis with which to carry out this mission. The commanding generals would be invited

to propose modifications. The War Department would then announce the method of disposing of the troop surplus which would exist in the inactive Theaters.

c. The category system was established as an aid to the disposal of surplus units by inactivation or transfer to an active Theater. All units of the army would fall into one of the following categories:

Category I.--Those to be retained for continued service in their current commands.

Category II.--Those to be transferred from one theater to another or to the United States, or from the United States to a theater.

Category III.--Those to be reorganized and redesignated, and, upon completion, fall under category I or II.

Category IV.--Those to be inactivated(?).

The responsibility for naming the units to be placed in each of the four categories fell to the commanding general of each Theater or major command.

d. Individuals within a categorized unit were not, however, to assume the category of the unit to which they were assigned. The eligibility of each man for discharge was to depend upon whether his skill was essential or nonessential, and upon his score in points and his age. Regardless of the point score or age of an individual a Theater commander could declare any man essential. Even after the return of a unit to the United States some men would have to be declared essential

and reassigned to a unit for further service. It would seem that in an army of over eight million men there could not be an individual who was irreplaceable, but there were an insufficient number holding certain skills. Therefore any man holding one of these much needed skills could not be released until every unit needing that particular skill had been supplied. Every man whose score was below the critical score, or who held a critical military occupational specialty number, was declared to be essential.

e. After all troops within a given theater had been classified as to eligibility for discharge, readjustment of personnel within the units was begun. The plan was to shift individuals from one unit to another until all units contained personnel of only one score group. Insofar as possible this was to be accomplished within each major command of the Theater concerned. At the conclusion of the readjustment of personnel, units in Categories I, II, and III would contain men ineligible for discharge. Category II units had first priority on men needed to fill their Tables of Organization and also on shipping.

4. Plans Sent to European Theater.

During the later part of August and early in September the War Department sent, piecemeal, to the European Theater its plans for redeployment and readjustment. A fairly complete version was released in the Stars and Stripes for 8 September, 1944(8).

a. The plan announced priorities on men, material, supplies, and equipment. The Pacific Theater was to receive first priority in all these items. The method of determining the priority of individuals for release was to be based on a credit point system suggested by the soldiers themselves.(9) For over a year the War Department had been sampling soldier opinion in order to determine what the average soldier should determine a man's eligibility for discharge when only a relatively small number of men could be released. The soldiers voted for a weighted four-point credit system. These credits, tabulated on an adjusted service rating card which would become a part of the service record, were to be based on the following factors.

1. Service credit--based upon the total number of months of army service since September 16, 1940.
2. Overseas credit--based upon the number of months of service overseas.
3. Combat credit--based upon the first and each additional award to an individual of the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Legion of Merit, the Silver Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Soldiers Medal, the Bronze Stars or Battle Participation Stars.
4. Parenthood credit--which gives credit for each dependent child under 18 years up to the limit of three children.

b. Of all the soldiers interviewed, 90 percent voted for the early release of men with overseas service and those with dependent children. These two factors were judged to be the most important and

and therefore, when point values were determined, received the highest value.

c. The official War Department release explained that the values to be assigned these various factors were still under consideration and would not be released until after the cessation of hostilities. The reporter's version of the plan, however, gave the soldier in Europe a good idea of how to figure his score. Quoting "official Army quarters," the reporter indicated that overseas service would count one point for each month, length of service would count one point for each month, combat awards would count five points each, and dependent children of less than eighteen years would count eight points each for not more than three children. The reporter had his information correct for that stage of planning. Eight months later when the plan went into effect only one point value was changed, that for each dependent child being changed from eight to twelve points.

d. Priority for discharge from the Women's Army Corps was established along the same general principles as those for the men, with the exception that married females might be discharged as soon as their husbands were released from military or naval service.

e. One important item of information was omitted in this account. It failed to give any idea as to what total score credit--later called critical score--would entitle a man to discharge. This would not be

established until adjusted service rating scores were computed and tabulated by each Theater and major command and turned over to the G-1 Division of the War Department. Even at this early date four separate critical scores were planned--one each for enlisted men of the air, ground, and service forces, and one for the Women's Army Corps.

f. In the case of officers, it was believed that no critical score would be necessary. The only determining factors in the discharge of officers were stated to be the long and arduous service of individuals and military necessity. Military necessity was also, in the long run, the determining factor for enlisted men and women. The official War Department release emphasized this by saying, "demands of military necessity for a great army of occupation in Europe and the needs of the war against Japan must first be met, and regardless of a man's priority standing, certain types of personnel can never become eligible for discharge as long as the war against Japan continues." (10)

g. Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Selective Service Chief, said that one or two million men would be discharged from the United States Army after Germany's defeat. These discharges could not, at first, be equally distributed among the branches of the Army. The ground forces could release the most men. The air forces, on the other hand, could release few because the type of fighting in the Pacific area called for a large air force. Moreover, there was a greater need for service troops in the Pacific area because of the longer supply lines and scattered

bases. Only when replacements became available through readjustment and induction would the air and service forces be able to discharge more men.

5. Subsequent Announcements of War Department Policy Prior to Planning in the European Theater.

a. A considerable amount of supplementary information was issued during September 1944. One regulation prescribed the procedures for movements of personnel by water, rail, and air.(11) Another, entitled Athletic and Recreation Program.(12) was designated to assist Theater commanders in maintaining morale during the period of readjustment and redeployment. It prescribed athletics music, theatrical presentations, motion pictures, library services, art and crafts training, and social events. A regulation entitled Army Education Program(13) was designed to prepare each man for his return to civilian life. It contemplated that every veteran would have achieved a fifth grade general education and one or more useful vocational or professional skills or a basic education leading toward such skills. No man's separation from the service was to be delayed, however, because of the educational program.

b. On 16 September 1944 the War Department cabled the plan for initiating redeployment activities in Europe immediately after the cessation of hostilities.(14) A supply plan during the period of readjustment and redeployment was issued by the War Department on 4 November 1944.(15) It covered supplying of troops as well as the redeployment of supplies.

c. On 29 November, the War Department issued Redeployment Movements which revised and supplemented the existing procedures and established new ones for the movement of troops, impediments, and the supplies required during redeployment and readjustment.(16) It outlined on a world--wide basis, the over-all program for the movement of troops between overseas Theaters and to the United States. The responsibilities for carrying out these procedures were established and assigned to different levels of command.

d. Based on the plans and principles set forth in War Department documents, the commanding generals of Theaters and major commands were directed to prepare their plans to implement the War Department program.

PREPARATION OF THE FIRST DRAFT PLAN FOR THE EUROPEAN THEATER

6. Assignment of Planning Responsibility for the European Theater.

In Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, planning was initiated in the Planning and Control Section of G-4 Division. On 23 November 1944, Colonel W. E. Potter of that Section requested the publication of a brief planning directive and a general order establishing a Redeployment Post-Hostilities Planning Group.(17) This was approved and on 27 November 1944 the Redeployment Planning Group was

established as a special staff section, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.(18) It operated directly under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff, with Colonel Hugh W. Riley, who was loaned from the G-3 Division, as chief. Three days after the establishment of the Redeployment Planning Group, the first Theater planning directive on redeployment matters, Planning Directive, Series "I" No. 4, was published.(19) In compliance with this directive the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, appointed five officers to serve with the Group. These were, in addition to Colonel Riley, the following officers who represented, respectively, the general staff divisions named: Colonel Philip C. Wahlborn (G-1), Lieutenant Colonel Roderick Wetherill (G-3), Lieutenant Colonel William Van Joyce (G-4), and Lieutenant Colonel Walter Gerkin (G-4).(20)

7. Initial Policies Guiding Work of Redeployment Planning Group.

a. According to instructions in the Theater planning directive, Colonel Riley allocated to the general and special sections of the Theater Headquarters those matters affecting their sections and coordinated with the interested agencies all matters concerning redeployment. As an aid to the integration of effort and materials, all general and special staff sections cleared through Colonel Riley all incoming and outgoing War Department correspondence which dealt with redeployment matters.

b. As the group started its work in early December 1944, there was, other than Planning Directive, Series "I" No. 4, practically no

guiding material of Theater level. Three Theater directives dealing with posthostilities planning mentioned redeployment and demobilization problems only in vague relationship to other posthostilities planning and established no definite policy.(21) The War Department plans, however, were complete in that the aims of redeployment were given, together with the general methods to be followed in achieving these aims. The directives available for Theater planning during December 1944 consisted of four War Department Readjustment Regulations, a cable dated 16 September, and two letters from the War Department.(22)

8. Allocation of Planning Responsibilities-Early Phase.

a. On 6 January 1945(23) the Redeployment Planning Group issued the Redeployment Planning Directive No. 1. This was not, as the name might indicate, a plan for redeploying troops, but an outline to direct Theater level planning for redeployment and redistribution of units, troops, and equipment in accordance with War Department plans. The first requirement was that each general staff section chief and the Inspector General submit immediately in writing questions concerning the application to his section of redeployment plans. On 12 January 1945, Colonel Riley took these questions to the War Department, where he spent nearly two months in working out the answers.

b. The directive also allocated staff responsibilities for the development of detailed Theater plans for redeployment. The Chief of the Redeployment Planning Group was responsible for assembling and completing

the over-all Theater plan. In accordance with the directive, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff and the Inspector General developed plans to cover the duties both of their own divisions and the special staff divisions prior to the submission of their respective plans.

c. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, supervised the planning of divisions concerning education, athletics, recreation, military justice, fiscal procedures, army exchange service, chaplain activities, claims, and graves registration. The major effort of G-1 Division was in developing plans for categorization of units, readjustment of personnel, and establishment of the reinforcement system.

d. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, supervised the planning as it related to counterintelligence, industrial intelligence, censorship, and the examination of captured enemy material.

e. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, supervised the planning for movement, organization, equipping and training of troops, and the development of a system for maintenance and revision of the Theater occupational troop basis. He co-operated with other staff divisions in making plans for an assembly area and the categorization of units.

f. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, supervised the planning for the redeployment materials. The main part of this was the planning for transportation, which was especially complicated because the transportation facilities already had heavy commitments for the movement

of displaced persons, prisoners of war, and the sick and wounded. Another function of the G-4 Division was the responsibility for the development of a standing operating procedure for use by individual unit commanders. This document was to give instructions in the preparation and movement of troops, equipment, and supplies from unit stations, through the assembly and staging areas to the ports for embarkation and movement overseas. G-4 also supervised the planning for civil affairs and installations and other requirements needed for the completion of the G-4 Division's work in the Theater.

g. The Inspector General developed the plans for insuring that redeployment responsibilities charged to the Theater Commander by the War Department were fulfilled. The plan was to include provisions for determining the status of training, administration, equipment, and supply of the units being redeployed.

h. All the foregoing plans were to be submitted to the Redeployment Planning Group by 10 February 1945.

9. Major Problems in the Development of Policy.

a. Categorization. During the planning period two main questions presented themselves for settlement. The first of these, which concerned categorization, arose shortly after the formation of the Redeployment Planning Group; it was not solved until the middle of January. During December 1944, the G-1 Division of Theater Headquarters pointed out

weakness in classifying units on the basis of length of service overseas. Many units old in overseas service had had a large turnover of personnel. There were many units which had been overseas for a long time but had more troops with shorter periods of overseas service than some units which had more recently come overseas. The G-1 Division recommended that units be placed in a category only after an analysis of the scores of the men had been made. The G-1 Division further recommended that units having the largest percentage of men with critical scores should be placed in Category IV; those having the highest percentage of men with low scores in Category II; and those units having the highest percentage of men with scores in the middle range, in Category I. There was one basic reason for G-1 Division's choice of this plan of categorization. The War Department had made the commanding generals of Theaters and major commands responsible for the maintenance of operational efficiency. This, in effect, limited the amount of readjustment that could be accomplished within some units. G-1 held that combat efficiency could be achieved by cutting personnel readjustments to a minimum and the other general staff divisions concurred with minor changes. The plan as amended was dispatched to Washington by cable.(24) The War Department approved it in part. It disapproved that portion which recommended postponing categorization until after announcement of the critical score. As it was necessary to start shipping units immediately after the cessation of hostilities, some units, in order to prepare for shipment, would have to be categorized before V-E Day. Therefore a temporary expedient was adopted by Theater

Headquarters. All units to be shipped before V-E Day and within a month thereafter would be categorized according to length of service overseas, while those that were to ship at a later period would be categorized according to the plan of the G-1 Division.(25) The War Department established the priority for demobilization of the three types of army units. Army of the United States organizations, other than National Guard units and Regular Army, received first priority on demobilization. National Guard organizations were next in line for demobilization and Regular Army organizations came last.(26)

b. Assembly Areas.(27) The second question was whether an assembly area was needed. When the Redeployment Planning Directive No. 1. was written, the authors assumed that there would be one or more assembly areas. The responsibility for determining the locations of the areas, the facilities that would be required, and the date that the areas should be available had been assigned to the G-1 Division, though unconvinced that there was a real need for assembly areas, conceded that such an installation would be the best place for completion of readjustment where time prohibited this prior to movement from the unit station. On the other hand, G-4 thought that a real need existed for assembly areas. Representatives of the G-4 Division pointed out that an installation for processing troops would promote efficiency and would provide an even flow of troops to the staging areas, which would save time and shipping space. The representatives of the other staff divisions finally concurred, and

the plan for the assembly area was adopted. The assembly area was conceived as an area in which units to be redeployed would be assembled for processing, adjustment of equipment, and the transfer of individuals to suitable units.(28)

10. Changes in Theater Planning Machinery.

Before the publication of the first draft of a Theater basic plan, the Redeployment Planning Group was dissolved and the officers serving with it returned to their respective general staff divisions. A new agency known as the Redeployment Planning Committee was established on 8 March 1945. It was composed of the senior planning office of each general staff division, and was under the chairmanship of Brigadier General George S. Eyster, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.(29) At the same time, the Theater Commander directed most of the general and special staff divisions to form redeployment planning groups whose function would be to prepare plans for their respective divisions on all aspects of redeployment and readjustment.(30)

11. The Publication of the Theater Plan (First Draft).

The European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment was published the third week in March 1945.(31) It was the result of the work done by the Redeployment Group and was based on War Department publications(32), plans submitted by staff divisions of Theater Headquarters in compliance with the Redeployment Planning Directive No. 1.

and on the answers to questions which Colonel Riley had taken to Washington. This plan, commonly referred to as "Basic Plan, First Draft," was much the same as the plan described in Stars and Stripes the previous September(33), but was expanded in form. It promulgated existing War Department instructions and prescribed the basic procedures and policies governing the action of the major command. It was distributed only to general and special staff divisions and major commanders. Chiefs of special staff divisions, in compliance with the instructions contained in the letter of transmittal(34), forwarded their suggestions for revisions to the chiefs of general staff divisions having supervision over them. The chiefs of general staff divisions consolidated the approved revisions and turned them in to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, by 9 April 1945. Major commanders, in view of the fact that V-E Day was believed to be imminent, were directed to prepare tentative plans for redeployment and readjustment within their commands. Comments concerning the basic plan required from the major commands by 10 April 1945.

FINAL PLANNING PRIOR TO V-E DAY AND PREPARATION OF THEATER PLAN

12. Reallocation of Redeployment Responsibilities.

The Theater could have started the redeployment of troops at any time after the publication of its basic plan, with annexes, for redeployment.

Before revising the plan for actual use, Theater Headquarters issued a short directive reassigning Theater level responsibilities for redeployment planning and implementation.(35)

a. Responsibility for Policy Changes. The planning for policy changes turned out to be rather complicated, for all papers were routed through several agencies before final approval was given. This routing was necessary since redeployment matters affected all Army activities and no Army activity could take place without affecting redeployment. The responsibility for actual formulation of future redeployment planning policy, including policy on readjustment of personnel as contemplated in War Department publications, was charged to the United States element of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. This was a temporary arrangement, and, upon the establishment of a Theater headquarters separate from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, these duties were to be transferred to that organization. Any recommended policy-change first had to be cleared through the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, European Theater of Operations United States Army, whose office for that purpose was at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Headquarters. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Division, United States element of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force coordinated the proposal with other pending policy changes. Finally, the policy planning was sent to the Theater Commander for approval.

b. Responsibilities of Commanding General, Communications Zone.

The Commanding General, Communications Zone, was charged with the duty of developing the detailed redeployment plan, including readjustment of personnel, and to implement as necessary the plans and general policies which were developed by the Theater Commander and promulgated by the United States element of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. He further was directed to provide "on the job" training, where practicable, for all types of service units which had been designated for redeployment. Cooperation with the Commanding General, 6th Army Group and the Commanding General United States Strategic Air Forces was necessary in the training mission. The Commanding General, Communications Zone, after the issue of Theater movement orders, was responsible for the moving, processing, and equipping of all units, except flight echelons of the Air Force moving by air, and assumed full responsibility for scheduling the outflow of all units moving from this Theater. The Commanding General of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe was directed to perform the same duties for the flight echelons of the air force units moving by air.

c. Responsibilities of the Commanding General, 6th Army Group.

The Commanding General, 6th Army Group was charged with supervising all training during the redeployment period. Specifically he was to train all ground forces which had been designated for redeployment, unless excluded from training by order of the Theater Commander. He was responsible, too,

for the conversion training and training of Category IV ground force units for which there was, at the time, no operational use. The development of training areas and facilities in order to execute the mission of training was at the discretion of the Commanding Generals of 6th Army Group, Communications Zone, and United States Strategic Air Force in Europe. Excessive personnel changes made it difficult to train and keep a unit in condition to perform its primary mission. Therefore, as a check, it was determined that reports should be made to the Theater Commander, prior to each unit's redeployment, of the status of training of that unit. The Commanding General, 6th Army Group, made the report of units assigned to him for training and the Commanding General United States Strategic Air Forces made the reports on units for which he was responsible.

d. Responsibilities of Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe. The Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe performed the same duties for his command as did the Commanding General for the Communications Zone. He was charged with the implementation of the Theater basic plan, including readjustment of personnel, insofar as it affected air force units. He was responsible for planning the organization of training areas and facilities for his own troops training, the organization of training for troops being redeployed and also for his own Category IV units for which there was no operational use. For "on the job training" of service units assigned to the air forces which were to be redeployed, the Commanding General United States

Strategic Air Forces in Europe coordinated with the Commanding General, 6th Army Group and the Commanding General of the Communications Zone.

13. Establishment of the Redeployment Coordinating Group.

a. All the agencies assigned redeployment duties were also involved in carrying out actual military operations during the last weeks of hostilities in Europe and in planning and putting into effect programs concerned with the final surrender of the enemy and a multitude of other duties in the coordination of redeployment efforts. For this purpose the Redeployment Coordinating Group was organized as a division of the special staff of European Theater of Operations, United States Army, with Colonel Miles W. Brewster, General Staff Corps, of G-3 Division assigned as Chief.(36)

b. The group was to operate directly under the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, General (then Major General) Lucius D. Clay. Its purpose was not to plan or organize redeployment activities, but rather "to keep the Theater Commander fully informed as to the status of redeployment and readjustment, and to make recommendations as may be necessary to increase the efficiency of redeployment and readjustment procedures."(37) To carry out these activities the group was divided into several branches, as follows: personnel and readjustment and related G-1 Division procedures, supply and related G-4 Division activities, operations and related G-3 Division procedures, Air Force redeployment, and lastly, a reports and statistics division.(38)

14. Developing the Theater Plan and its Annexes.

a. As the Theater Commander had directed that nothing should interfere with combat operations, the basic plan was not distributed, for comments or suggestions, to combat units below army group. This not only left many combat units without knowledge of redeployment plans, but also deprived the planning committee of suggestions from combat commanders. The Redeployment Planning Committee had at hand recent War Department directives(39), the comments and suggestions of the general staff divisions of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations United States Army and the Communications Zone, and of the major commands. These were of assistance in the preparation of a second draft of the plan, which was issued under the title of Tentative European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment on 21 April 1945.(40)

b. The April plan was declared to be in effect, pending War Department approval.(41) As was the case with the first draft, the tentative plan was not sent to units below army group. Major commanders and chiefs of general and special divisions again were requested to submit suggestions for improvement. Major commanders were also directed to complete their detailed plans and to transmit them to Theater Headquarters by 15 May 1945. The imminence of V-E Day was seen, however, and major commanders were redirected to submit their plans by 10 May 1945.

c. At the direction of the Chief of Staff the tentative plan was flown to Washington for submission to the War Department. Approval

was granted by the War Department on 2 May 1945, but with the reservation that there would be made a revision to incorporate recent War Department publications.(42) These included plans for inter-Theater movements and plans for readjustment of officers. These changes were worked into the Theater directive as it went into effect on 12 May 1945(43) and as published three days later(44), except that the third and ninth annexes were not completed at that time. Annex No. 3.

Preparation for Overseas Movement Redeployment, a basic directive to insure uniform and prompt preparation of units for overseas movement, was published 19 May 1945.(45) It gave unit Commanders detailed instructions to be followed in the preparation of their organizations for redeployment. This plan was mainly the work of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Division, Headquarters European Theater of Operations United States Army, with G-1 Division preparing the administrative provisions and G-3 Division preparing the movements section. Annex No. 9, Supply Procedure for Overseas Movement, was published on 13 June 1945.(46) It covered the entire supply problem, outlining the processes both for the supply of redeploying troops and also for redeployment of supplies.

PLANNING FOR TROOP OUTFLOW

15. War Department Plans for Troop Outflow.

- a. The first planning of the War Department to reach the

Theater arrived in October 1944.(47) At that time the War Department estimated that 450,000 troops would leave the European and North African Theaters during the first three months after the cessation of hostilities. For each succeeding quarter it was planned that 600,000 troops would leave at the rate of 200,000 per month. While these figures included the outflow for both North African and European Theaters of Operations it was definitely stated that the European Theater of Operations would not be responsible for the redeployment of units in the North African Theater except for units which might in the future be transferred from that Theater to the European Theater for both operational and administrative control. The European Theater did not make definite plans on these estimates because of many obscure elements.

b. In January, still in uncertainty about exact War Department requirements, the Theater sent a cable recommending that the War Department furnish a redeployment outflow chart, phased quarterly, with the first quarter being broken down into two forty-five day periods. These figures were to be computed on the planned occupational troop basis for the Theater--not yet available except at War Department level.(48)

c. The cable arrived in Washington just as the War Department was preparing a document to be entitled Redeployment Forecast which would cover the information requested. This document, an analysis of the needs of all Theaters, was the plan for complete reallocation of

troops on the basis of the needs of the various Theaters. This reallocation was to be accomplished through a schedule of activations, inactivations, and transfers. These were necessary to bring about the transition from the troop basis in effect to the planned troop basis to be put into effect upon the termination of the war in Europe. The forecast consisted of a monthly scheduled build-up of units by type and number in the active Theaters. The plan was also a schedule of monthly withdrawals of units by number and type from the then inactive Theaters by both direct and indirect redeployment and direct shipment to the United States for disbandment. Those units remaining in inactive Theaters were assigned by number and type to occupational duties or scheduled for reorganization and redesignation, upon completion of which they were to be recategorized for occupational duties or an active theater of war.(49) The forecast was published a month later in sections, the portion applicable to the European Theater of Operations being entitled *Redeployment Forecast--Atlantic Section*.(50) All computations of troop outflow were made only by number and type. The actual unit to fill the quota of units of each type in each category was to be chosen by the Theater commanders in accordance with principles and policies of categorization as set up by the War Department.

16. Theater Plans for Troop Outflow.

a. Redeployment Flow Chart. The information applicable to the European Theater of Operations was incorporated into a chart

published in April 1945, as the Redeployment Flow Chart. (51) This chart, like the War Department forecast upon which it was based, was not a stable document but was subject to continued revision and periodic change due to the War Department's amendments and varying conception of needs arising from war plans and results in the Pacific. The Redeployment Flow Chart assigned every unit in the Theater, by number and type, to a particular category. Categories II and III were scheduled by number and type to leave the Theater during a particular month of the following year. All Category II allocations of units were further grouped as to the Theater of destination: the Pacific Ocean Area, the China-Burma-India Area, the Southwest Pacific Area, or the United States. The exact destination of units was not given, but it was planned that the next issue of the flow chart would contain this information. The Category III block of units appeared in both the main part of the flow chart and also in an annex. In the "Conversion Program for AGF," the units were blocked off as to the number and type to be converted, reorganized, or redesignated. (52)

b. Redeployment Forecast of Readiness. Shortly after the publication of the Redeployment Flow Chart, the Theater issued its Top Secret Redeployment Forecast Readiness. (53) The forecast was a schedule of units by name that were to leave the Theater within the first three months after the cessation of hostilities. In view of the fact that at this time no adjusted service rating scores were available, the choosing of specific units was done on the basis of length of service in the

Theater. The last units to arrive in the Theater were scheduled to leave first on shipments going directly to the Pacific. Some changes had been made since the publication of the Redeployment Flow Chart, but in most cases the total first quarter requirements remained the same; the variation between the two documents lay mostly in the acceleration of flow within the first quarters. The chart was issued only to Theater, army group, and Communications Zone level. Those headquarters, in compliance with directions, made plans for the preparation of unit departures at the times designated in the Redeployment Forecast of Readiness. Major Headquarters could recommend that certain units be deferred from shipment, but as a guide the following policy was stated, "Since this Theater will be considered mainly as a source of units for active theaters, only the most sound and detailed justification will be considered in deferring any units scheduled for redeployment. . . ." (54)

c. The plan for redistribution of troops in the European Theater of Operations is illustrated in Chart I.


RECOGNITION OF MORALE FACTOR DURING PLANNING

17. General Marshall and General Eisenhower Emphasize Morale Factors.

a. The question of morale was weighed and considered during

CHART I
 PLANS FOR UTILIZATION OF THEATER STRENGTH

8 May 1945



Source of Statistics: Chart, prepared by Troops and Redeployment Branch, G-3 Division, USFET, and published in Special Theater Activities, Summary by Headquarters, USFET for the Undersecretary of War, 25 Mar 46, p 48.

the planning. About three weeks before V-E Day, General Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army, requested that General Eisenhower make plans for returning a maximum number of personnel with high adjusted service rating scores immediately after the cessation of hostilities. General Marshall contemplated the use of air as well as water transportation in order to return the men quickly and in large numbers. He felt it necessary to emphasize the importance of morale and public relations. In his message to General Eisenhower he directed that return be initiated prior to the application of readjustment and expressed concern, saying,

I fear that the weight of public opinion in the United States will be such that unless the task is handled properly we may be forced to take measures that will interfere with redeployment and result in prolongation of the Japanese War(55)

He reiterated that men must be discharged promptly and that these men were to be selected with great care, adding,

I think it is very important from a psychological point of view that the first shipment of men to be demobilized should be drawn from combat troops...deepest in Germany, resorting to air transport service to get them to points of ship embarkation, if necessary.(56)

b. General Eisenhower was in full accord with General Marshall's statements, and in his answer emphasized that "the soldier must be convinced that the system is fair and impartial,"(57) General Eisenhower in a personal letter to Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, Commanding

General of the Communications Zone transmitted the ideas of General Marshall on redeployment. He outlined the serious consequences of morale and human relations stressing the importance of fairness and speed in getting the men out of the Theater. Lack of fairness and speed, he pointed out, would result in low morale, and develop an unfavorable attitude towards the Army, resulting in loss of prestige therefor. (58) This was the underlying purpose of the education and orientation program as directed by the War Department and Theater Headquarters in their publications. It was necessary to build up in the individual soldier an understanding of the need for fighting Japan and to show him why his service in the European Theater did not complete his military obligations. The occupational soldier, too, needed to be informed of the necessity of occupying Germany. The Theater used Armed Forces Network, motion pictures, Stars and Stripes, Yank, and other educational facilities as the means for combatting rumors and keeping the men fully informed as to what they could expect from the Army and what the Army expected of them.

c. In American newspapers there was an effort to inform the public of the responsibilities of the Army, and to prepare the people for the reality that relatively few of the European Theater veterans could be discharged.

d. With this background of careful planning in all phases, the European Theater of Operations was able to start redeployment of troops

systematically upon the announcement from General Marshall that Redeployment (R-Day)--the day upon which redeployment and readjustment regulations would go into effect--was 12 May 1945.

Chapter II
REDEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES
AND
OPERATIONS PRIOR TO V-J DAY

READJUSTMENT

18. General.


The War Department, had, by V-E Day committed itself to a world-wide program of demobilization on an individual merit basis rather than on a unit merit basis. This necessitated the release of many men from the service, yet compelled the United States Army to maintain the strength and efficiency of units destined for use in the Pacific area. For this purpose there was instituted a program of personnel readjustment involving the transfer of men eligible for discharge out of units scheduled for further service and into units which were not needed for the prosecution of the war; it further involved the transfer of men ineligible for discharge from units not needed in the war to units which were scheduled for further service. This program by War Department Order, was begun on 12 May 1945. (1)

CHART II

PERSONNEL READJUSTMENT


STEP I

WITHIN MAJOR COMMANDS




STEP II

ACCOMPLISHED BY GROUND FORCE REINFORCEMENT COMMAND



STEP III

ACCOMPLISHED BY ASSEMBLY AREA COMMANDER BY REQUISITIONING ON GFRG



PROCESS OF PERSONNEL READJUSTMENT

FLOW OF UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS

UNCLASSIFIED




CHART III

19. Readjustment -- Phase I.

a. Point Values Announced.(2) Phase I of readjustment commenced with the announcement of the interim critical score as 38 for enlisted men and 44 for enlisted women. At the same time came the announcement of point values for factors contributing toward eligibility for discharge. These values were established as follows: length of service, one point for each month of service since 16 September 1940; overseas service, one point for each month of overseas army service since 16 September 1940; combat time, five points for each award of the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Legion of Merit, the Silver Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Soldier's Medal, the Bronze Star, the Air Medal, the Purple Heart, and each battle participation; parenthood, 12 points for each child under 18 years of age, for as many as three children. Because unit commanders were confused concerning the amounts of credit to be given for certain medals it was established on 15 May 1945 that credit would not be given for the following: Meritorious service unit plaque, unit citation, bronze service arrowhead, stars on American Defense Service Ribbon, Theater commander or unit commander certificates of merit.(3)

b. Adjusted Service Rating (ASR) Score. The total number of points that an individual accumulated under the point system was known as his adjusted service rating (ASR) score. On 12 May 1945 all units in the Theater filled out adjusted service rating score cards on every man in the unit(4), and turned the cards in to the servicing machine

records unit. These reports, in turn, were consolidated and sent to Theater Headquarters. After another consolidation, the scores of all men in the Theater were sent to the War Department in Washington. Based on these reports the War Department established the critical score at 85 for enlisted men and 44 for enlisted women.(5) Married females, regardless of service, score, or military necessity continued to be discharged on request if their husbands had already returned to civilian life.(6) The War Department also continued its recently inaugurated policy of discharging enlisted personnel over 42 years of age.(7) All enlisted personnel with scores equal to or above the critical score automatically became eligible for discharge. Individuals having a scarce military occupational specialty number were declared essential and retained in the service regardless of their scores. Thus, in the final analysis, it was military necessity alone which determined whether the individual was to be discharged.(8)

c. Categorization of Units. After the announcement of the interim critical score, categorization of units within the Theater was begun. Prior to this announcement, as requirements for Category II units were received from the War Department, needed units designated as Category II on the basis of their most recent departure from the United States. After the announcement of the critical score, normal categorization procedures were carried out. Based upon the critical score, and the War Department Forecast(9), which requested specific numbers of each

type of unit for various theaters. the Theater Headquarters started categorizing all its units. This categorization of each unit depended upon its component, whether it was composed of White or Negro troops, and its length of overseas service. The main criteria, however, was an outgrowth of the idea that there should be a minimum of personnel shifting among the Theater's units. Thus, units containing the largest percentage of high score personnel were categorized as Category IV units, units having the largest percentage of low score personnel were Category II; those having the largest percentage of low score personnel after all Category II units were designated became Category I or III. It was hoped that this principle of categorization would preserve to a maximum extent the efficiency of the units. The categorization list was published on 5 June 1945.(10) There were five amendments to it.(11)

20. Phase II of Readjustment: From Categorization until All Category II Units had left the Theater.

a. Readjustment Within Major Commands.(12) The first step in the actual shifting of personnel took place at the unit station. The Theater readjustment plan contemplated that the major portion of readjustment would be completed by the major commands. This was to avoid the inevitable difficulties that would accompany a highly centralized reshuffling of personnel with resultant excessive physical movement of individuals. Each major commander was responsible that a maximum readjustment was made between the units assigned or attached to his command.

be readjusted to the greatest possible extent within limits of the available "essentials" having the proper military occupational specialty numbers and physical qualifications. If all essentials were moved from a unit it sailed at two percent overstrength. If the unit sailed incompletely readjusted it carried a ten percent overstrength to take care of future readjustment losses.(13) The major unit commanders also during this period converted his Category III units to Category I or II as directed by Theater Headquarters. After the major unit commanders had completed their readjustment, which as originally planned would have taken about 30 days, each Category I and II unit submitted to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command a Readjustment Inventory Report, by unit, on enlisted personnel, indicating the net number of essentials remaining in each Category IV unit, by branch, grade, military occupational specialty number, race, and physical qualifications. Upon call by Theater Headquarters, each Category I, II, and III unit submitted a requisition for the essentials required to replace all candidates remaining therein, to fill vacancies and to bring the unit to its authorized overstrength.(14)

b. Readjustment by Ground Forces Reinforcement Command. The second step of readjustment was also completed at the unit station. This consisted of readjustment procedures in the hands of the Commanding General of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, who completed the readjustment of personnel of various units, in the order of the units, priorities for outmovement from the Theater. Category II units scheduled

for early direct redeployment-by-passing the assembly area--were readjusted prior to movement to the staging area, and Category II units were readjusted prior to the beginning of their redeployment training period. Category IV units were to be readjusted just prior to their movement to the assembly area; before V-J Day no Category IV units moved to the assembly area. Normally the Ground Force Reinforcement Command readjusted units by the assignment of personnel from its pool of reinforcements. The pool of reinforcements was replenished by calling on Category IV units for essentials and by the receipt of candidates from Category I, II, and III units. These transfers of individuals were from unit to unit, without the necessity for personnel to pass through the Ground Force Reinforcement Command.(15)

c. Readjustment at the Assembly Area Command. When the Ground Force Reinforcement Command had finished its part of the readjustment program, the units were supposed to be ready for the redeployment. A third step, however, was placed in the system as a precautionary measure. Step III of Phase II started as soon as the unit arrived in the assembly area. Here the Assembly Area Command accomplished a last minute cleanup of readjustments not completed elsewhere and the weeding out of any non-essentials from Category II units. Supposedly the Assembly Area Command would have only a few readjustments per unit; and these would be replacements of candidate personnel not previously released, and the withdrawal

of essential personnel from Category IV units and replacing them with candidates. Actually, however, as the units were not properly readjusted when they arrived in the assembly area, a terrific job fell to the Assembly Area Command. The readjustment was accomplished by the Assembly Area Command requisitioning from the Ground Force Reinforcement Command.(16)

21. Phase III of Readjustment: To Have Been Accomplished After All Category II Units Had Left the Theater.

The final readjustment of remaining units, and their shipment of Category IV units from the Theater would have taken place after the last Category II unit had left the Theater.(17) Plans were made obsolete, however, by the termination of the war in the Pacific; this occurred before all Category II units had departed.

22. Readjustment of Officers.

Officers and enlisted personnel were readjusted in much the same manner. For officer readjustment, the following deviations from the rules were in effect.

a. An effort was made to correct malassignments in the case of officers, particularly where units were employed in the Theater in other than their normal missions and officers had been assigned thereto without regard to the military occupational specialty numbers called for by the proper Table of Organization.

b. The War Department did not establish a critical score for officers, but in order to provide a guide for officer personnel readjustment, Theater Headquarters established a Theater Eligibility Score of 85 for male officers and 59 for WAC officers(18), for officers other than those assigned to the Air Force. It was emphasized that the score was only a guide. At the time an officer's adjusted service rating forms were completed he was instructed that his total credits and his desires were subordinate to military necessity in determining whether he was to be released or retained. The adjusted service rating score was given consideration as an aid and guide in making decisions, especially in the case of officers with lengthy overseas service and with long and hazardous combat duty. But in any case where an officer's release would have impaired materially the efficiency of the organization in performing its primary mission the officer was denied separation. There was a mistaken belief among many officers that the Theater Eligibility Score of 85 or better entitled them to a discharge from the service. The failure to establish a firm redeployment and discharge policy for commissioned personnel contributed toward a low state of morale among some officers in the Theater.(19)

23. Readjustment of Medical Department Officers.

a. The readjustment of medical officers presented a special problem and was the subject of much correspondence during the entire redeployment period. At first it was thought that medical officers could

not be discharged in accordance with the regulations for other officers. On 7 June the War Department informed the Theater that Medical Corps officers would be readjusted as other officers, but that mounting hospital loads in the Zone of the Interior prevented the arrival of replacements. This, coupled with the lack of shipping space, made it likely that only a small number of medical officers would be returned before the end of the year. Special consideration was to be given to Medical Corps officers if they were over 50 years of age and did not possess a special skill needed by the Army.(20)

b. A number of reasons had contributed to the Medical Department situation. Theater availability of certain Medical Corps specialists was insufficient to meet all redeployment requirements under the existing Table of Organization and Equipment. This was due to gradations of qualifications in specialties and maladjustments under Tables of Organization that were made to meet special operational requirements.(21)

c. In July, to compensate on redeployment requirements for 1,000 Medical officers who were at the time being furnished by the War Department by air shipment as individuals, the Theater listed units that were to ship short of medical officers.(22) At the end of July the War Department had decided to return 7,000 doctors and nurses to civilian practice. This brought about a situation that, except for V-J Day, would have caused medical units being indirectly redeployed to ship short of personnel.(23)

24. Female Readjustment.

a. In general the readjustment policies applicable to male personnel whose husbands had been separated from the service were also separated upon application. The immediate commanding officer of the female concerned was responsible that proof was obtained in the form of a photostatic or certified copy of the husband's certificate of discharge of certificate of service. Separation of the husband may have occurred at any time after 16 September 1940. The date of marriage was not considered in determining the wife's eligibility.

b. Women's Army Corps redeployment plans were based on the assumption that WAC personnel were not to be redeployed to any other Theater.(24) Small groups of enlisted women with over 70 points departed for the Zone of the Interior in July. At that time it was anticipated that inshipments of members of the Women's Army Corps would continue to arrive monthly. The War Department later decided to discontinue shipping members of the Women's Army Corps to this Theater and the last shipment arrived in August. This lack of replacements made it necessary to "freeze" about 1,500 essential enlisted women--clerk typists, stenographers, teletypewriters and telephone operators--whose adjusted service rating score ranged from 44 to 112 points.(25) This action made little difference, inasmuch as V-J Day released the women from the freeze.

25. Headquarters of Two-Theater Veterans.

At General Eisenhower's personal request a policy was set up whereby a combat veteran of two Theaters was not sent to the Pacific.(26) In effecting personnel readjustment of enlisted personnel under redeployment procedures, no combat soldier who fought in actual combat in both the European and North African Theaters of Operations, even though he had an adjusted service rating score below the critical score, was assigned against his will to a Category II units. Such men were removed from Category I units and assigned to the Army of Occupation. For determining combat status under this policy, the North African Theater was constructed to include the Continent of Africa, Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and Italy. The term combat soldier included any man who had been awarded a battle participation star for campaigns in each Theater. This policy applied only to enlisted men.(27)

26. Volunteers.

After the critical score was known, Theater Headquarters announced that personnel with adjusted service rating scores equal to or above the critical score and who had satisfactory records could remain in the service. Such personnel volunteered with the understanding that their decisions were irrevocable and that they could not again until after the defeat of Japan, be considered for separation under readjustment regulations.(28)

27. Readjustment Difficulties.

a. The problem of readjustment was a never ending one. Much time and work were required to readjust a unit and get it ready to leave the Theater. Then, too often, time was lacking to complete the job before the movement orders sent the unit on its way. Often after a unit was readjusted it would be awarded another battle star and then readjustment had to be accomplished all over again. For this, and other reasons, there was always some unit which was unable to be in a state of perfect adjustment when it started through the pipeline.(29)

b. By 6 July the Theater had abandoned the policy of trying to complete readjustment within 30 days as originally planned. Readjustment of personnel now became recognized as being a continuous process. It was accomplished on a unit basis in the order of priority for out-movement from the Theater. In order to accomplish the readjustment on a skill-for-skill basis, Category II units were authorized to draw personnel from a later-moving Category II reserve unit or from a Category I unit. By the latter part of July, while Theater Headquarters was planning for the new basic plan, it was decided that it would be possible to complete readjustment by 1 September.(30) Later this estimate was changed for some units to 1 October 1945.(31)

28. Attempts to Lower the Critical Score.

a. One of the complicating factors in readjustment was the realization in Theater Headquarters that the critical score might be

lowered. During June the War Department informed Theater that all individuals with scores below the critical score were available for any necessary assignment.(32) Despite this, Theater adopted the policy of adjusting units when possible to the 75 point level, to preclude the necessity for further readjustment in the event that the War Department should later order the score to be lowered.(33) Particularly was this 75-point level used with units being redeployed directly to the Pacific.(34) These instructions were not given any publicity among the troops.

b. The Theater did not want the critical score lowered. It told the War Department that any lowering of the critical score would critically upset readjustment in the Theater. It was pointed out that there were hundreds of thousands of troops in or enroute to the assembly areas and staging areas. An announcement of a lowered score would have necessitated a major readjustment just prior to embarkation of units destined for the Pacific.(35) The lowering of the score to 75 would have increased the number of men eligible for discharge in the middle of July from 150,000 to 300,000. Included in this 300,000 would have been critical specialists in the Ordnance Service, Signal Corps, Transportation Corps, and the Corps of Engineers.(36) The Theater requested, on the basis of the problem that would arise in readjustment here, that if there were to be any lowering of the critical score, especially if it were more than a point or two, that the announcement

be deferred until 1 November.(37) For the time being, there was no lowering of the score. Announcement by the War Department of retention of the critical score at 85 for the next few months made readjustment procedures firm, and during August readjustment difficulties began to clear up.(38)

29. Critical Military Occupational Specialty Numbers.

a. On 15 May the War Department sent to the Theater a list of skills critically needed by the Army.(39) Enlisted personnel qualified as skilled or semi-skilled in one or more of the following civilian or military occupational specialties were considered essential under the provisions of "military necessity" and were not eligible for separation regardless of their adjusted service rating scores:

077	Powerhouse engineer (with at least 2 years civilian experience in power station or as substation operator)
080	Marine engineer
187	Repeaterman, TP
267	Translator (Asiatic languages)
320	Interpreter (Asiatic languages)
366	Orthopedic mechanic
538	Voice interceptor (Asiatic languages)
543	Radio intelligence control chief
709	Traffic analyst (radio)

739	Intercept operator (signal)
760	Radio operator, AACCS
790	Weather observer--TT technician
798	Transmitter attendant, fixed station
799	Intercept operator, fixed station
801	Cryptographic repairman (Class I and Class II)
808	Cryptanalysis technician
852	Radar mechanic, RCM
952	Radar repairman, gun-laying equipment (instructor)
953	Radar repairman, reporting equipment (instructor)
---	Acoustic technician (hearing aid specialist)
---	Electroencephalographic specialist

The last two specialists were not identifiable by any one specialty serial number. Careful examination of all qualification data was required in those cases.(40)

b. In addition to the War Department list of critically needed specialists the Theater found it necessary to declare certain other personnel essential. By the middle of June the shortage of office workers caused the stenographer (213) and the clerk-typist (405) to be put on the critical list.(41) By 2 July this list included the court reporter (280), tabulating machine operator (425), and the power house engineer (077).(42) On 30 July the following 20 categories were added

to the list of critically needed specialists in the Theater in the Army
Ground Forces and Army Service Forces: (43)

013	Diesel mechanic
039	Cable splicer, TP and TG
042	Camera repairman
095	Central office repairman
096	Installer repairman, TP and TG
098	Instrument repairman, non-electric
166	Powerman
206	Sound projector repairman
207	Sound recording equipment maintenance man
237	Teletypewriter operator
238	Lineman, TP and TG
239	Teletype mechanic
338	Instrument repairman, electrical
581	Signal supply technician
646	Telephone and telegraph equipment repairman
648	Radio repairman
649	Radio repairman, fixed station
650	Telephone switchboard operator
805	Cryptographic technician
806	Code clerk

30. Boards of Review.

a. Boards of review were established at the particular direction of General Marshall. Major commands established boards at levels not lower than a division or its equivalent, and operated them under the provisions of Army Regulation 420-5. These boards were instituted to examine the cases of individuals for discharge by reason of their adjusted service rating score, but who were held in the Army because of "military necessity." During early redeployment the responsibility for convening the board rested with the major command preparing the unit for redeployment. During normal procedures the Assembly Area Command maintained a board for units passing through the assembly area, while major commands maintained boards for units not passing through the Assembly Area Command. Each board consisted of selected mature officers, over one half of each board consisting of field grade officers. The board of review declared the individuals concerned surplus or upheld their retention in the Army, due to lack of available replacements or to the immediate operation requirement for the service of the individual. Individuals who were declared surplus by the board were assigned to Category IV units or sent to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command. Reports were submitted to Theater Headquarters in the case of all individuals whose retention in the service was approved by the board, together with a brief statement of the facts which justified such retention. At no time did board action prevent the sailing of a Category II unit.(44)

b. On 9 July 1945 it was announced that officers, too, who had a critical score of 85 or more would be entitled to appear before a board of review upon their own request. Every officer was advised that the decision of the board was wholly dependent upon the availability of a qualified replacement. No officer was to be removed from his unit solely so that he could appear before a board of review.(45)

31. Priorities in Readjustment Movements.(46)

a. Category II units received first priority on personnel in all readjustment movements, in the order of the units' appearance in the Redeployment Forecast of Readiness. Second priority was given to Category III units which were to be changed to Category II units. Third priority was given Category I units, and fourth priority to Category III units which were to become Category I units.

b. Candidates were held in Category II units after the arrival of essential personnel, and the units often existed at temporary over-strength not exceeding 10 percent of the authorized strength, for the purpose of orderly transition, particularly in the case of key specialists. Candidates were not held beyond the minimum period required to effect orderly transition after the arrival of essential personnel.

c. Primary consideration was given in readjustment to military occupational specialty numbers. Where possible, replacement was made

in the grade required, but a difference in grade between the current status of the replacement and the rating carried by the new position was not cause for failure to effect a transfer. Grades and military occupational specialty numbers were immaterial in Category IV units. All Category IV units were to be filled to 150 percent overstrength without regard to grades and military occupational specialty numbers.

TYPES OF REDEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES

32. General.

General McArthur's needs in the Pacific drew upon the Theater's manpower supply with an urgency that had denied even a breathing spell between combat and redeployment. McArthur had requested 17 combat divisions. These divisions all were going by normal indirect redeployment, but had to be processed immediately in order that they might be returned to Zone of the Interior, where all men would complete their furloughs, and the units would finish training, and arrive in the Pacific in time for the invasion of Kyushu on 1 November. Of even more pressing importance was the need in the Pacific of signal, engineer, harbor, depot, and other service troops. These troops must be sent in large numbers immediately if preparations for the invasion were to be made on time. Postponement of the invasion after 1 November would mean, because of adverse weather normally encountered after 1 November,

CHART IV

INDIRECT REDEPLOYMENT FLOW OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT





CHART V
DIRECT REDEPLOYMENT
FLOW OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT



waiting until the spring of 1946. This would have been extremely costly both in money and lives and would needlessly prolong the war.(49)

33. Early Direct Redeployment Procedures.

a. In order to meet these urgent service troops requirements a special set of procedures, called Early Redeployment Procedures were developed. Units redeployed under this plan were processed directly to the Pacific Area through the port of Marseilles. Delta Base Section, was responsible for the entire processing of such units.(50)

b. Units selected for this type of redeployment were normally those which had most recently left the Zone of the Interior and would therefore have a large percentage of men with low adjusted service rating scores. Many units left before readjustment procedures were well under way, so units were adjusted only by the removal of men whose point scores were over 85.(51)

c. Delta Base Section was entirely responsible for the redeployment of these units. It was responsible for the operation of the staging assembly and pre-storage areas, loading of convoys, and for full documentation in accordance with War Department requirements. With the use of Theater Overseas Movement Orders and the Movement Priority Lists, Delta Base Section called units forward as required. After the call the unit left its station and moved by road and rail at this time. Little or none of its equipment was packed for overseas movement and it had the

normal amount of unserviceable equipment and shortages. The Delta Base Section performed third and higher echelon repair and replaced such items as necessary in order to insure full combat serviceability of all authorized items of Table of Organization and Equipment and Table of Equipment 21 and all supplies on scales of the Theater of destination.(52)

d. The packing of equipment was done by the units themselves under the supervision of packing technicians. Originally the units retained, convoy-loaded with the unit, all of their equipment which was force-marked and shipped.(53) During June, however, a plan was adopted whereby organic equipment, with the exception of minimum essential equipment, was preshipped 35 days ahead of unit personnel.(54) Slower moving cargo ships were utilized and schedules arranged so that personnel and equipment would arrive in the Theater of destination at approximately the same time. Some 62 days were required in the early direct procedures in order to process personnel and equipment properly.(55) These early direct procedures took longer than the indirect mainly because the direct units had to process and rehabilitate their organic equipment. Special care had to be taken in packing for shipment to the tropics, particularly with the engineer equipment which otherwise could easily have been injured by the climate.(56) Unfortunately later reports indicated that many supplies arrived at their destination in an unusable condition because of improper packing.

e. It was planned that these early procedures would be used in the movement of three convoys, starting on 22 May 1945 and sailing at 15 day intervals. The first load was to carry approximately 43,000; the second, 23,000; and the third, 20,000. All three were to be convoy-loaded with full organic equipment.(57) None of these shipping dates were met.(58)

34. Early Indirect Redeployment Procedures.

The first units redeployed indirectly were dispatched nearly according to Normal Redeployment Procedures, except that the early units used what was known as the Normandy Assembly Area, operated by the 89th Division and comprised of Camps Lucky Strike, Old Gold, and Twenty Grand.(59) The early indirect procedures took approximately 37 days.(60)

35. Normal Redeployment Procedures.

Normal Redeployment Procedures came into use during the latter part of June. These procedures differed from the early ones mainly in that the Assembly Area Command rather than the port was used as a main processing point. Under this system, personnel and equipment of a unit were already processed when called to the port. There were two types of normal procedures; the direct procedures were used for those units going directly to the Pacific while the indirect procedures were used for those going to the Pacific via the United States.

36. Normal Direct Procedures(62).

a. When a unit was nominated for redeployment it took immediate steps to rehabilitate its equipment and to fill all shortages through supply channels. Readjustment and the filling of personnel shortages were also filled through the major commands.

b. The War Department Movement Directive was the first authority for the actual movement of a unit. Upon receipt of this directive the Theater issued its Overseas Movement Order. Direct redeployment under normal procedures took approximately 75 days. Whenever possible this order was issued 75 days prior to the sailing date of the unit, but the War Department could not always confirm nominations and issue the Movement Directive sufficiently in advance to permit this. Whenever the movement directive did not arrive in time, the Theater, in order to meet its shipping quota, issued an alert order 30 to 45 days before the unit's sailing date.(63) Many times this order was not issued until the unit's availability date.(64) This made for much confusion and disorganization. The Overseas Movement Order was made up by the Theater Adjutant General and contained all information needed for the unit to make its entire journey to shipside. It named the availability date, personnel readiness date, equipment readiness date, the applicable Tables of Organization and Equipment, personnel strength, authorized overstrength, types of equipment to accompany the troops, and designated the collecting point which would receive equipment. It

included, also, any special instructions which might be necessary.(65)

c. As soon as the unit received its Overseas Movement Order it immediately set about to fulfill any requirements given therein. Readjustment was completed and equipment shortages were filled. If not procurable elsewhere, articles of equipment were withdrawn from other units in the command.(66)

d. On the availability date the unit moved either by rail or by its own organic transportation to the Assembly Area Command. Upon arrival, personnel and equipment shortages were filled when possible. Men held in the service by reason of their being essential were given the opportunity to go before a board of review. With the assistance of technical teams for tropical packing the unit packed and marked its own equipment. When space was available, usually on or about the impedimenta readiness date, the Port Commander called for the equipment. It was then transported to the port either by organic transport or by rail. Directly redeployed units retained only their minimum essential equipment, which was not packed until the approach of the personnel readiness date, 35 days after the impedimenta readiness date. When shipping space was available the unit personnel and the minimum essential equipment moved to the Marseilles Staging area, where after a few days they were unloaded for the Pacific Theater.(67)

37. Normal Indirect Procedures.(68)

a. Normal indirect procedures were quite similar to the

normal direct procedures. Upon receipt of the Overseas Movement Order the unit being indirectly redeployed turned in its organic equipment, with the exception of its minimum essential equipment, to collecting points designated by the supply services in the movement orders. The supply services rehabilitated the equipment, turned in into bulk depot stock, packaged to full Table of Equipment, less minimum essential equipment, and shipped it to the overseas destination with 60 full days of maintenance supplies.

b. On the availability date the unit moved by organic equipment and rail to the Assembly Area Command where personnel and equipment shortages were filled in so far as possible. At the call of the Port Commander, on or about the personnel readiness date, the unit moved to the designated staging area and, within a few days, was outloaded with its minimum essential equipment for the United States. The entire process took normally about 46 days.

c. Casuals were redeployed by means of the reception station group. This was the principal means of redeploying high score men prior to V-J Day. It was also used as a means of supplying replacements to divisions already shipped short or who had lost a considerable portion of their strength due to point score change.

38. Air Force Redeployment.

a. The Air Force had its own redeployment program and even

returned some of its personnel to the United States before V-E Day. The Air Force system differed greatly from the Theater procedures for the first two months, but later it was correlated with Theater policy.

b. Personnel readjustment was especially difficult in the Air Force because specialists were needed in the Zone of the Interior for training replacements for Pacific-bound units. The shortage of specialists was so critical that the Air Force had given the United States Strategic Air Force in Europe the authority to spread its specialists over the entire list of units required for redeployment rather than completely filling up those for units having the earliest sailing dates. The policy was not looked upon favorably in the Theater, but the Air Force claimed that replacements could more easily be found in the Zone of the Interior than in this Theater. (69)

c. The Air Force redeployment program was based on the fact that the Commanding General, Army Air Forces desired the rapid return of Air Force personnel in order to train men in the Zone of the Interior for eventual use in the Pacific. On 5 May 1945 the War Department inaugurated a system of flying to the United States all available heavy bombardment aircraft, including a 100 percent reserve complete with low score combat crews and maintenance personnel. This so-called White Project was accelerated in the latter part of June so that by 4 July, 1,825 heavy bombers had returned to the United States with approximately 20 passengers (all Air Force Personnel) in each. Personnel returned

by this project were not readjusted in accordance with Readjustment Regulation 1-1 and for this reason there was some criticism of the project.(70)

d. The Green Project was another of the Air Force plans for redeployment. Under this plan, in addition to normal passenger traffic, the planes were to return approximately 38,000 troops per month -- 26,000 of whom were to come from the European Theater of Operations. Quotas for return via the Green Project was allocated by the Theater G-1 Division to the major commands and were initially limited to personnel with very high adjusted service rating scores. Later it was used for special types of personnel as the medical and railroad men. Personnel returned by the Green Project were staged through special areas established at Orly Field near Paris, Istres Field near Marseilles, and Camp Crookstone at Prestwick, Scotland. The Ground Force Reinforcement Command had established special installations in the United Kingdom and on the Continent for processing of all personnel other than the Air Forces who were being returned under this project.(71)

39. Redeployment from the United Kingdom.

Redeployment movements proceeded with less difficulty in the United Kingdom Base than on the Continent because all the installations and units involved, other than the Air Force, were under a single command, thereby allowing better coordination and timing. The difficulties encountered were those experienced in connection with early

procedures on the Continent. There were delays in receiving instructions on special lists of equipment to accompany units, which in turn imposed a delay in submitting estimates of unit impediments shipping requirements; there were delays in receiving code shipment numbers without which unit equipment could not be marked and thus there was in some cases delay in receiving replacements. Both direct and indirect shipments were made from the United Kingdom. For replacement in the United Kingdom, 70 days notice was required for units being redeployed and 40 days for indirect shipment.(72)

40. Check System to Insure Efficiency and Coordination.

a. Because alert and movement orders often were not issued in time and sometimes, though issued, were not received, a control system was established. All commands were required to report to Theater Headquarters by telephone certain data on units about to undergo redeployment. With these data, plus movement data from the Assembly Area Command and the staging areas, a control system was designed which operated to reduce the number of instances in which orders were lost.(73)

b. Deficiency reports pertaining to each command were also prepared. These consisted of lists of units deficient in redeployment requirement throughout the various phases of the pipeline from the issuance of alert orders to the sailing of the unit. These reports when analyzed helped to detect deficiencies which were causing delay in out-shipment of troops. They also brought about closer control on the part

of major commands over their units.(74)

c. One of the most important reports required of this Theater by the War Department was the Status Report. Part I of the Status Report called for information on the unit's medical requirement, its firing experience, the status of its equipment, and details concerning its personnel strength, efficiency, and experience. Part II of the Status Report, when filled in, gave a list of specialists still needed to bring the unit to full strength. Part III called for a detailed report on the status of the unit's training. This information was turned in by major commands to Theater Headquarters to the appropriate general staff section where an estimate of the unit's readiness was made to the G-3 Division. G-3 then prepared a recommendation as to the readiness or lack of readiness of the unit; since rapid outmovement of units was essential, the lack of complete readiness of a unit did not often actually delay its sailing. Information on units being redeployed directly was required by the War Department 10 days prior to the scheduled personnel readiness date. The Status Report on units being indirectly redeployed was required five days prior to the personnel readiness date.(75)

THE ASSEMBLY AREA COMMAND

41. Pipeline.

The "pipeline" was a term used to define the entire path along which a unit moved during redeployment, from the time it left its unit station until it arrived at its final destination. There were two main stopping points along the pipeline for personnel and two other for the equipment and supply not accompanying the troops. The two stopping points for personnel were the Assembly Area Command and the ports of embarkation.

42. Activation of the Assembly Area Command.

a. The plan for an assembly area, was adopted in February 1945.(76) Two months later, on 9 April 1945, the Assembly Area Command was activated as a section operating directly under the Commanding General of the Communication Zone.(77) Major General Royal B. Lord was relieved of his assignment as Chief of Staff of the Communication Zone and was assigned as the Commanding General of the Assembly Area Command.(78)

b. The Assembly Area Command was located about 100 miles from Paris, near Reims, France. The location was ideal. The land was agriculturally unproductive and thus the French were not deprived of tillable soil. The road and rails nets were adequate even though close coordination was necessary to avoid major traffic difficulties. There

were also twelve general hospitals near the area to provide adequate hospitalization for the large numbers of incoming troops.(79)

43. Mission.

The purpose of the Assembly Area Command was to provide accomodation and facilities for units and personnel designated for redeployment from the Continent and to process these units and their equipment, insuring readiness for outmovement at such times as the Port Commander might call them forward to the staging area. The Assembly Area Command thus provided a reservoir of units whose personnel and equipment were ready for the "port call." This made for a system whereby all available shipping space could be filled in a minimum time and provided an even flow of troops to the ports.(80)

44. Organization.


a. The Assembly Area Command was organized into four sub-areas. Each sub-area consisted of a group of four or five camps named after American cities and distributed as follows:(81)

Mailly	Cuicpes	Mourmelon	Sissone
<u>Sub-area</u>	<u>Sub-area</u>	<u>Sub-area</u>	<u>Sub-area</u>
Atlanta	Boston	St. Louis	Oklahoma City
Miami	Baltimore	Cleveland	Washington
New Orleans	Brooklyn	Pittsburg	Detroit
Norfolk	New York	Philadelphia	Chicago
San Antonio		Carlisle	

Part of Camp Pittsburg was reserved for WACs, nurses, and other families. In July it was established as a separate camp and named Carlisle.(82)

AAC

CHART VI



AAC INSTALLATIONS

1 AUGUST 1945

b. The ultimate scale of accommodations for these camps was Phase III construction for 10 camps and SOP 5A for eight camps. Phase III consisted of winterized tents for living quarters and huts for mess halls and administrative buildings. Complete utilities together with roads, walks, and hardstandings for vehicles were planned. But due to the rush of redeployment, the camps were filled before construction was completed. Thus, troops going through the Assembly Area Command in the early days lived in camps which just met the SOP 5A standards. The SOP 5A standard called for tents or improvised construction, utilizing all the existing facilities. Not until the end of September was the planned standard completed; 10 camps finished in Phase III standard and eight in SOP 5A standards.(83)

c. The administrative organization was essentially the same as had existed in training camps and staging areas in the United States. The Assembly Area Commander had his own headquarters staff and static housekeeping units--all separate from the chain of command existing in the troop units being serviced. The mission of the sub-area commander and his small staff was primarily on-the-ground control and supervision of his subarea, with administrative responsibility only for his own static troops.(84)

45. Distribution of Incoming Troops.

a. Due to the speed with which troops poured into the Assembly Area Command it was not possible at all times to house the units being

processed in as orderly a manner as the plan provided. It had been planned, in order to facilitate processing, to segregate incoming units as follows:(85)

Camp Pittsburg.	Medical units, nurses, and other female personnel
Camp Detroit.	Air Corps
Camp Washington	Heavy ordnance
Camp Philadelphia)	
Camp St. Louis)	
Camp New York)	
Camp Oklahoma City)---	Divisions
Camp Norfolk)	
Camp Baltimore)	

b. Units being redeployed indirectly were to be sent into the camps in the northern part of the Command and directly redeploying units into the southern part. This plan could not be adhered to at all times, however, because of the increased speed with which redeployment was carried on. Originally it was anticipated that there would be 70,000 troops in the command by 10 June, but 170,000 had been alerted by that date. While plans called for only 6 camps by 1 June and 12 by 1 July, by late June it became necessary to use all the camps even though construction was less than three-fourths complete. At first a capacity of 270,000 was planned, but later this was changed to 294,000.(86) Even with this capacity it was necessary to issue in-movement orders for units while the area in the command was still occupied. Then again space would remain empty because units had not received their orders.

During the first week of July there were 48 units due in June which had not even acknowledged the call.

c. It was extremely difficult to obtain operating personnel. On one occasion the Command urgently needed 13,400 troops. The Communications Zone sent the 75th Infantry Division with its 13,450 men and said that now the Assembly Area Command had 50 men more than it needed. But the 75th Division was ordered only to report to the Assembly Area for duty. It remained assigned to the XVI Corps. Thus the division was charged against the bulk allotment of the Assembly Area Command, yet retained its organizational integrity. Therefore a great many persons who could have been useful to the Command were kept at normal tasks in the division. Then, too, essentially a large number of the 13,450 men were combat soldiers rather than clerks, typists, and other service or administrative specialists urgently needed by the Assembly Area Command; furthermore, the Command was directed by the Theater to use personnel of the 75th Infantry Division as a source to effect necessary readjustment for units being redeployed through the Assembly Area Command.(87) This continual change in static housekeeping personnel greatly reduced operating efficiency. By the end of July, however, the Assembly Area Command had sufficient operating personnel. It was using 40,056 static personnel, 32,269 prisoners of war and 1,610 civilians.(88)

46. Difficulties.

a. The first difficulty centered around the late arrival of

units. A large number failed to arrive in time to complete their processing and meet their impedimenta and personnel readiness dates. Of the first 837 units called to the Assembly Area Command, only 232 or 37 percent arrived on time. This failure to report was attributed to two factors. First, higher echelons of command were not expeditiously transmitting call-ups issued by the Assembly Area Command to the units concerned. Secondly, movement orders covering the entire movement of a unit from its station to the port had not been issued sufficiently in advance to permit the orderly processing of information through channels as prescribed, namely the army groups, army, and corps headquarters. All attempts to bring better results had little effect. Finally at a conference in Paris a satisfactory arrangement was made with Theater Headquarters. Thereafter telephones were used during the period from 2400 to 0600 (when phones were not used otherwise) to check on unit call-ups and planned arrivals at the Assembly Area Command.(89)

b. Another cause for confusion centered around the frequent changes in orders. For instance the 87th Infantry Division in four days received four different written movement orders, as well as various verbal orders.(90)

c. Another difficulty was the shortage of many items of supply. There were insufficient packaging and preserving materials which were essential for equipment going to a tropical region. Critical shortages also made it necessary for trucks to go as far as Antwerp and Cherbourg

for expendable supplies. This caused a loss of time and transportation.(91)


d. Other transportation difficulties were encountered. The inbound rail operations were off schedule partly because of inadequate wire communication with Germany. This was remedied by the installation of radio stations, which unfortunately, corrected only a part of the problem. After the trains reached France there was difficulty in getting on the proper tracks at the proper time due to the French system of routing. Much time was lost and trains arrived at railheads late and at unexpected times. This was finally arranged more satisfactorily with the French authorities.(92)

e. The greatest administrative burden of the Assembly Area Command came from the fact that units arrived with little or none of their personnel readjustment accomplished. It had been planned that the Assembly Area Command would do some readjusting of units, but this was to consist only in making last minute replacements. When the situation became acute, Theater took action.(93) To alleviate the predicament in which the Assembly Area Command found itself, the policy was adopted of requiring the major commands to furnish the replacements for Category II units arriving understrength or with personnel eligible for discharge. If replacements constituted over five percent of the strength of a division or ten percent for a smaller unit, the Assembly Area Command notified Theater Headquarters, which in turn, asked the major

REDEPLOYMENT TROOP DEPARTURES FROM EUROPEAN THEATER


UNIT & NON-UNIT PERSONNEL
12 MAY 1945 THROUGH 30 JUN 1946

 CASUALS
  CAT II INDIRECT & RESERVE
  CAT II DIRECT
  CAT IV DEMOBILIZATION



*INCLUDES 5,810 DIRECT TO PUERTO RICO


PREPARED BY HIST DIV USFET GRAPHIC SECTION



STATISTICS FURNISHED BY G-3 DIVISION
TROOPS & REDEPLOYMENT BRANCH, USFET

CHART VIII

ETOUSA OVERSEAS MOVEMENT IMPLEMENTATION CHART



command concerned why replacements were not made. If this was the result of negligence rather than from the lack of qualified personnel the major commands were directed to fill the vacancies before the personnel readiness date of the unit in question.(94)

47. Close-out and Accomplishments.

In September the Assembly Area Command ceased to be a separate command and was assigned, for operations(95), to Oice Intermediate Section. It continued to operate, although some units bypassed the area, until the end of the year. During its six months period of operation the Assembly Area Command processed over 600,000 troops. The table below shows the flow of redeploying troops.(96)

Assembly Area Command Redeploying Population

MONTH	TOTAL ARRIVALS (Cumulative)	TOTAL DEPARTURES (Cumulative)	REDEPLOYING Population (Arrivals less departures)
15 June	21,533	0	21,533
22 June	108,804	0	108,804
1 July	172,816	16,470	156,346
8 July	224,128	73,730	150,398
15 July	270,976	106,743	164,233
22 July	285,555	128,941	166,614
1 August	331,703	159,564	172,139
8 August	346,257	190,258	155,999
15 August	349,468	229,105	120,363
22 August	369,115	266,529	102,586
1 September	366,789*	298,842	67,947
8 September	380,306	299,771	80,535
15 September	438,779	316,103	117,676
22 September	481,749	347,536	134,213
1 October	600,298	406,116	194,182
8 October	623,130	451,014	172,116

*This figure is less than that of 22 August due to the

deletion from the Cumulative Arrivals column of all units removed from the alert status up to that time.

THE PORTS OF EMBARKATION

48. Mission.

The purpose of a port and its area was to provide accommodations and facilities for personnel units and their supplies and equipment. It processed and inspected these units, insuring that as they embarked they met the Theater and War Department standards for redeployment. The mission was similar to that of a port of embarkation in the Zone of the Interior and, insofar as possible, the organization was the same. (97)

49. Organization. (98)

a. The areas at each port consisted of the port storage areas for supplies and equipment, staging areas for personnel, and the port of embarkation itself. The activities of these branches were coordinated and controlled by the Overseas Movement Division which was under the direct control commander concerned. The latter under the jurisdiction of his base section commander, in turn, was responsible for supply, and control, and final decision on policy in connection with redeployment. On technical matters and shipping schedules the port commander worked directly with the Chief of Transportation. He dealt directly with the

commanders of the Communications Zone depots and other installations for the movement of equipment and supplies to designated port intransit storage areas or depots. He also dealt with the Assembly Area Command of troops to the staging areas.

50. The Ports and Their Staging Facilities.

Redeploying troops departed, for the most part, from six parts--four on the Continent, two in the United Kingdom Base.

a. Le Havre.

Probably the best known of the Continental ports was the Le Havre Port of Embarkation, which was under the Normandy Base Section and later under Chanor Medium Port.(99) Its main function was to outload personnel and equipment for indirect redeployment or for return to the Zone of the Interior for discharge.(100) The port's secondary mission was to outload supply shipments.(101) The staging areas for Le Havre consisted of five camps--Philip Morris, Herbert Tareyton, Home Run, Wings, and Pall Mall--(102) having a total staging capacity of about 61,000.(103) By 15 May 1945 it was seen that the Assembly Area Command would be unable to start operations before June. The Communications Zone consequently directed Normandy Base Section to establish an emergency assembly area for all troops going through Le Havre.(104) Normandy Base chose Lucky Strike, Twenty Grand, and Old Gold, which were three camps, a part of the old Red Horse Staging Area which had staged replacements for the armies during the war.(105) They had a total

capacity of about 11,000.(106) The 80th Infantry Division, designated the Overseas Staging Command, was placed in charge of these camps. In July a portion of Lucky Strike was used as the Chanor Provisional Training Headquarters.(109) Old Gold closed out in August.(110) Lucky Strike and Twenty Grand were held in reserve for staging purposes until the end of the year.(111)

b. Marseilles. Marseilles, a Delta Base Section port operated by the 6th Port, was the second most important port for redeployment.(112) Its main function was the outloading of personnel and their equipment for direct shipment to Pacific Theaters of war. It also outloaded separate supply shipments. After V-J Day it redeployed troops and supplies to the Zone of the Interior.(113) By 15 June three staging areas--Arles, St. Victoret, and Calais--could handle 155,000; construction on a bivouac area was well advanced, with a 200,000 capacity available for the first of July. The Calais Staging Area at Marseille held in reserve a space for 10,000 casualties who were being returned to the Zone of the Interior by the Air Force's Green Project. The 66th Infantry Division was assigned to Marseilles with its principle mission being the operation of St. Victoret and Arles Staging Areas.(114)

c. Antwerp. The third Continental port used for outloading of personnel was at Antwerp, Belgium, which under Channel Base and later Chanor Base Section for administration, was operated by the 13th Major Port.(115) It made both direct and indirect personnel shipments, but

was used mainly for outshipment of ammunition and supplies, particularly to the Pacific prior to V-J Day.(116) Initial plans had not called for personnel shipments from Antwerp, but the accelerated movement of troops demanded that the port be so used.(117) Case Top Hat, with a capacity of 16,500, processed the first troop shipment which left Antwerp on 5 July 1945.(118) Camp White Tie, with capacity of 11,000, was being built for use in August, but prior to completion it was decided that this facility would not be needed.(119)

d. Cherbourg. The fourth Continental redeployment port was at Cherbourg, France. Cherbourg, which was under Normandy Base Section and later under Chanor Base Section for administration, was operated by the 4th Major Port. The main task at Cherbourg was the outshipment of supplies, but Cherbourg was also used as an embarkation point for hospital ships.(120)

e. United Kingdom Ports. The United Kingdom ports were at Southampton and on the Clyde River in Scotland. Both ports outloaded personnel and separate supply shipments. The Glasgow port of Embarkation, on the Clyde River, was operated by the 7th Port.(121) During the early days of redeployment it continued to be an important military port. The three largest ocean liners, the Queen Mary, the Queen Elizabeth, and the Acquitania, could berth neither at Le Havre, because of war damage to the port, nor at Southampton because of the need for dredging there. Thus the wartime base at Glasgow was used.(122)

Troops from the Continent were shuttled to the United Kingdom steamers, docked at Southampton, and taken by train to the ports of embarkation on the Clyde.(123) In August the Clyde River ports were closed as embarkation points, staging areas at Southampton were rushed to completion and thereafter the Queens and the Arguitania operated from Southampton. The Southampton Port of Embarkation was operated by the 14th Major Port. Its staging areas Tedworth, Barton Stacey, and the four at Southampton--were capable of housing about 33,380 troops.(124) After August of 1945 Southampton was called the United Kingdom Port of Embarkation.

51. Difficulties.

The ports encountered somewhat the same personnel difficulties as did the Assembly Area Command. While instructions read that units would report to the assembly area readjusted to the fullest extent possible, the fact remained that all available shipping had to be filled and that early outshipment of personnel, in the final analysis, took precedence over the later outshipment of a perfectly readjustment and trained unit. Therefore units arrived in the assembly area, and again in the port area, incompletely readjusted. When the port commander called for a unit to fill a shipping space for the following week it was imperative that he get the personnel. This he did, but in some cases the units were incompletely readjusted and equipment was short. Sometimes this was due to the fact that the unit had received its movement

orders late or not at all; there simply was not sufficient time to complete processing and equipping the unit. Some units had already readjusted their personnel, but had to do it again since the unit or some of its members subsequently received further battle participation credits, placing additional men above the interim critical score. These units transferred out their new candidate personnel, but sailed before replacements arrived. Sudden advancement of sailing dates to fill unexpected increases in shipping space necessitated the shipment of some units, including the 86th Infantry Division, before documentation had been completed. Last minute arrivals necessitated preparation of new passenger lists, reception station lists, personnel rosters and in general contributed toward delay in forwarding documents to the Zone of the Interior.(125)

52. Despite difficulties the ports managed to fill all available shipping, which, in the long run, was recognized as more important than shipping a unit in perfect condition. This was recognized by the Theater planners, who had made provision for shipment of incompletely readjusted units. Units incompletely readjusted were shipped not at the normal two percent overstrength but at ten percent overstrength to take care of expected losses or shortages on arrival at their new destination.(126)

SHIPMENTS PRIOR TO CAPITULATION OF JAPAN

53. General.

On 2 June 1945 the Theater flow chart(127) based on the February War Department Forecast(128) was rescinded. The new forecast covered(129) the period of June, July, and August and incorporated changes made by the War Department in the May forecast. The(130) third Redeployment Forecast Unit Schedule(131), based on the Third Edition of the War Department Forecast distributed 21 August.(132) It contained a considerable number of changes, particularly in the service units. This was brought about by varying operational requirements in the Pacific. If this schedule had had to be met there would have been an unavoidable build up in the Assembly Area Command and the removal of a number of small units from the alert status. The schedules as shown for outshipment were, except for Category IV units, obsolete because of the unexpectedly early capitulation of Japan. The forecast also changed the categories of some units, and thereby superseded the categorization of 5 June.(133)

54. May Shipments.

Redeployment operations got under way on 12 May and before the end of the month nearly 90,000 men had been shipped.(134) Of these, 21,564 were men in Category II units who were being sent to the Pacific via the United States.(135) The remaining 67,597(136) men

were casualties and consisted of high score men, patients, recovered Allied military personnel, and others.(137) No direct shipments to the Pacific left during the month.(138)

55. June Shipments.

a. In June a total of 313,298 men were redeployed. Of this total, 23,479 men formed the first direct shipments to the Pacific. In Category II indirect shipments there were 165,656 men. Casualties, consisting mostly of high score men and patients, made up another 124,163 of the June shipments.(139) Major units shipped during June included the III, V, VII, and XIII Corps, the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 86th, 95th, 97th, and the 104th Infantry Division.(140)

b. By the end of June the Theater was getting a good hold on the situation. The total forecast for the May-June period called for redeployment of 424,025 men.(141) Against this quota 402,459 men were redeployed.(142) The Theater did not meet the casual quota, but shipped 191,760 men(143) against the quota of 193,800.(144) It exceeded the quota for indirect redeployment, shipping 187,220(145) against a forecast of 167,473.(146) Direct shipments again fell short of the forecast. The main reason for the situation was the change in plans which called for the shipment of a unit's organic equipment 35 days ahead of the unit.(147) This had been a necessary move to utilize both fast and slow moving ships to the best advantage. By shipping equipment 35 days ahead on slow moving freighters and using all the

space on fast moving ships for troops, the unit and its equipment could arrive at approximately the same time. The direct forecast figure for May and June was originally 62,752.(148) This was reduced in June to 21,000.(149) Against this latter quota of 21,000 there were 23,479 men shipped directly to the Pacific.(150)

56. July Shipments.

a. During July the Theater could not make up the May-June backlog, but it did exceed the shipping requirements for July itself. Against a forecast for outshipment of 385,910(151) the Theater sent out 391,058.(152) Of this number 227,141 men were in Category II indirect units, 72,338 were in Category II direct units and 91,679 were in casual units.(153) July shipments included the VIII Corps, the 13th and 20th Armored Division, and the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 26th, 44th, and 87th Infantry Division.(154)

57. Early August Shipments.

The first warning of V-J Day arrived in the Theater on 10 August.(155) During the first 10 days of August the Theater shipped 35,760 men in Category II indirect units, 15,826 men in Category II direct units and 33,451 in casual units or a total of 85,037 men.(156) The War Department had asked for the redeployment of 905,296 men by this date.(157) The Theater had shipped more than 878,000 but was still about 27,000 short of the War Department objective. Theater plans, however, would have cleared this backlog by the end of August had Japan not

capitulated. A summary of commitments and accomplishments of the Theater from V-E Day is given below. (159)

Accomplishments 12 May-10 August 1945

	Cat II Indirect	Cat II Direct	Total Unit	Casual	Total Redeployed
May-Jun forecast	167,473	62,752	230,225	193,800	424,025
May-Jun shipment	187,220	23,479	210,699	191,760	402,459
Jul forecast	179,690	116,520	296,210	89,700	385,910
Jul shipment	221,741	72,238	299,379	91,679	391,058
1-10 Aug shipment	35,760	15,826	51,586	33,451	85,037
Total Shipments 12 May-10 Aug 45.	450,121	111,543	561,664	316,890	878,554
Forecast for 12 May-10 Aug	380,647	207,816	588,463	316,833	905,296

Chapter III

V-J DAY AND ITS EFFECTS

58. Pre-V-J Day Position.

The month of August was one of radical change in redeployment in the European Theater. During the first week in August the following situation existed:(1)

a. Plans were established to ship 186,082 troops. Of these troops 85,631 were being shipped directly to the Pacific area and 100,451 were being redeployed to the Pacific via the United States. An additional 166,000 spaces were to be furnished the Theater for the out-shipment of the June and July backlogs.

b. Changes in War Department policies and in Theater organization had necessitated the issue of a Theater directive on 1 August 1945.(2) It was also planned to revise the unit commanders' handbook ETO-SOP Number 61, Preparation for Overseas Movement, Redeployment(3).

to conform with the new basic directive. These measures would, it was considered, cover the final stages of redeployment of troops within the Theater down to the Occupational Troop Basis by 1 July 1946. In general, the pipeline was filled with low score personnel needed to fill Pacific area and Zone of the Interior requirements; redeployment procedures were functioning smoothly for the first time after months of constant adjustment.

59. V-J Day--Its Significance to Redeployment.

The advent of V-J Day, however, meant a complete reversal of priorities and entailed a rapid about-face in previous procedure, with the prime emphasis shifted from the outshipment of Category II unit to the demobilization of high score personnel.

60. Adjustment of War Department Policies.

Interim instructions on the adjustments to be carried out with the capitulation of Japan were dispatched by the War Department in two cables(4), the main points of which were:

a. The Commanding Generals of the Allied Forces, Pacific Area Command and China would revise the Redeployment Forecast shipping schedule and submit a report to the War Department listing all units and equipment needed for the succeeding 60 days.

b. All direct redeployment would be halted except for urgent requirements; ships in port would receive new instructions as to

destination, while those en route to the Pacific would either be re-routed or allowed to continue, whichever procedure was more economical.

c. All enlisted men with scores equal to or above the then current critical score and those over 40 years of age would automatically be declared nonessential, unless their specification serial numbers appeared on current War Department lists of critical specialists. Critical specialists could be retained for only six months.

d. Training could continue under existing policies, except that Category IV units' training would be modified with emphasis on the education program.

e. Shipping priorities would be as follows:

Occupational forces for the Pacific
Patients and recovered Allied military personnel
War Department requisitions
High score personnel

f. Personnel priorities were to be adjusted in the following order:

Category IV units
Low-score casualties required as Zone of the Interior replacements.

g. All enlisted men with adjusted service rating scores of 85 or more would be returned and plans made to return those with adjusted service rating scores of 75 or above if necessary to fill shipping. Except for urgent requirements for the Pacific area, precedence was to be

given to the return of high score personnel. Formal notification of the capitulation of Japan was received on 14 August 1945 and the interim instructions came into effect immediately.(5) Thus, within a five-day period from the date of receipt of the instructions, the Theater was required to shift from shipment of large low-score quotas to even larger shipments of high-score personnel.

61. Factors Influencing the Theater's Ability to Reverse Priorities.

a. Status of the pipeline, 10 August 1945.(6) At the time that the Theater was directed to reverse redeployment priorities, there were in the pipeline 212,000 low score personnel being processed for direct shipment to the Pacific. There were also 170,000 troops being processed for shipment to the Pacific via the United States; included in this figure were the 30th, 35th, 45th Infantry, and the 13th Airborne Divisions. Units and casualties to fill the September shipping had already been called and were beginning to flow into the pipeline system.(7)

b. Clearing the pipeline. The Theater requested the War Department's permission to ship from the Theater all units which could not feasibly be withdrawn from the pipeline. This permission was obtained on 14 August 1945.(8) Between 16 and 31 August 1945, the pipeline was cleared of 113,554 low-score personnel; during the same period 134,967 high point men were shipped to the Zone of the Interior.(9)

200,000 of the highest scores and 50,000 with adjusted service rating scores of from 45 to 60, for use in the Zone of the Interior. The reduction was to be accomplished in the following stages:

By 1 October	Strength to be 1,736,000
By 1 January	Strength to be 1,051,000
By 1 April	Strength to be 420,000
By 1 July	Strength to be 404,000(13)

b. The War Department, for planning purposes, requested the Theater to estimate the number of persons with point scores of 85 or more or of an age of 36 or more that would be available for shipment by air or water on certain dates.(14) The following detailed report on shipping estimates for the period of 17 August to 28 September was submitted.(15)

CASUALS

On hand and ready by 17 August.	10,000
18-24 August.	14,000
25-31 August.	17,000
1-7 September.	13,000
8-15 September	17,000
16-22 September	10,000
23-28 September	<u>8,000</u>
All over 85 points or over 36 years of age	89,000

In addition, the following units would be ready by the indicated dates, with sailing dates five to ten days later:

5 September.	103rd Infantry Division	14,000
	69th Infantry Division	14,500
10 September.	17th Airborne Division	14,000
15 September.	63rd Infantry Division	14,500
	6th Infantry Division	11,000

21 September.	5th Armored Division	10,500
	14th Armored Division	<u>10,500</u>
		89,000

Beyond this, quotas of 81,000, including 60,000 high-score personnel would be ready between 8 and 28 September, making a total of 259,000.

c. On 14 August, the War Department urged the Theater to use every means in its power to reduce the reversal period of 30 days, saying, "the pressure here is terrific." (16) The Theater responded to this request by raising the figures for shipment of high-score personnel as follows: (17)

1-20 August.	25,000
20-31 August	27,500
by 15 September.	81,500 (total)
by 30 September.	227,500 (total)

64. Additional High-score Quotas for September.

In order to fill the high score 200,000 quota authorized by the War Department for September (18), in addition to the seven alerted divisions the Third Army was given an additional quota of 50,000 and the Seventh Army one of 31,000. (19) Category IV units, especially National Guard units, were used as carriers for personnel with the highest scores in the Theater. The armies were authorized to dip down to an adjusted service rating score of 60 to fill the quota, if necessary. All personnel who could not be placed in Category IV units were to be shipped to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command and returned in casual detachments. (20) This expedient was found to be unnecessary as the armies

had sufficient Category IV carriers. The remainder of the 200,000 was made up by authorizing the seven alerted divisions a total overstrength of 12 percent instead of the normal 2 percent. The ratio of officers to enlisted men was fixed at one to ten.(21)

65. Reduction of Discharge Requirements.

a. On 16 August the War Department announced that the age for discharge of enlisted men and women was reduced from 40 to 38 years, and that military necessity was to be no bar to discharge on account of age.(22) The individual concerned had only to apply in writing to his or her immediate commanding officer. After application the individual concerned could be retained for only 90 days before being placed on orders for return to the United States for discharge.(23)

b. One week later the War Department list of critical military occupational specialty numbers was reduced to three. These were the orthopedic mechanic, transmitter attendant (fixed station), and the electroencephalographic specialist.(24) Persons possessing a critical military occupational specialty number who had an adjusted service rating score of 85 or more as of 14 August 1945 could be retained in service because of military necessity, but not for a period beyond 14 February 1946.(25) If a man were a "key man," even though his skill was not on the list of War Department critical military occupational specialty numbers, he could be retained for one month, or until 14 September 1945.(26)

c. The War Department notified General Eisenhower that the ultimate critical score might be 45, and that all enlisted personnel with a lower score should be placed in Category I units while all enlisted personnel with scores from 45 to 59 inclusively should be placed in Category II units, pending decision on requirements in the Pacific.(27)

66. Instructions to Major Commands.

a. Major Commands received the War Department instructions by a cable which further directed that all high score personnel be adjusted in the following Category IV priority groups.(28)

Scores of 85 and over. . . . Priority I

Scores of 75 to 85 Priority II

Scores of 60 to 74 Priority III

No low-score personnel were authorized for Category IV units, although this had been permitted earlier.(29)

b. On 22 August the Theater published the Interim Directive for Redeployment and Readjustment Following the Defeat of Japan.(30) This plan supplemented the Theater Basic Plan of August(31) and superseded conflicting portions of Readjustment of Personnel After the Defeat of Germany.(32)

67. Problems Involved in the Change-over of Priorities.

a. On 15 August the Redeployment Forecast - Unit Schedule, 3rd Edition was published.(33) It was based on the War Department forecast

on 19 July 1945.(34) V-J Day upset this schedule completely. Three problems were thus involved in the change-over of priorities:

(1) By-passing Category II units in the pipeline with high-score units and individuals.

(2) Withdrawing Category II units from the pipeline to take over the operation of installations and depots in the Theater. These jobs were formerly done by Category IV units.

(3) Decentralizing the selection of units to fill shipments to the subordinate commands so as to move out highest score units first.

b. The Occupational Troop Basis for July 1946 was reduced from 404,000 to 370,000, thus releasing for redeployment an additional 34,000, and making necessary a recomputation of figures.(35)

c. In accordance with the above, plans were soon made to defer all Category II alerted units which had not entered the assembly area. Eventually some of these were withdrawn and were used to replace Category IV units engaged in important redeployment operations so that the Category IV units could be used as carriers for high-score personnel.(36)

68. August and September Final Shipping Plans.

a. On 20 August, in TWX conference with the War Department the Theater summarized the Theater shipping plans for the remainder of

August and September. The remainder of August shipping would be Category II units and 27,500 high-score personnel which had replaced low-score men. The Theater stated that vacancies in the staging areas and the assembly area allowed 200,000 high-score personnel to be processed in September. There were sufficient Category II units in the pipeline to meet the September low-score quota of 50,000. September shipping to the United States would include some 40,000 low-score originally Category II direct personnel from Marseilles. High-score personnel could not be sent to the port in time for early September shipment. With the 35th and 45th Infantry Divisions sailing from the United Kingdom, a total of 70,000 low-score personnel would depart during the month. From 1 through 15 September 60,000 high-score personnel would be shipped, and from 15 through 30 September 140,000 more. Included in the carrier units for the 200,000 high-score personnel were six infantry divisions, four armored divisions, and one airborne division. Category II units in the pipeline would be used to process and readjust other units under Theater Service Forces, to readjust Category I units to the G-44 score level, and to fill the expected 50,000 low-score monthly quotas.(37)

b. On 21 August the high-score quotas for October shipping were released to the major commands as follows:(38)

Eastern Military District.	103,000
Western Military District.	78,000
Theater Service Forces	50,000
United States Air Forces in Europe	40,000
United States Forces in Austria	<u>2,000</u>
	273,000

c. High-score personnel were to have a shipping priority over Category II units regardless of their relative position on the priority list. The Theater requested on 21 August the major commands to submit, on all Category IV units departing from their stations, a report showing the strength of the unit by type of personnel and by adjusted service rating scores in blocks of 85 and above, 84-75, 74-60, 59-45, and 44-0.(39)

69. Shipping Forecasts.

a. On 24-25 August several TWX conferences were held with the War Department in which the War Department stated that from 1 September 1945 to 1 February 1946 it desired that a total of 1,716,000 men be shipped from the Theater to the United States.(40) This represented a tremendous acceleration over previously estimated figures. The shipping schedule was adjusted to achieve this goal as follows:

September	406,000	December	340,000
October	318,000	January	<u>340,000</u>
November	312,000	Total	1,716,000(41)

b. The Theater informed the War Department that the following modifications would have to be employed to meet this schedule: The War Department would be prepared to accept low-score personnel in excess of the 20 percent quota; and a 300,000 liquidation force be approved over and above the Occupational Troop Basis of 370,000.(42) The Theater at the same time announced that it was prepared to ship units in accordance with the redeployment forecast(43) with priorities as

follows:

National Guard Combat Categories II and IV
Category IV Combat
Category IV Service
Category II Combat
National Guard Service, Category II
Category II Service(44)

c. The War Department informed the Theater in the conference that the new categorization would be as follows:

Category I	Occupational troop basis
Category II.	Reserve units (greatly reduced)
	Low-score in reception station groups
Category IV.	Units for demobilization
Casuals.	High-score in separation center groups

No further Category II units were required of the Theater. Any unit could be inactivated if its strength was low and the remaining personnel used to fill up operational units. The controlling factor was rapid demobilization and results alone counted.(45)

70. Allocation of Shipping to Ports.

The shipping for September and future months was set up in the following ports:(46)

	<u>September</u>	<u>Later Months</u>
Antwerp	45,000	45,000
Le Havre (incl UK)	240,000	150,000
Marseilles	121,000	117,000 - 145,000
	<u>406,000</u>	<u>312,000 - 340,000</u>

Casuals were to be used only to fill air lift and specific requirements. Units were considered more feasible as carriers because of the

administrative advantages and command organization. Large numbers of the middle-score personnel not eligible for discharge were not desired by the War Department because there were no duties for them in the Zone of the Interior and they might be forced into a position of indiscriminate discharge.(47) This would tend to lower the morale of higher point men in the European Theater.

71. Adjustment of Category Scores.

Certain adjustments in the scores for the various categories were made by both the Theater and the War Department. The Theater adjusted Category II units in the 45-50 bracket with the exception of a few men below 45 who were excess in Category I units. The War Department confirmed this in a cable dated 28 August 1945 but insisted on Category II Strategic Reserve units being adjusted to below 45.(48) On 30 August, General Marshall informed General Eisenhower that no middle-score personnel should be returned, or the point system might have to be abandoned.(49)

72. Close-out Force.

The Theater's proposal that a close-out force of 300,000 be maintained was rejected by the War Department, pending further study.(50)

73. Summary of Redeployment as of 31 August 1945.

By the end of August the Theater had again established procedures in accordance with War Department directives and made an about-

face in priority of personnel shipments. The War Department had given the Theater a shipping schedule which would reduce the Theater to the Occupational Troop Basis by the end of January 1946. At the same time it announced that the 1,108,000 persons with adjusted service rating scores of between 45 and 70 were not desired in the Zone of the Interior until some time in November when they could be more easily handled. Recategorization of many units had been accomplished. By War Department order all National Guard units were changed to Category IV and their places taken by Regular Army and Army of the United States units. Plans were also being made to recategorize all Category II units, except the Strategic Reserve units, to Category IV. All Category II indirect shipments were stepped as far as possible, since these units contained personnel of the middle-score bracket. The question of the 300,000 close-out force was side-stopped by the War Department for the time being. By the end of August, a total of 15 divisions had been alerted for September or early October shipment. Seven of these were those divisions which had been alerted first, and which had, besides high-score personnel, specific authority to carry 300 low-score personnel. In addition, the 70th, 99th, and 106th Infantry Divisions and the 7th, 9th, 10th, 16th, and 20th Armored Divisions were alerted; no specific authority was granted to carry low-score personnel. On 31 August a final revised study of the Occupational Troop Basis was submitted to the Commanding General for approval. The War Department was notified that the Occupational Troop Basis would arrive in Washington in time to meet the 10 September

deadline.(51) During August the Theater shipped a total of 278,270 men. Of these, 2,817 were sent directly to the Pacific; 179,311 were returned to the Zone of the Interior in Category II Indirect units; and 96,142 returned to the United States as casualties.(52) A breakdown of shipments by Arms, Air and Service for the period of 12 May through 31 August is given below.(53)

**AIR, ARMS, SERVICE AND CASUAL SHIPMENTS
MAY-AUGUST 1945**

	May-June	July	August	Total
Category II Units (Indirect Service Arms Air)				
Service	38,903	42,907	90,153	171,963
Arms	73,278	142,302	47,865	263,445
Air	63,596	52,653	41,293	157,542
Total	175,777	237,862	179,311	592,950
Category II Units (Direct Service Arms Air)				
Service	22,573	73,223	2,817	98,613
Arms	-	-	-	-
Air	-	-	-	-
Total	22,573	73,223	2,817	98,613
Casuals (Redeployment and nonredeployment)	199,638	85,118	100,932	385,688
Grand Total Shipped	397,988	396,203	283,060	1,077,251

Chapter IV

SEPTEMBER THROUGH DECEMBER 1945--CLEARANCE OF EXCESS TROOPS

74. Method of Keeping Statistics.

In September 1945 the statistics on redeployment departures and Theater strength were in a confused state. The G-3 Division, European Theater of Operations, took the initiative, and together with the Redeployment Coordinating Group and the Adjutant General Machine Records Unit, straightened out the figures for the period from 8 May through 31 August 1945. On 1 September a new system involving the use of statistical code symbols was put into use. This new procedure insured that accurate figures would be available at Theater level for use in planning further redeployment of troops.(1)

75. Status Report Procedures in September 1945.

One corrective measure to insure better statistics on redeployment

was the establishment of new procedures for keeping status reports. The question of status reports had been under consideration for some time, as experience had indicated to the Theater that the report as required by the War Department did not reflect a true picture of personnel readjustment within particular units. Authority had been requested on 11 July for the preparation of a preliminary report, and the subject had been discussed at considerable length during the TWX conferences, with the result that a new procedure was adopted for the preparation of status reports. Part I was to be submitted by the unit commander upon completion of the final personnel readjustment within the unit. Previous improvements had been effected owing to the following factors: the conducting of a school by the Assembly Area Command during July and August; the installation of a records system based on Machine Records Unit facilities and basic data furnished by the Information and Statistics Subsection of the Plans and Control Section; and the elimination on V-J Day, of direct units and Theater shortage lists. By the middle of September, however, authority came from the War Department to discontinue status reports altogether. Work done by the Status Reports Section was placed under the Plans and Control Section of Troops and Redeployment Branch of the G-3 Division in Theater Headquarters. A final inventory of the reports as of 13 September showed a deficit of 554 between the 2,327 submitted and the 2,881 due to the War Department.(2)

76. Further Revision of Personnel Redeployment Reporting.

The form of reporting the departures from the Theater by the statistical code system was consolidated by the Adjutant General Control Machine Records Unit from the machine record units in the field. From the above report, daily reports on departures from the Theater, according to "Unit or Non-Unit" and "Quota" were computed by the Information and Statistics Subsection of the Plans and Control Section, Troops and Redeployment Branch. This report listed all departures by reason and was available forty-eight hours after the actual departures. This method, which proved satisfactory for Theater needs, remained in effect with minor additions and changes until February 1946. (3)

77. Telephone Conference, 2 September 1945.

a. Shipping changes. During August there were constant changes in shipping quotas and plans. On 2 September Brigadier General George S. Eyster telephoned the following figures to the War Department: (4)

<u>Period</u>	<u>No. of men shipped or to be shipped</u>
21-31 August	87,054 (29,000 high-score)
1-10 September	168,645 (52,970 high-score)
11-20 September	101,081 (96,636 high-score)
21-30 September	113,420 (all high-score but there will be on hand for this period 128,292-- no low-score shipments for this period)

Since September contained 22 percent low-score personnel, and all of the

October shipping would contain high-score personnel, the average for the period 21 August to 31 October would be 1 percent low-score. It was thought that the point score level for the major commands by 31 October would be as follows: Theater Service Forces, 75; Third Army, 70; Seventh Army, 65; and the United States Air Forces in Europe, 72. All commands had been given a great flexibility in readjusting, however, and owing to the amount of shipping available during the next four months, it was thought that the non-equalization of scores would make little difference.(5)

b. Retention of certain specialist categories. The Theater also informed the War Department in this conference that certain high-score specialists were being retained as port communications and railway personnel. A total retention period of ninety days was granted by the War Department for this type of personnel.(6)

c. Miscellaneous retentions. Certain other units were being retained: certain Category IV units composed of low-score personnel were kept and then inactivated in the Theater; and all by-passed Category II units were returned for use in the Theater.(7)

78. New System of Recording Theater Strength.

The War Department was informed that the Theater strength on 1 September was 1,805,334;(8) however, it was later verified to be 2,042,478.(9) Of these, 1,158,809 were in the 45-75 point bracket, and

only 296,525 had scores of 75 or above. According to the current plans, therefore, the Theater would be shipping men in the low 70's even in September if all higher scores had been cleared to the last man. The breakdown of point score groupings was estimated as follows:(10)

0-44	350,000	70-74	100,000
45-59	758,809	75	296,525
60-69	300,000		

Other factors touching on the point system were brought up by the Theater at this conference. It was considered that 45 would be too low for the occupational troop basis, and it was suggested that 50-55 would be better. It was proposed that the liquidation force should consist of the 45-60 point men since the War Department did not require these men. It was pointed out that, due to the large amount of shipping per month and the rapid movement of units owing to the reversal of redeployment, it was impossible to readjust units into narrow point score brackets immediately. The best that could be done was to insure that all units were adjusted to 60 and above. All men over 60 would have to be acceptable to the War Department or the ships would return empty. It was also claimed that, on the basis of these figures, the shipping figures would require readjusting or the total lift through January 1946 of some 1,805,144 personnel would clear the Theater of even the occupational troop basis personnel. The Theater suggested that the critical score of 85 should be lowered by the number of points obtained between V-E Day and V-J Day, thus avoiding recomputation of scores. The War Department, meanwhile, reiterated that they did not want personnel below 70 and that

eventually all Category II Reserve units would have to be readjusted to 45 or below since a critical score of 45 would be reached ultimately.(11)

79. Change in Criteria for Discharge.

There had been considerable agitation for the lowering of discharge requirements. One change had been made on 1 September. At that time the War Department announced that all enlisted personnel over 35 years of age with two years of honorable active service could apply for immediate discharge. No special quotas were established to return this class of personnel to the United States. A further change came when the War Department announced that the critical score would be lowered to 80 for enlisted men and 41 for enlisted women. Eight points would be added to the score of all military personnel in the Theater for credit earned during the period from 12 May 1945 through 2 September 1945. Twelve points were given for each child born during this same period; credit was not subtracted from the total score for any child who died or reached the age of eighteen during this period. These additional eight points given to everyone in the Theater had the effect of lowering the critical score, based on V-E Day figures, to 72. Thus practically every man that the War Department desired to have shipped in the 70 and above bracket was now eligible for discharge. It was also directed that personnel having scores of 85 or above on V-E Day be given first priority for return. In addition, officers who desired to remain

in the service could volunteer irrevocably to serve for the duration of the emergency plus six months unless sooner relieved.(12)

80. Shipping Revision.

a. Revision of 3 September 1945. On 3 September a special TWX conference was held with the War Department. The Theater stated that by 1 December all men with adjusted service rating 60 (V-E Day) would be out of the Theater and that it would be imperative to reduce shipping for December. A reduction in October and November would also be welcomed. Firm shipping figures were needed by 30 September at the latest. The "close-out force" figure of 300,000 was again requested. A revised point score breakdown was submitted as follows:(13)

0-44	375,000	70-74	143,355
45-59	549,004	75	453,056
60-69	284,919	(Scores as of V-E Day)	

The War Department replied that the water lift was set up as follows, though it indicated that there might be a change:(14)

September	418,000	November	310,000
October	380,000	December	340,000

Total 1,448,000

The quota for the GREEN project was to be only 11,800 for September; and termination of the project was planned for 1 October 1945.(15) The War Department stated that the shipping for January and February had been scaled down to leave the Theater between January and July with the minimum personnel above the occupational troop basis for maintenance,

security, and disposal of surplus property. The War Department requested two divisions from the European Theater for the Strategic Reserve in the United States. All other units were to become Category IV, including all National Guard units. It was reiterated that men with the highest scores must return first lest the point system collapse. Return of high-score personnel by means of Category IV unit "carriers" was approved. Status reports were no longer required until strategic reserve units had been formed long enough to warrant submission. A clarification of the Theater strength figures which were obviously in error by 200,000 was requested.(16)

b. Revision of 6 September 1945. After setting up the shipping figures of 3 September, Theater Headquarters realized that such a shipping schedule would cut Theater strength to less than the figure needed for occupational and close-out duties. Thus the following revised shipping schedule was suggested by the Theater and approved by the War Department:

September	418,000	November	310,000
October	380,000	December	208,000
<u>Total</u>		<u>1,316,000</u>	

These shipping figures would reduce the strength of the Theater to 707,000 by 1 January 1946, and remove all personnel with an adjusted service rating score of above 60 as computed on the V-J Day basis. On 13 September the War Department approved in principle the final out-shipment.(17)

81. Redeployment Conference, 4 September 1945.

a. On 4 September 1945 a conference on the return of high-score personnel in accordance with War Department policy announced after V-J Day was held in Paris between the G-1 and G-3 sections of all major commands and representatives of Theater Headquarters. The meeting opened with a summary of redeployment since 14 August 1945. Discussion then followed on the use of casualties in shipments, the freeing of 45-60 personnel, the filling of the occupational troop basis with personnel whose adjusted service rating score was 45 or less, the requirements over and above the occupational troop basis, shipping problems, the liquidation force, the requirements of the United States Strategic Reserve, and the new reduction of the critical score.(18)

b. Major commands were informed of the following important procedural changes regarding Theater requirements: the Training Report required by TWX 75 days before redeployment was no longer required; boards of review were no longer required since military necessity was no longer a consideration; special emphasis was to be given to the return of high-score personnel, regardless of military necessity; no casual shipments or units departing in September and October would contain personnel with adjusted service rating scores of below 70 (V-J basis); and the definition of a quota as being only a minimum number for release was explained to all present. Commands were to request an increase in case more men were available in a particular score bracket

than covered by a particular quota. All recomputation of adjusted service rating scores was to be completed as quickly as possible so that everyone could act with an equal understanding when a certain score was computed. The matter of the War Department's desire to have only men with an adjusted service rating above the critical score shipped to the United States at this time was stressed. Men with low score would have to be pulled out all along the pipeline system, even at the ports, if necessary. The War Department's desire to have personnel returned in five-point brackets was also brought up. The commands thought that they could adjust to a ten-point bracket but that was the best they could do. As the amount of shipping was so great it was considered that this was sufficient for the present. All commands claimed that they would be hard hit on releasing some of the important technicians, especially the Air Forces, who were short of engineer mechanics and men to construct new air fields. They were informed, however, that they had to conform and to make shift as best they could.(19)

c. The United States Air Forces in Europe reported that they had only 34,042 personnel below 45 (V-E basis) and they would have to requisition 35,000 replacements to fill even the occupational force.(20)

d. The return of high score personnel by casual groups was frowned upon by all commands in general, as sufficient units for carriers were available. The Air Forces would probably have to rely completely on casual packets after October due to previous inactivations

of units. As units were depleted by withdrawals, they could be reduced to a "one officer, one enlisted man" status and then inactivated on War Department approval.(21)

e. Major commands were requested at the redeployment conference to submit nominations for units required for the close-out force. In a TWX conference with the War Department on 11 September 1945, the maximum figure for the close-out force was put at 337,000, which was confirmed in a cable dated 12 September 1945. This cable also directed the designation of liquidation force units as Category IV as soon as their work had been completed.(22)

82. War Department Approval of the Occupational Troop Basis.

a. The final plans for the occupational troop basis had been taken to the War Department by Brigadier General Eyster on 6 September. On 29 September he returned bringing with him the War Department approval of the occupational troop basis and Theater strength of 707,000 on 1 January 1946. The occupational troop basis was set at 363,000 excluding service units for the Mediterranean Theater and a "liquidation force" of 337,000. Based on these approvals the Requirements Section planned a list of Category I units for early publication. This list included the 1st, 3rd, 9th, 42nd, and 78th Infantry Divisions and the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions. In addition the 71st, 80th, 83rd, 84th, 94th and 102nd Infantry were listed as the close-out force and designated Category I (T) units. Category II divisions were the 2nd Armored Division

and the 101st Airborne Division. All other divisions were re-categorized as Category IV.(23)

b. On 24 September a representative of the Redeployment Branch was sent to Italy to determine the Mediterranean Theater's re-deployment, since it was then contemplated that the two Theaters would combine on 1 December 1945; to get estimates of the strength status of that Theater, by month, after 1 December; and to obtain the status of readjustment on 1 December 1945.(24)

c. The score level for 1 December in that Theater was estimated to be below 45 for enlisted men and below 70 for officers. If the occupation of Venezia Giulia was not necessary, the occupational troop basis for Italy could be reduced to 5,000 by 1 July 1946, the bulk of these being Air Forces. One B-29 group would be needed in the Air Forces occupational troop basis. It was estimated that 1,250,000 long tons of supplies must be disposed of, and this could be completed by 1 April 1946.(25)

83. Plan for Outshipment of the Liquidation Force.

Plans were made for the outshipment of the liquidation force after 1 January 1946. The first plans were as follows:(26)

January	100,000	April	50,000
February	50,000	May	50,000
March	50,000	June	37,000
	<u>Total</u>		<u>337,000</u>

At the end of the month of September, however, the plan was to ship out approximately one twelfth of the total force each month during January, February, and March, and one fourth of the total force each month during April, May, and June. It was considered that the bulk of the force would be needed during the critical months of January, February, and March.(27)

84. Redeployment of Officers.

a. Policy Changes. On 6 September the War Department had announced the long-awaited definite policy on officer redeployment. Most of Readjustment Regulations 1-5 was rescinded. Effective 2 September the release scores for officers were as follows:(28)

Male (field grade)	100	Nurses	65
Male (company grade)	85	Women's Army	
Male (warrant officers		Corps	44
and flight officers)	80	Physiotherapists	
		and Medical	
		Dietitians	41

All officers above critical score except Regular Army and volunteers (for duration of emergency plus six months) were to be reported for separation within sixty days of eligibility date. There was to be no consideration of military necessity for certain Transportation Corps specialists and for legal officers with admiralty law experience in the Transportation Corps, and for officers assigned to, or in training for, civil affairs or military government. If volunteers were surplus they could be returned to the United States for final decision on retention. Separation of officers above critical scores was carried out in the

late in August that it was considered expedient to permit excess medical officers to leave the Theater.(34)

(2) On 22 August, therefore, a directive was issued to all commands requiring the release of Medical Department officers whose loss, without replacements, would not jeopardize the medical service for the command. These officers would be released against high-score quotas of major commands and in proper relation to officers of other arms and services.(35) A study of the adjusted service rating score of all female medical personnel had been made and it had been determined that, in order to meet Theater requirements, a score of 55 would have to be set for nurses for redeployment purposes, and 40 for physiotherapists and dietitians.(36) Each major command had been instructed to submit a weekly report by air courier to Theater Headquarters of all Medical Department officers returned to the United States during the preceding seven days, excluding those returning to units. These were to be reported by the submission of extracts of unit rosters.(37)

(3) On 10 September a directive was issued to all major commands which authorized the retention of low-score medical officers in the ratio of 2.5 per 1000 troops assigned to the command. The remaining officers were eligible for discharge if they possessed the scores made effective for all officers on 2 September 1945. The above release scores for female medical officers were rescinded by this directive. All low-score medical officers in excess of the 2.5 ratio

were to be reported for appropriate disposition.(38) A high priority for the shipment of eligible officers to the United States was established.

(4) As the War Department was under considerable pressure to return as many medical officers as possible for civilian use, the number authorized the Theater was lowered to 32 Medical Department officers per 1000 fixed beds (the number of fixed beds being 4 percent of the troop strength), 1.1 percent of the troop strength for Dental Corps officers, and one nurse per 12 fixed beds.(39)

(5) The cut in September shipping left many eligible Medical Department officers stranded. To insure their rapid redeployment, air priority by way of the Green project was authorized.(40) The Green project was curtailed early in September, however, and was stopped completely by 30 September. An accumulation of officers awaiting transportation forced the adoption of emergency measures. Arrangements were made with the Air Transport Command to furnish three planes daily to ship a daily total of from 60 to 75 medical officers out of the Theater until all eligible were gone. This project was completed on 5 October 1945.(41)

85. Lowering of Discharge Criteria.

a. Effective 1 October 1945, the War Department directed the Theater to return personnel who qualified under the following criteria

for discharge:(42)

Male (except Medical Department) officers	75	Women's Army Corps (enlisted)	36
Male (enlisted)	70	Women's Army Corps (officers)	39

b. Special criteria were established for Medical and Dental officers as follows:

Medical and
Dental Officers -- score of 80, 48 years of age, or,
if not possessing a critical skill,
active military service since 7
December 1941, and, if possessing
a critical skill, service prior to
1 January 1941.

Veterinary
Officers -- score of 80, 42 years of age, or
active military service since
1 January 1941.

Administrative
and Sanitary
Corps officers -- score of 70, 42 years of age, or
active military service since 7
December 1941.

Nurses -- score of 35, 35 years of age,
married, or with dependents under
14 years of age.

Physiotherapists
and dietitians -- score of 40, 40 years of age,
married, or with dependents under
14 years of age.

86. Delays in Shipping.

By the middle of September 1945, it became evident that
shipping was not going to meet the schedule of 410,000 which had been

set up for September departure. There were several reasons for this. Many Liberty and Victory ships being converted into troop carriers in shipyards in the Zone of the Interior were not ready, owing to strikes in the dockyards. Some ships that had been borrowed by the United States during the war had been returned to their former owners. The turn-around time for ships was longer than had been estimated; and finally, storms increased sailing time and delayed loading as the ships arrived at the docks out of schedule and had to wait for dock space.(43)

87. Mauve Project.(44)

During July there had developed, in the United States, due to a heavy redeployment traffic, a critical shortage of railroad operators. In order to alleviate this situation the War Department, in accordance with personal instructions from General Marshall, directed the speedy return of all railroad men.(45) Officers and enlisted men whose adjusted service rating scores were at least 85 and who possessed any of the 20 military occupational specialty numbers dealing with railroad work were eligible for return under the terms of the Mauve project.(46) By the end of July 318 men were on their way to the United States.(47) On 3 August the War Department speeded up the program, giving the men to be returned under the project a priority over all other high score returnees and directed that all men qualifying under the terms of the project be returned not later than 15 September.(48) The Theater scheduled the men to return by air with the Green project.(49) By 28

September a total of 488 had been returned by water and 2,454 had been returned by air. The remaining men left shortly thereafter. Approximately 3,000 men were returned to the United States under the provisions of the Maave project.(50)

88. September Inactivations and Shipments of Corps and Divisions.

During September the Theater inactivated the XIX and XXI Corps, and made plans to inactivate the XII and XXII. The II Corps had previously been inactivated. Three divisions--the 65th and 76th Infantry and the 11th Armored Divisions--were also inactivated in the Theater. During September nine divisions were redeployed to the Zone of the Interior. These were the 45th, 63rd, 69th, 70th, 103rd, and 106th Infantry Divisions, the 6th and 14th Armored Divisions and the 17th Airborne Division.(51)

89. Analysis of September Shipments.

a. Troop movements from the Theater during September totalled 374,307.(52) Of these, 369,918 were personnel being redeployed and the remainder(53) were persons returning on temporary duty and detached service. A breakdown of shipments by category and service is given in the Table(54) on the following page:

b. The majority of the men shipped during September had point scores of 80 or above. A breakdown of shipments by adjusted service rating score is given on the following page:(55)

**ARMS, AIR, SERVICE AND CASUAL SHIPMENTS
SEPTEMBER 1945**

<u>Category II</u> (Indirect and Reserve)		
Service	30,921	
Arms	28,968	
Air	7,702	
Total		67,591
<u>Category IV</u>		
Service	14,444	
Arms	140,340	
Air	10,639	
Total		165,423
<u>Casuals</u>		
Patients	4,793	
High-score	131,668	
Low-score	11,726	
Navy and miscellaneous	3,106	
Total		141,293
Grand Total		374,307

<u>Y-J Scores</u>		
<u>Enlisted</u>		
0-55	34,364	
56-69	25,673	
70-74	11,925	
75-79	12,830	
80-	252,640	
Total		337,432
<u>Officer</u>		
Above critical score	25,582	
Below critical score	3,797	
Total		278,202
<u>Officer and Enlisted Men</u>		
Above critical score	278,202	
Below critical score	88,589	
Total		366,791

90. Inactivation of Assembly Area Command.

During the month of September, the use of Assembly Area was reduced and on 22 September 1945 the command was inactivated. The administration of the Assembly Area camps was transferred to Oise Intermediate Section. That command was then granted authority by the Theater to send special processing teams to divisions at their unit stations to remain a week or 10 days and complete the work that the Assembly Area formerly accomplished. This enabled the divisions to by-pass the Assembly Area and proceed directly to the staging areas. (56)

91. Summary of Redeployment Procedures and Accomplishments as of 1 October 1945.

a. Instructions issued by the War Department Theater Headquarters on readjustment and redeployment procedures and policies had grown so great in number that it became administratively difficult for major commands to intercept and apply them correctly. A circular "Summary of Personnel Readjustment Policies and Procedures" was prepared by the G-1 Division to clarify and consolidate all instructions which had been issued since V-J Day. Reference to the Theater circular in alert and movement orders issued by Theater Headquarters made it unnecessary for action agencies to familiarize themselves with the provisions of the twenty-nine cables which the circular summarized. This circular proved to be an invaluable source of summarized information. The important subjects covered by the circular were: discharge criteria effective 1

October and 1 November 1945, critical military occupational specialty numbers, officer volunteers, release of Medical Department personnel, return of low-score personnel to the United States, and reports required from major commands on departing units.(57) Two days later the Theater revised its basic plan of 1 August and issued the "Directive for Redeployment and Readjustment Following the Cessation of Hostilities."(58) These two publications, together with the revision of Theater SQP Number 61, Preparation for Overseas Movement, Redeployment, furnished policies and procedures for all levels.(59)

b. The total movement of personnel for the period from 12 May to 30 September 1945 is given in the table on the following page:(60) The planned shipping schedule for 8 May-30 September 1945 called for 1,509,309. Space for only 1,450,626 arrived; overloading made it possible to ship a total of 1,451,558.(61) This left the Theater with a strength of 1,672,569 of which 117,172 were officers (including 2,864 regular army officers) and 1,555,397 enlisted personnel. This strength was broken down on 30 September 1945 as shown on the following page:(62)

OCTOBER REDEPLOYMENT

92. Acceleration of Readjustment.

October started off with a speed-up of redeployment. In order

Category II (Indirect and Reserve)		
Service	202,884	
Arms	292,413	
Air	165,244	
Total		660,541
Category II (Direct)		
Service	98,613	
Arms	-	
Air	-	
Total (no shipment in September)		98,613
Category IV (to U.S. for Demobilization)		
Service	14,444	
Arms	140,340	
Air	10,639	
Total		165,423
Casuals (includes non-redeployment Casuals)		
RAMPS	68,457	
Patients	92,325	
High-score	241,567	
Others	124,682	
Total		526,981
Grand total		1,451,558

	Enlisted Men	Officers
75-up		71,770
80-up	320,938	
70-74		9,476
70-79	293,646	
60-69	318,698	15,649
50-59	118,861	5,157
40-49	270,544	
0-39		15,120
0-44	232,510	
Total	1,565,397	117,172

to carry out General Eisenhower's directive that all personnel leave the Theater in "highest score first" order, the activities of the Troops and Redeployment Branch were coordinated very closely with the G-1 Division in an accelerated readjustment program. A coordinated command cable had been dispatched on 25 September 1945 directing that all enlisted personnel with adjusted service rating scores of 80 and above be shipped from the Theater in October;(63) all enlisted personnel with adjusted service rating scores of 70 or above in November. All shipments in both months were to exclude those with critical military occupational specialty numbers, volunteers, those to be discharged in the Theater and those hospitalized. All major commands were directed to nominate additional Category IV units as vehicles for the surplus 80-pointers and above who could not be shipped out of the Theater under current quotas.(64) The War Department had announced that effective 1 November 1945 the critical scores for enlisted men would be 60 and for enlisted women 34. Enlisted personnel with adjusted service rating scores of below 80 could not, however, be placed in units for outshipment as long as any above 80 remained in the command. Officers were to be reported for separation within 60 days of the date upon which they were to become eligible. Enlisted personnel continued to be separated under the procedures governing since 2 September 1945.(65)

93. Readjustment Directives to Major Commands.

When one month remained to ship all enlisted men with an

adjusted service rating score of 80 or above from the Theater, certain measures were taken to effect this. The Inspector General was authorized to direct the attention of commanders, where necessary, to the fact that they were violating Theater policies by placing personnel with adjusted service rating scores lower than that authorized in outgoing units, and all violations reported by the Inspector General were investigated and appropriate action taken.(66) On 6 October 1945 a cable was dispatched to all commands directing them to assume responsibility for final compliance with the War Department instructions.(67)

94. The Effect of Shipping Delays.

To make up the September loss in shipping, the Theater requested the War Department to raise the October shipping schedule from 380,000 to 409,000, as it was judged that this would be sufficient to return all 80-point men to the Zone of the Interior. However, the same factors that produced the September loss prevailed in October, and a carry-over of 80-pointers into November became inevitable. The coup de grace to plans for "all 80's out of the Theater in October" and "707,000 on 1 January" was delivered with the sudden loss (by return to the British) of the Queen Elizabeth and the Aquitania early in October, together with the loss of other troop space (ten Victory ships) in exchange for continued use of the Queen Mary. It was estimated that this transaction entailed a loss of 120,000 spaces in the period up to 1 January 1946. As a result all men with scores of 80 or above were expected to leave the Theater by the middle of November. Since 80-point

personnel had continued to turn up from time to time in out of the way parts of the Theater, it could not definitely be stated that all 80's would be out by 15 November. The return of Victories and Liberties in ballast enabled these ships to maintain a better turnaround time than during the previous month. As a result of the shipping loss it was estimated that only 352,000 would leave in October. As a partial compensation for the loss of other vessels, it was planned to use naval vessels. Three CVLs and three CVEs and six cruisers with a total combined capacity of 27,000 were planned for the Theater. Only four CVLs and three heavy carriers were received. The six cruisers were eventually used. The three CVEs, however, were cancelled and another plan adopted. Of the CVLs lent to the United Kingdom during the war, two were to be released to the United States Navy each month and would carry high-score personnel with them to the United States for the one crossing. Later, the battleship Washington was also received to carry redeployment personnel. (68)

95. G-3 Division Supervision.

During the month of October various staff officers of the G-3 Division of Theater Headquarters were sent to the major commands, the ports, and staging areas to determine whether the commands were properly carrying out the Theater Commander's directives on readjustment and redeployment. The Movements Section was busy rearranging the priorities of units in the pipeline so that they would outship in proper order. Sometimes new readiness dates were given to speed up the processing or to

allow higher-score units to by-pass the lower-score ones. The situation was complicated from time to time by some commands reporting that units with very high scores had suddenly been located in their areas. (69)

96. Tri-monthly Strength Report.

A tri-monthly strength report was initiated by the G-1 Division on 23 October 1945. All commands were to submit to Theater Headquarters a tri-monthly report containing the command strength in white and colored enlisted personnel broken down in 10-point adjusted service rating brackets from 44 to 80 enlisted men, and in 5-point brackets from 74 to 100 for officer personnel. Additional information such as over-age, volunteer, and re-enlistment furlough personnel in the above score brackets was also required. The submission of the tri-monthly report continued until 30 November 1945, when it was rescinded. Prior to the tri-monthly report, the Machine Record Unit was the only source of strength information. The compelling reason for adopting a new system of strength accounting was the lag of 18 to 24 days in the availability of the Machine Record Unit figures of Theater strength as of the first of every month. With the acceleration of the redeployment program, up-to-date strength data became increasingly necessary. The tri-monthly report was then adopted for determining the current strength and the establishment of Theater quotas, and as a check on the over-all progress of redeployment by a comparison of successive reports. It was also

employed in studies on the occupational troop basis and liquidation force requiring strength figures on personnel in the lower point-score brackets, and in the allocation of redeployment quotas to the major commands.(70)

97. Plans for the Reduction of Theater Strength.

Meanwhile plans were made to reduce the Theater strength of 707,000 by 1 January 1946. Theater strength reduction for the remainder of the year was estimated as follows:(71)

Theater Strength, 1 November (estimated)		1,317,000
November Shipping Lift	390,000	
December Shipping Lift	367,000	757,000
Uncorrected Strength, 1 January 1946		560,000
MTO Strength (estimated)	50,000	
Replacements (estimated)	75,000	
Naval, Quasi-official and TD Returns	22,000	147,000
Theater Strength, 1 January 1946		707,000

Thus, if there were no delays in shipping as had occurred in September and October the target strength of the Theater would be reached by the date set, 1 January 1946.

98. Redeployment of Task Force "A".

Plans were made to include in the October high-score personnel of Task Force "A" in Norway. Low-score personnel were to be sent to the Continent as replacements. British units were to take over the

American Sector of Norway, and only a few men were to be left with the United States Military Attache to Norway for close-out purposes. Redeployment was to begin approximately 15 October. Three ships would be sufficient to remove all personnel scheduled to depart.(72)

99. Air Forces Redeployment.

The readjustment situation in the Air Forces had been subject to much discussion for a long time. It was finally settled when Theater approved the United States Air Forces in Europe plan to select the most suitable units for moving out priority I personnel (score of 80 and above), priority II (score of 75-79), priority III (score of 70-74), priority IV (score of 65-69) and priority V (score of 60-64) personnel without regard to original readiness date in order to avoid useless shifting of personnel. As soon as such units were determined, Theater Headquarters amended movement orders to establish appropriate readiness dates.(73)

100. High Point Readjustments for November Shipment.

On 25 October a cable was dispatched to the Air Forces directing that all personnel above adjusted service rating score of 80 who could not be placed in units with a readiness date of 4 November be placed in units with a readiness date of 6 November. Other units with readiness dates of 6, 15, and 30 November were to be adjusted on a 70-79 adjusted service rating score bracket.(74)

101. October Shipments.

a. During October two infantry and five armored divisions were redeployed to the United States. These shipments included the 70th and 75th Infantry Divisions and the 5th, 7th, 9th, 10th and 16th Armored Divisions.(75)

b. During October a total of 366,903 persons, of whom 359,938 were redeployment personnel, left the Theater for the Zone of the Interior. A breakdown of the shipments by category and service is given in the table on the following page:(76)

Category II			
Service		1,018	
Arms		5,481	
Air		15	
Total			6,514
Category IV			
Service		45,471	
Arms		136,750	
Air		29,278	
Total			211,499
Casuals			
Redeployment			
Above critical score	94,620		
Reassignment	2,647		
Patients	1,688		
Over age	32,111		
Medical Officers and			
Nurses	405		
Redeployment detachments	546		
Emergency	6,795		
Other	2,113		
Total Redeployment		141,925	
Non-redeployment			
TD or DS	294		
TD or RN & R	2,132		
Troops not charged to			
Theater	1,703		
Civilians and Allied			
military	1,562		
Navy and miscellaneous	1,274		
Total Non-redeployment		6,965	
Total			148,890
Grand total shipped			366,903

The total shipment of 366,903 did not meet the 391,129 forecast set up by the Transportation Corps. However, it exceeded the forecast of

318,000 made by the Theater in a TWX conference with the War Department in August.(77)

c. The majority of the personnel shipped had point scores of 75 or above. A breakdown of October shipments by adjusted service rating scores is shown in the table below:(78)

Enlisted Personnel*		
0-55	22,195	
55-59	7,016	
60-69	17,787	
70-74	33,394	
75-up	261,344	
Total		331,736
Officers**		
Above critical score	26,854	
Below critical score	1,348	
Total		28,202
Officers and Enlisted Personnel		
Above critical score	313,404	
Below critical score	46,534	
Total		359,938

*Includes 2,041 enlisted women above the critical score of 36. Critical score for enlisted men was 70.

**Includes 69 Women's Army Corps officers, 2281 nurses, 62 physiotherapists and dietitians. Critical score for male officers was 75; Women's Army Corps officers, 39; nurses, 35; and physiotherapists and dietitians, 41.(79)

d. This left a Theater strength of 93,580 officers and 1,223,748 enlisted personnel; a total of 1,317,328. This was broken down to adjusted service rating score groups as shown in table below: (80)

Enlisted Personnel	
0-55	412,979
56-59	101,905
60-69	287,906
70-79	218,263
80-up	120,044*
Unknown	82,651
Total	1,223,748
Officers	
0-77	37,614
75-up	43,238
Unknown	12,728**
Total	93,580

*Include 51,358 in staging.

**Approximately 2,800 of these officers were regular army.

NOVEMBER 1945

102. Redeployment Conference, 3 November 1945.

a. On 3 November 1945 a conference was held in Paris between the G-1 and G-3 sections of all major commands and major subordinate commands of Theater Service Forces and representatives of Theater

Headquarters. The purpose was to discuss the nomination of Category IV units, availability dates, strength of commands, adjusted service rating score brackets, and the release of personnel who were surplus to the occupational troop basis and close-out force requirements.(81)

b. The last residual quota, which would bring the Theater strength down to 707,000 by 1 January 1946 and establish a score-level of between 55 and 59 was set up and issued to the commands. If it were necessary to dip below 55 to fill a quota, the command concerned was to notify the Theater of the estimated score-level it would have to reach in order to meet the quota. All commands were to submit Category IV carrier units arranged in the desired sequence for outmovement. Units were to be adjusted within five-point brackets, between 55 and 70. Divisions were allowed a ten-point spread. The Theater would continue all sequence lists into a single priorities list for final outshipment of the entire quota.(82)

103. Opening of Bremen to Receive Replacements.

On 31 October the War Department was advised that Bremen was being prepared as a main port of debarkation for replacements. It was estimated that replacements would be received there at the rate of 3000 every ten days from 1 November to 1 December, 5000 from 1 to 10 December, and 10,000 every ten days thereafter. The responsibilities of Bremen Port Command would consist of reception, billeting, feeding, and

transporting personnel to other depots. A maximum time of 48 hours was set for retention of troops in the staging area.(83)

104. Method of Verifying Low-Score Personnel in Shipments.

In order to verify the numbers of low-score personnel in units departing from their home stations to processing agencies of Theater Service Forces, the Theater dispatched a cable on 7 September to all major commands directing them to submit a report concerning Category IV units within 24 hours after the availability date of the unit.(84) This report included date of departure from the unit station, strength of unit by adjusted service rating score groups, and date of expected arrival at the port of debarkation. On 7 November, all major commands were directed to have Category IV units having readiness dates only report 24 hours subsequent to readiness date, if the date was prior to 1 December, or five days prior to readiness date, if the date was subsequent to 1 December. On 10 November all Category IV units not specifically scheduled for processing at unit stations were directed to complete personnel adjustment by the availability date. All reports showing personnel above or below the proper point bracket for the unit must contain a statement as to action being taken to readjust the personnel content. All the above data was collected and consolidated in a report submitted daily to the G-3 and G-1 Divisions.(85)

105. New York Parade.

On 6 November the War Department requested that a division

be made available from the Theater to parade either in New York City or Washington early in January for the purpose of glorifying the American soldier and his achievements in battle. The Theater tentatively nominated the 79th Infantry Division. In the final selection, this division was dropped from consideration because it was scheduled for early redeployment. The 82nd Airborne Division composed of low-score personnel from both the 82nd and the 101st Airborne Division was chosen. All high-score personnel from the two divisions were returned to the United States for discharge. The 101st Airborne Division was inactivated in the Theater. The 82nd was scheduled to sail on 28 December to New York to participate in the parade. Following the parade, this division would become a cadre for the formation of a new airborne division as part of the United States Strategic Reserve. (86)

106. Discussion on Consolidation of European Theater and Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

Discussion concerning the consolidation of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and the European Theater of Operations had begun in October. On 20 October the War Department had sent the Theater a proposal to adjust shipping so as to permit the score-level for personnel eligible for separation in both Theaters by 1 December 1945. Comments had been requested of both the Theaters on the plan. Both had agreed that the proposal was not practicable because the diversion of shipping from the Mediterranean Theater would not be sufficiently great

to help the European Theater substantially, and would interfere with the Mediterranean Theater's shipping plans for November. The question of the consolidation of the European and Mediterranean Theaters came to a head during November. On 3 November, the Theater informed the War Department that neither Theater desired to adjust shipping to permit the same score-level in both Theaters by 1 December. The War Department approved the decision on 7 November, and the matter ended with the final rejection of the proposed merger on 20 November 1945.(87)

107. Redeployment Forecast Unit Schedule, 4th Edition.

On 15 November 1945, the fourth edition of the Redeployment Forecast Unit Schedule was published.(88) This document listed every unit which was in the Theater on V-E Day, and thus furnished a complete history of unit movement since that day. An extract of this forecast had been published on 20 October under separate cover and entitled "United States Liquidation Force, and Occupational Troop Basis."(89)

108. Control over Shipments.

During November the G-3 Division exercised stringent control over the priorities list, and coordinated closely with the Transportation Corps in governing the outshipment of personnel. Units in the pipeline were adjusted to assure outshipping in proper adjusted service rating score brackets. Improper adjustment of units by major commands necessitated frequent changes in the priority lists. This list was the basis for the planned shipping of units and presented their availability

to fill the estimated lift for outshipment. When major commands failed to adjust units properly or reported them as being adjusted within erroneous adjusted service rating score brackets, the priority list lost its value and there was the possibility of personnel in lower point score brackets being shipped home prior to high-score personnel. To prevent such an occurrence, it was directed that units in the 80-point score bracket be given priority in outloading over the 70 to 79 bracket carrier units. Exceptions to this policy were made only when such action would delay a scheduled sailing of a vessel. Under no circumstances were the scheduled sailings of vessels to be delayed, nor were vessels to be permitted to sail with vacant accommodations. Subsequent similar instructions were issued as successively lower transition points were reached.(90)

109. November Departures.

a. The month of November was the one in which the largest number of persons were redeployed. Of the 420,795 troops leaving the Theater, 400,058 were redeployment personnel. December departures by category and service are given in the table on the following page:(91)

Category II Units			
Service		59	
Arms		6	
Air		-	
Total			65
Category IV Units			
Service		144,704	
Arms		142,974	
Air		35,527	
Total			323,205
Casuals			
Redeployment			
Above critical score	54,008		
Reassignment	3,721		
Patients	6,193		
Overage	6,182		
Medical officers and nurses	2		
Emergency	4,921		
Other	1,761		
Total		76,788	
Non-redeployment			
TD or DS	398		
TD or RR & R	5,568		
Troops not charged to Theater	1,272		
Civilians and Allied military	1,318		
Navy and miscellaneous	1,465		
Volunteers	10,716		
Total		20,737	
Total Casuals			97,525
Grand total			420,795

DECEMBER 1945

110. Redeployment of Medical Corps Officers.

a. Discharge criteria for Medical Corps personnel was changed on 1 December to the following:

Medical and Dental Officers	--	Score of 70, age 48, or 42 months of active military duty. (45 months or score of 80, or service prior to 7 December 41 for some specialists).
Veterinary Corps Officers	--	Score of 70, age 42, or 42 months active service.
Sanitary Corps Officers	--	Score of 60, age 42, or 42 months of active service.
Medical Administrative Corps Officers	--	Score of 60, age 42, or 42 months service.
Nurses and Physiotherapists	-	Score of 25, age 30, 2 years service, married, or with dependent children under 14 years of age.
Hospital Dietitians	--	Score of 30, age 35, married, or with dependent children under 14 years of age.

Officers could be retained for 90 days after eligibility date although it was emphasized that maximum care as to whether they were needed must be exercised in the retention of officers eligible for discharge. (92)

b. Early in December the problem of redeployment of Medical Department officers became acute again. Two officers, Colonel D. G. Hall and Lieutenant Colonel B. R. Powell, representing the Secretary of War, arrived in the Theater to investigate the redeployment of Medical Department officers. After the termination of the Green project in September the Theater had arranged for a high priority surface transportation for the redeployment of these officers. Even before the 1 December release criteria were in effect, the Theater had cut the redeployment scores of Medical Department officers. The Theater had reiterated from time to time the necessity of returning Medical Department officers as expeditiously as possible. Officers additional to those required to maintain the 2.5 ratio or for meeting Table of Organization requirements of Category I units were dropped from the essential category list. The regulation permitting nurses to fill the male Table of Organization vacancies of Category IV units was also rescinded and doctors were substituted.(93)

c. On 19 December the War Department announced new criteria for Medical Department officers effective 31 December 1945.

Medical Corps
Officers (except
Groups I, II, and
III).

-- Score of 65, age 45, or 3
years of service.

Group I

-- Score of 70, age 45, three
years nine months of service.

Group II	-- Score of 80, age 45, or continuous active service since prior to 7 December 1941.
Group III	-- Score of 80, age 48, or continuous active service since prior to 7 December 1941.
Dental Corps or Veterinary Corps Officers	-- Score of 65, age 42 (Veterinary) or age 45 (Dental), or three years and six months service. (94)

d. All medical officers now on active duty who were graduates of the Army Specialized Training Program were not eligible for separation under point scores, length of service, or age, until they had completed three years of active service. Various procedures were prescribed for the different categories of medical officer.

e. On 2 December, all major commands were directed to survey their Table of Organization and non-Table of Organization allotments of Medical Department and Dental Corps officers and immediately to effect the maximum reduction in such officers, consistent with adequate medical supervision, by combining the medical requirements of adjacent units and installations. Infantry divisions were reduced to 22 Medical Department officers, and armored divisions to 20. All Medical Department, Dental Corps, and Veterinary Corps officers having adjusted service rating scores above 70, and if not placed in Category IV Medical units or casual groups, were reported to the Chief Surgeon for subsequent movement in numbers as indicated by him. It was in groups such as these

that the majority of surplus officer personnel of the Medical Department left the Theater. Necessary arrangements with the major commands for shipping these officers to the ports were handled by the Theater Chief Surgeon. The G-3 Division issued instructions to the Transportation Corps and to the ports, stressing the need for expediting the movement of this personnel. Throughout the period of movement, during December, the G-1 Division maintained a liaison officer at the port who reported daily on the progress made.(95)

111. Control of Return of Low-Score Personnel.

The War Department had advised the Theater that they were being embarrassed by the return of unauthorized low-score personnel from the Theater. The bulk of the low-score departures were found authorized by various reasons. To make the return of low-score personnel 100 percent perfect, however, the Theater notified all commands on 6 December 1945, that each unit or casual shipment commander complete a certificate stating the reason under which each person with a score lower than the current critical score was leaving. The commander was required to list all returning low-score personnel by name, rank, army serial number, reason for departure, and major command issuing the order for return. Theater Service Forces were charged with the responsibility of collecting these certificates at the port, consolidating the information, and reporting on a tri-monthly basis the low-score departures by reason for departure.(96)

112. Reduction in Shipping.

At the same time as the particular efforts to reduce to a minimum the low-score returns, the War Department announced a reduction in shipping for the Theater. Twenty-one vessels had been removed from Theater use. The rated capacity of these vessels, 54,157, meant a considerable loss. Later in the month the War Department announced that naval vessels would be recalled from the Theater by the end of the month. This order would further reduce the shipping for redeploying personnel. At the same time the War Department hinted that the Queen Mary would make its last trip for carrying male personnel to the Zone of the Interior on 28 December. Altogether a 90,000 lift would be lost by the end of the month.(97)

113. Plans for 1946 Redeployment.

a. Early in November the War Department requested Theater comments on two alternative courses of action for the return of enlisted personnel from the Theater during the first half of 1946. The first course was to reduce Theater strength as far as shipping would permit until the occupational troop basis (initially 370,000) had been reached. Considering shipping and replacement shipping capabilities this strength, 370,000, would be reached by mid-March. The second course was to phase out troops as rapidly as possible consistent with fulfilling all assigned functions.(98)

b. The Theater returned its comments on 22 November which were substantially as follows: The advantages of adopting the first course were that redeployment would be greatly accelerated, available shipping would be utilized to the maximum, and heavy pressure on War Department from Congress and the public would be alleviated. The implications inherent in the adoption of the first course were that the useful employment of the last elements of the "close-out force" would cease about mid-February since it required one month to pass the personnel through the pipeline; considerable numbers of the occupational force would have to be withdrawn to redeploy the last elements of this close-out force; the close-out force had other duties than liquidating supplies and property. The establishment of a constabulary type occupational force would withdraw some 38,000 personnel from normal occupational duties in addition to a considerable overhead and administrative detail. Hence, after mid-February the occupational force would have to assume all the normal duties of the close-out force. For the above reasons the Theater stated that the adoption of the second course was essential, if the Theater was to carry out properly its various missions, other than redeployment. The proposed plan of liquidating the close-out force was to move out one twelfth of the force in each of the first three months of 1946 and one fourth of the force in each of the next three months, leaving the Theater strength as of 11 July at 363,000.(99)

114. Plan for Further Reduction in Theater Strength.

a. During December it was necessary for the Theater to determine its required strength after 1 January 1946 for close-out and occupational duties. From time to time the figure of 344,000 close-out force and attached units, had been reduced. The Theater Commander at this time directed that the Occupational Troop Basis be reduced from 363,000 to 300,000. The close-out force, plus attached units, was set at 316,000. This gave 616,000 as the Total Theater strength for 1 January 1946. Shipping had to be reduced to permit the retention of this number of personnel on 1 January because it was evident that the huge amount of shipping of previous months could not be accepted. A shipping estimate of 342,000 for December would reduce the Theater strength to 616,000 by 1 January 1946. The estimated Theater strength as of 1 January was as follows:(100)

Theater strength, 1 December (including 75,000 expected replacements)	942,000
December lift (redeployment only)	<u>326,000</u>
Final Theater strength, 1 January 1946	616,000

b. Plans were made to reduce the close-out force gradually over a six month period inasmuch as the War Department had approved the Theater's request to adopt the second course. However, a detailed report showing the breakdown of the number of men needed for each mission to be accomplished was requested by the War Department to substantiate

the 616,000 figure. A manpower commission of three general officers was appointed to determine which tasks were necessary and to ascertain that excessive numbers of men were not being employed to accomplish these tasks. (101)

115. Plans and Estimates for Shipping and Flow of Reinforcements.

a. In order to carry out the plans outlined above, a planned shipping schedule for January through June 1946 was estimated as follows: (102)

Close-out Force	High score replacements for reinforcements from United States	Miscellaneous MRR, reenlistment furloughs	Total Shipping
January 47,700	34,500	15,000	97,200
February 53,500	22,200	15,000	90,700
March 53,500	20,000	15,000	88,500
April 53,500	23,000	15,000	91,500
May 53,500	18,000	15,000	86,500
June 53,500	18,000	15,000	86,500
Totals 315,200	135,700	90,000	540,900

b. Thus it can be seen that the total shipping per month (no month over 100,000) would include 53,500 of the close-out force, high-score personnel replaced by reinforcements arriving in the Theater from the United States, and an estimated 15,000 men returning to the United States on rest, rehabilitation and recuperation and the reenlistment

furlough. It was estimated that 52,000 of the 75,000 reinforcements due in the Theater up to 1 January 1946 would arrive by the end of the month, leaving a deficit of 23,000. This deficit was not included in the 616,000 figure and thus reduced the effective force available to the Theater. In fact, of the 616,000 only 453,000 were effective.(103) The breakdown of the 163,000 ineffectives in the total Theater strength is as follows:(104)

Leave, furlough, pass, confinement, hospitalized	90,000
Reenlistment furlough	15,000
Rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery	10,000
Deficit in reinforcements for which high-score men have already departed	23,000
Troops in pipeline	<u>25,000</u> 163,000

c. Since the close-out force and the 15,000 were definitely fixed each month, the total shipping for the month would vary with the receipt of reinforcements from the United States. High-score replacements would depart each month based on the scheduled arrival of reinforcements for any one month. However, the number of reinforcements deficient in any month would be subtracted from the numbers scheduled to depart two months later. This was due to the fact that quotas were given major commands based upon expected arrivals of reinforcements. Once a man was in the pipeline it was not feasible to retard his

redeployment.(105)

116. New Summary of Readjustment Policies.

On 18 December the G-1 Division published Circular 164, which was a consolidation of Circular 134 and all changes in policy and procedure on readjustment received from the War Department up to that date.(106) This document also supplemented the Theater "Directive for Redeployment and Readjustment Following Cessation of Hostilities." It was thought that this directive with its annexes and supplements as amended from time to time would see redeployment to its conclusion on 1 July 1946.

117. Rehabilitation, Recuperation and Recovery Program.

A program for the return to the United States on temporary duty for 30 days for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery of a limited number of personnel whose services would be required in the occupational forces had been established by Theater Headquarters in August 1945. The allocation of quotas to the major commands for the return of eligible personnel was a function of the G-1 Division. The allocations were based on the proportional strength of low-score personnel, Regular Army, volunteers, and other types of personnel who could be expected to remain in the Theater for a reasonable length of time. These quotas were adjusted from time to time according to the ability of the command to fill preceding quotas. Effective 1 January 1946 the period was extended to 45 days plus travel time. The increase in quotas

from this Theater from time to time is shown as follows:

August	500
September	500
October	2,000
November	5,000
December	5,000
January	<u>3,000</u>
	16,000

The drop in January was due to the fact that by that time redeployment would have cleared the Theater of all but the minimum needed for occupational and close-out duties. (107)

118. Plans for Shipping Dependents.

a. On 21 December the War Department announced that shipping capabilities for the return of dependents of enlisted personnel from Atlantic areas were as follows:

January	200
February	15,000
March	14,000
April	15,000
May	<u>14,500</u>
	49,200

It announced that legislation had passed Congress which would waive documentation, physical examinations abroad, and petitions for nonquota entry. The War Department had set aside certain vessels suitable for the return of the war brides and their return in no way interfered with or retarded the return of military personnel. (108)

119. Reduction in Shipping - December.

Toward the end of December it was realized that about 20,000

persons scheduled to be redeployed from the Theater that month would not depart because of nonavailability of shipping. The estimate on the return of reenlistment furlough personnel had been too low, and as these personnel took up shipping space normally allocated to redeployed personnel, a backlog of high-score personnel developed. (109)

120. December Departures.

a. During December, seven divisions left the Theater. They were the 26th, 36th, 79th, 80th, 89th, and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 82nd Airborne Division. (110)

b. Redeployment shipping had been slowed down by nearly 22 percent in December by a number of circumstances, including the Theater realization that unless shipping were reduced, outshipments would bring Theater strength to a figure below the Occupational Troop Basis plus the close-out force. Another reason for the cut in shipping was the December stormy weather which caused the Theater to miss its 342,000 December shipping quota. During December 303,669 persons were redeployed from the Theater. An additional 23,583 nonredeployment personnel also were sent to the Zone of the Interior. A breakdown of these shipments by category and service is given in the table on the following page. (111)

Category II Units (Reserve)			
Services		-	
Arms		8,576	
Air		-	
Total			8,576
Category IV Units			
Services		100,109	
Arms		124,796	
Air		35,997	
Total			260,902
Casuals			
Redeployment			
Above critical score	24,314		
Reassignment	1,681		
Patients	1,810		
Overage	1,076		
Length of service	78		
Emergency	3,597		
Other	1,655		
Total		34,211	
Nonredeployment			
TD or DS	248		
TD or RH & E	7,312		
Troops not charged to			
Theater	1,821		
Civilians and Allied			
military	1,240		
Navy and miscellaneous	1,731		
Volunteers	11,231		
Total		23,583	
Total casuals			57,794
Grand total			327,272

c. December shipping brought the Theater adjusted service rating score level down to 59. A breakdown of redeployed personnel by

adjusted service rating score during December is given in the table below: (112)

Enlisted		
0-54	10,950	
55-59	13,583	
60-69	215,874	
70-72	16,842	
73-up	28,913	
Total		286,162
Officers		
Above critical score	14,566	
Below critical score	2,392	
Regular Army officers	569	
Total		17,527
Grand total		

121. End of Redeployment in the European Theater.

By the end of December that phase of redeployment was practically over which dealt with sending from Europe all troops surplus to the Theater needs. Eighty-one percent of the Theater strength of V-E Day--2,505,390 individuals--had left the Theater for redeployment to the Pacific or for demobilization in the United States. Of these two and a half million men nearly 100,000 had gone directly to the Pacific. Over 875,000 more had gone to the United States with their mission outlined by the War Department as that of either going on to the Pacific to fight or of remaining in reserve in the Zone of the Interior for any emergency that might arise. Nearly 770,000 others had gone to the

United States in redeployment casual shipments. Prior to September no Category IV units had left the Theater; from September through December, however, Category IV units formed the bulk of the Theater's shipments. Nearly a million men had returned to the United States in Category IV units during the last four months of 1945.(113) A detailed breakdown of redeployment shipments from 9 May through 31 December 1945 is given in the table below:(114)

	Services	Arms	Air	Total
Category II Units (Indirect & Reserve)	208,721	301,494	162,387	670,602
Category II Units (Direct)	99,458	4,892	-	104,350
Category IV Demobilization	304,738	544,860	111,441	961,039
Casuals in Redeployment Shipments				769,409
Total Redeployed				2,505,390

Chapter V

REDEPLOYMENT OF THE CLOSE-OUT FORCE

122. Theater Situation on 1 January 1946.

a. By 1 January 1946 the number of troops in the Theater had declined to 622,789 officers and men(1), the planned strength for that date being 616,000.(2) Plans for January shipping included 20,000 extra spaces to take care of the December accumulation which had occurred because of storms. The planned outflow for the period of January through June 1946 was as follows: January, 97,200; February, 90,700; March, 88,500; April, 91,500; May, 86,500; and June 86,500.(3) The replacements that would arrive during this period were counted on to bring the Theater strength by 30 June to a level of 300,000, the planned occupational troop basis for that date.(4)

b. The planned schedule would have cleared from the Theater men with point scores of 55-59 by the end of February and men with scores of 50-54 by the middle of April, contingent upon receipt of reinforcements. Current criteria were to continue in force; all criteria had

equal priority, with the exception of Medical Department officers who had priority over all other classes of officers being redeployed.(5) The schedule would allow the useful employment of the last elements of the close-out force only until the middle of May since approximately one month would be required to readjust personnel, transfer responsibility for occupational duties, move to staging areas, and complete preparation for an orderly embarkation. Thus the last month's quota would have to be redeployed by the occupational forces.

c. Since the Theater planned to continue to fill these quotas by returning personnel on the basis of adjusted service rating scores and other eligibility criteria, it became impracticable to continue the outscheduling of the close-out force by units; therefore the Redeployment Forecast Unit Schedule, Fourth Edition(6) was no longer used. Major commands, when assigned quotas, were to fill these either by use of Category IV carrier units or by casual packets. Those Category IV and Category I (T) units which were not required in the revised occupational troop basis and close-out force were to be inactivated in the Theater. Major commands could nominate, without regard to monthly schedule, Category I (T) units for inactivation or utilization as carriers at any time that they were not required for close-out missions.(7)

123. Soldier Viaggioni.

a. The Theater plans were logical and efficient. Many soldiers, however, felt themselves injured thereby. The average soldier

had become accustomed to thinking of monthly redeployment shipments of from three to four hundred thousand individuals. The planned drop to less than a 100,000 per month in January had not been explained thoroughly to the soldiers in Europe. The Stars and Stripes from time to time throughout the Fall and Winter had given the soldiers the impression that 45-pointers might be kept in the Army of Occupation-- but more generally it told of large future shipments and discussed future decreases in criteria for discharge. As early as 10 October 1945 the Stars and Stripes had announced the War Department plan to send over 135,000 replacements to relieve the 45-59 point group in January.(8) Only 59,873 replacements had arrived by the first of January 1946.(9) Because of inadequate orientation on reasons for the decelerated redeployment, on the lack of replacements, and on Theater plans, some men considered that discrimination was being shown them. This was the case especially in this body of 244,000 enlisted men in the 45-59 point group and the 50,000 men with over three years service and less than 55 points.(10) There were many others with considerable service and comparatively high adjusted service rating scores.(11) A breakdown of Theater strength by service and point scores is given below to illustrate the problem of demobilization which faced the Theater during the early part of January 1946.(12)

ENLISTED MEN

O-44	197,386
45-49	78,682
50-54	96,476
55-up	68,644
Pipeline	65,020
Miscellaneous	30,162
Volunteers and Regular Army	<u>36,245</u>

TOTAL	572,615
-------	---------

OFFICERS

O-69	26,502
70-up	8,083
Pipeline	2,431
Miscellaneous	4,611
Volunteers and Regular Army	<u>8,547</u>

TOTAL	<u>50,174</u> 622,789
-------	--------------------------

b. Of those enlisted men who had less than 55 points there were nearly 145,000 who had more than two and one-half years service; a breakdown of service of all men whose point scores were less than 55 is given below:(13)

Less than 1½ years	77,124
1½ to 2 years	74,994
2 to 2½ years	75,560
2½ to 3 years	94,461
3 to 3½ years	42,867
3½ years and up	<u>7,838</u>

TOTAL	372,844
-------	---------

124. Growing Discontent Among Soldiers.

a. The general feeling of discontent was sharpened on 6

January when the Stars and Stripes carried the following double banner headline: REDEPLOYMENT IS ENDED ON BASIS OF POINT SCORE.(14) The story told the 50-pointers that they had up to three months more to serve in the Theater. At that time there were, exclusive of those men in the pipeline, approximately 165,000 men in the Theater with point scores of 50 or over. The retention of 50-point men was tersely explained by General McNarney: "There are no replacements."(15)

b. Concurrent with the slow-down in redeployment came the announcement that plans were completed for shipping war brides to the United States. This caused further agitation among those who thought that war bride shipping prevented allocation of sufficient shipping for redeploying troops. This was again the result of troops being inadequately informed of the problems confronting the Theater;(16) hence General McNarney assured the soldiers through the Stars and Stripes that, "No transportation required for the return of military personnel will be used for other purposes."(17)

c. Two days after the announcement of the reason for the presence of 50-pointers in the Theater, the press pointed the story of the mass protest in Manila in which the 10,000 GI's booed their commander and branded the Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, their "No 1 Enemy."(18) And the following day it was announced in the Stars and Stripes that the 50-pointers in the Pacific would be home by 31 January. The headline in the Stars and Stripes, "Developments Follow Fast After

Protest," indicated that this speed-up was the direct result of the soldier protest in Manila of 7 January.(19)

125. Redeployment Demonstrations in the European Theater.

a. With such a background it was inevitable that demonstrations should start in the European Theater. On 8 January the first such meeting occurred. In Paris an estimated 1,000 soldiers gathered at the Arc de Triomphe and marched down the Champs-Elysees to the Place de la Concorde, shouting "We want to go home." (20)

b. The following day some three or four thousand men held a protest meeting at MAO Circle, in the Theater Headquarters area in Frankfurt, Germany.(21) After "soap box oratory" by various agitators the group formed columns and marched in noisy manner to the Headquarters Building. A riot squad was on duty but there was no need for it, because at no time did the meeting get out of hand. The speeches were mainly protests against the point system, shouts of "We want to go home," and outcries against General McNarney, with the added remark that "Ike" would have listened to their grievances. General McNarney had been unable to be in Frankfurt at the time because of the regular four-power conference meeting in Berlin. He had, however, knowledge of the planned meeting before his departure, and, in staff conference, had directed that there be no interference.(22)

c. On the following day Stars and Stripes printed a War

Department announcement that the War Department was revamping the whole demobilization program. This appeasement did not, however, curtail demonstrations. On the 12th of January the soldiers in the United Kingdom gathered and took their complaints to Senators Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg, who were then staying in the Claridges Hotel in London.(23) The same day in Germany 400 members of the Third Army gathered at the Bad Tols Red Cross Club to air their grievances. The discussion centered around a petition demanding explanation of the shortage of replacements. After concluding that a demonstration at the residence of Lieutenant General Truscott, Third Army Commander, would be seditious, the group decided that the best plan of action was to write individual letters to columnists, editors, and congressmen.(24) Small meetings continued in Paris in the area of the Arc de Triomphe. On 12 January the authorities felt it necessary to request, through the Stars and Stripes, that these meetings cease. The Paris prefect of police had complained, saying that such gatherings at the tomb of France's Unknown Soldier were transgressions against a national shrine.(25)

d. One of the most interesting protests against the redeployment slow-down, and indicative of the fact that all demonstrations were not necessarily based on a desire to return to the United States, was the case of one T/5 Johnson of the Information and Education Section of Headquarters Berlin District. During the week in which he received his redeployment orders, T/5 Johnson posted notices on unit bulletin boards throughout Berlin saying that it was planned to send a cable to Congress

protesting the redeployment slow-down in the Theater. All those who wished to participate in this action were invited to turn in their names, together with three Allied marks each to cover the cost of the cable and the inclusion of the names. The cable was sent; T/5 Johnson collected several reams of currency from eager protesters, and was redeployed in accordance with previously issued orders. Several weeks later the Inspector General in investigating this incident concluded that manipulator Johnson had probably cleared a considerable sum of money on the deal.(26)

e. Meantime the Frankfurt demonstrations continued for three days with decreasingly smaller groups. Then on 13 January the Stars and Stripes carried this headline, "Demonstrations Successful, McHarney Tells Soldiers." In part, the story read: "McHarney, pointing out the demonstrations had accomplished their purpose, asked that they be discontinued. . . ." This opinion that the demonstrations had caused the War Department to revise its redeployment program was reiterated in an official public relations release of 16 January. The release, in part, read: "The Theater Commander today issued the following instructions to all major commanders--'The mass meetings of soldiers, permitted without interference because of the confusion and apparent misunderstanding in the minds of many men regarding the program of redeployment, have served their purpose. . . .'"

f. Actually, the real reason for a failure to acquaint troops

with the true status of redeployment at this time--the fact that replacements failed to arrive from the Zone of the Interior as anticipated plus the diversion of shipping to other, higher priority purposes, causing the downward revision in return of troops to the United States--did not originate in the Theater. The War Department had so classified its policy communications on redeployment (from restricted to secret) that it was impossible for commanders in the Theater to reveal to troops the policies upon which redeployment revisions were based. The directive of January 1, that only such troops as were actually surplus to Theater needs would be scheduled for outshipment, was classified "Secret." (27) As demonstrations developed during the first two weeks of January, an interchange of cables between General McNarney and General Eisenhower succeeded in bringing about a declassification of these policy directives. This declassification meant that the personnel in the Theater could now be adequately informed of the basic redeployment policy in existence and, while it was not pleasant information, it served the purpose of halting public demonstrations as the need for revision in the program was explained. G-1, TSFET, drew this conclusion from the mass meetings and their conclusion, once information regarding redeployment was properly disseminated. (28) "Bad news in an American Army must not be delayed or omitted. It must be explained promptly to prevent exaggeration and promote a commonsense understanding and confidence."

126. Immediate Theater Answer to Demonstrations.

a. On 13 January the Publicity and Release Group was formed to disseminate all pertinent news and information concerning redeployment. To accomplish its mission the facilities of radio, news releases, conferences, and letters were used. Four radio broadcasts were conducted in January in which Brigadier General George S. Eyster, General Staff Corps, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Division of Theater Headquarters and other officers of the Theater Headquarters and Service Forces Headquarters appeared in round table conference discussions with soldiers at Armed Forces Network studios in Hoescht, Germany. (29) On 15 January General McNarney announced the new official War Department demobilization plan to newspaper representatives in press conferences. Nine press releases were made. (30) A vigorous follow-up by unit orientation officers was directed in order to further remedy the misunderstanding as shown by the recent soldier demonstrations. Field trips made by members of the Redeployment Coordinating Group during January, however, still showed that major commands were not properly oriented on redeployment policies. (31) Confusion existed as to directives published by Theater Headquarters and interpretation on many points was not in accord with that of the issuing headquarters. During February the campaign of informing the soldier through orientation was continued, with increasingly good results.

127. War Department Demobilization Program.

a. On 15 January the cable setting forth the new War

Department demobilization program reached the Theater. The program prescribed discharge criteria for the period ending 30 April and for the period 1 May to 30 June. For the first period, the War Department directed the demobilization by 30 April of all enlisted men, with the exception of volunteers, who had a point score of 45 or who had completed 30 months' service as of that date; all enlisted women, except volunteers, who had completed 24 months service as of that date; all male officers, except Regular Army, volunteers, and Medical Department officers, who had a point score of 67 or who had completed 45 months' service as of 30 April; Women's Army Corps officers with 36 months' service as of that date. Between May and the end of June the discharge was planned of all enlisted men, except volunteers, who had 40 points or 24 months' service. Male officers, with the same exceptions as above, were eligible for discharge if they had 65 points or 42 months' active service. Separate discharge criteria for the Women's Army Corps were to be issued later.(32)

b. On the basis of these criteria it was estimated, and so released to the press, that the shipment of the various point scores would be as follows: 55 points, mid February; 53 points, end of February; 50 points and $3\frac{1}{2}$ years' service, mid March; 47 points, mid April; 45 points and $2\frac{1}{2}$ years' service, end of April; 43 points, end of May; and 40 points or 2 years of service, by the end of June.(33)

c. Under the demobilization program the release of personnel

continued to follow the principle of priority for those with the highest points and longest length of service, particularly combat service. Previously announced criteria, such as age discharge, were not invalidated, and personnel eligible for discharge under these criteria were given priority over personnel eligible under the new ones.(34)

d. Scarce category personnel could still be retained in the service until replaced, providing they were used in their specialty, but the period of their retention was limited to six months. Scarce categories at this period were: highway traffic engineers and superintendent Water Divisions in the Transportation Corps, machine records officers, machine records control officers, legal officers with admiralty law experience in the Transportation Corps, officers and warrant officers with experience or training in statutory renegotiation activities, officers and warrant officers with experience or training in contract termination and property disposal activities, civil affairs or military government officers who were assigned in occupied territories or who had training for such as assignment (excluding civil affairs officers whose specialty number was Internal Security SSN 9226), dental laboratory technicians, X-ray technicians, orthopedic mechanics, and medical laboratory technicians.(35)

128. Changes Due to Revised Program.

a. Advancement of Shipping Dates. Due to the increase in shipping providing for accelerated redeployment, approximately 10,000

persons in major commands had their readiness dates altered from 8 to 1 February. The 71st Infantry Division, less its infantry, cavalry reconnaissance troops, and ordnance maintenance company was alerted for late February shipment. In all, a total of 37,000 additional personnel was made available for February shipment. Some 26,000 additional personnel had erroneously been included in outloading plans for May and June. The error was discovered in late January, and since under the new criteria for discharge these troops were eligible for return by 30 April, plans were drawn up to include them in the shipping schedule for March and April.

b. Toward the close of January a new shipping plan was devised which was to reduce the Theater strength by a certain amount each month regardless of replacements so as to be able to comply with criteria. The earlier January schedule had been tentative, pending the arrival of replacements, but this schedule was to be met whether or not replacements arrived. (36)

	<u>Reduction in Theater Strength</u>	<u>Man-Troop Basis RR & R. Re-enlistment Furlough etc.</u>	<u>Total Shipping</u>
Jan	106,000	15,000	120,000
Feb	85,000	15,000	100,000
Mar	92,000	14,500	107,000
Apr	87,191	14,000	101,191
May	38,859	14,000	52,859
June	<u>38,860</u>	<u>14,000</u>	<u>52,860</u>
Total	447,410	86,000	533,910

	<u>Theater Strength</u>	<u>Reinforcements</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 Jan	622,789	24,541	647,330
1 Feb	496,213	36,000 est	532,213
1 Mar	477,213	40,000 "	487,213
1 Apr	394,713	30,000 "	424,713
1 May	337,522	30,000 "	367,522
1 Jun	328,663	20,000 "	348,663
1 Jul	309,803		

129. Closeout of Redeployment Installations - January to March.

a. The period from January to June 1946 saw a steady process of consolidation of the administrative organizations dealing with redeployment and a gradual close-out of staging and port facilities. The first step in this process came with the transfer on 1 January 1946 of the Redeployment Section of G-3, Theater Service Forces to the Troops and Redeployment Branch of G-3 Division of Theater Headquarters, where it became the Service Section. The responsibilities of this new section were defined as the coordination of the redeployment of Theater Service Forces to the end that the impending amalgamation of Theater Forces and Theater Headquarters would be accomplished smoothly and not adversely affect the progress of redeployment. The responsibilities included the selection of carrier units to be used by Theater Service Forces, recommendations on the staging capacities and processing areas, and the maintenance of close liaison between the G-3 divisions of Theater Service Forces and Theater Headquarters on redeployment matters. During January, the Service Section was primarily concerned with the completion of the Theater Service Forces' nominations for February and March,

assuring effective coordination between Theater Service Forces' planning agencies and those of Theater Headquarters, and establishing a firm requirement for staging installations for the next six months to provide accommodation for the scheduled outflow and inflow of the Theater. The transferring to Theater Headquarters of the Theater Service Forces' redeployment operation facilitated the incorporation of their redeployment responsibilities when that command disbanded on or about 1 March 1946.(37)

b. Oise Intermediate Section was redesignated Western Base Section effective 15 January 1946 and with the inactivation of Seine Section on the same date, the Commanding General, Eastern Base Section, assumed responsibilities and functions of the Commanding General of Oise and Seine Sections. Delta Base Section was also discontinued on 25 January 1946 and absorbed by Western Base Section. Chanor Base Section was discontinued as of 20 February 1946. The port staging areas at this same time took over the major portion of processing all out-bound personnel except those in major units.(38)

c. Marseilles was the first of the ports to close out. Though originally scheduled for 1 January 1946, the close-out had to be postponed owing to the presence there of two divisions, the 100th Infantry and 2d Armored, which had been sent to Marseilles for outshipment to relieve the pressure on Le Havre. In early January, five vessels were diverted to Marseilles so that the port could finally be closed for

redeployment purposes on 25 January 1946. Delta Base Section ceased redeployment activities on the same date and became a part of Western Base Section.(39)

d. Investigation of Bremerhaven. Complaints received from personnel in the pipeline at Bremerhaven made it advisable on 6 February 1946 to send a representative from Theater Headquarters to investigate the alleged delay of personnel in the port staging area. The allegations that personnel were kept in overcrowded living conditions for an unwarranted length of time were found to be correct. To prevent a recurrence of these circumstances it was prescribed that the time for units to remain in port staging areas would be decreased, if necessary, by delaying their port call, and Victory-type vessels were to be loaded to a capacity of 1,500 if necessary.(40)

e. The Redeployment Coordinating Group closed out 28 February 1946. For ten months the group had coordinated Theater level redeployment activities and kept the Chief of Staff, Theater Headquarters informed of redeployment problems and progress.(41)

130. Redeployment Operations.

a. The Theater's request to the War Department that only that amount of lift required to outload available personnel should be assigned to Continental ports was denied. This resulted in an excess lift when vessels were loaded beyond their normal capacities. To

alleviate this situation, the War Department directed the westbound Victories would carry only 1000 persons; vessels would be light-loaded, but at no time would they sail empty nor be delayed until troops became ready for shipment; Liberties would not be utilized as lift except in emergency cases, which would have to be authorized by Theater Headquarters. (42)

b. Because of complaints received from certain Women's Army Corps officers concerning the inadequacy of accommodations furnished women aboard shipping, request was made to the War Department on 29 March to use the hospital ship Blanche Sigman exclusively for female personnel in lieu of decommissioning it as planned by the War Department. The request was approved on 2 April and two trips were made by this vessel. (43) On 13 March the War Department announced new criteria for male officers, with the exception of medical officers, volunteers, and critical specialists. All those having 24 months' service as of 31 August were made eligible for immediate discharge, consistent with the officer requirements of the commands concerned. (44) The Theater found that their commitments for 1 July 1946 could not be met, and a supplemental occupational troop basis was prepared to cover the extra commitments of the Theater for 1 July 1946 and for 1 January 1947. War Department approval was obtained on 14 March 1946. (45)

c. During the first three months of 1946 the Theater redeployed 370,250 persons, bringing the total number of persons redeployed

from the Theater since V-E Day to 2,875,640 or 93 percent of the V-E Day strength. A breakdown of redeployment shipments is shown in the table on the following page:(46)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Total Jan-Mar	Total V-E Day- 30 Mar
Category II Units (indirect and reserve)					
Services	0	-	-	0	206,721
Arms	5,485	-	-	5,485	306,979
Air	0	-	-	0	162,387
Total	5,485	-	-	5,485	676,087
					1,352,174
Category II Units (direct)					
Services	-	-	-	-	99,458
Arms	-	-	-	-	4,892
Air	-	-	-	-	0
Total	-	-	-	-	104,350
Category IV Units (demobilization)					
Services	40,807	44,905	37,297	122,809	427,537
Arms	74,115	19,764	63,606	157,485	702,345
Air	191	0	0	191	111,622
Total	114,913	64,669	100,903	280,485	1,241,514
Casuals					
Redeployment Casuals	24,221	17,700	17,045	58,966	-
Above Critical Score	603	583	742	1,928	-
Reassignment	1,020	1,611	1,295	3,924	-
Overage	404	249	433	1,086	-
Length of Service	309	846	8,099	9,254	-
Emergency	2,851	1,565	1,164	5,580	-
Other (1)	1,311	1,268	963	3,542	-
Total Redeployment Casuals	30,719	23,822	29,739	84,280	853,689
Total Individuals Redeployed	151,117	88,491	130,642	370,250	2,875,640

Non-Redeployment Casuals					
T.D. or D.S.	285	378	95	758	-
T.D. or RR & R	1,898	1,352	1,410	4,660	-
Troops not charged to Theater	563	625	319	1,507	-
Civilian and Allied Military	1,586	9,622	703	11,911	-
Navy & Miscellaneous	2,704	406	306	3,416	
Volunteers	3,157	2,619	1,282	7,058	
Total	10,193	15,002	4,115	29,310	99,593
TOTAL Casuals	40,912	38,824	33,854	113,590	953,282
TOTAL Shipped	161,310	103,493	134,757	399,560	2,975,233

d. The Theater had asked for 120,000 spaces for January and approximately 145,000 spaces were granted. It was anticipated that a normal loss of shipping space would make only 120,000 spaces available. This assumption proved incorrect: a total of 165,000 spaces arrived(47), and a total of 161,310 troops were shipped.(48) Of this number, 151,117 were redeployment personnel, and 10,193 were personnel not deductible from Theater strength. The December accumulation of 20,000 were shipped. In order to achieve this large shipment the Theater shipped 12,500 operational reserves from the pipeline and some 28,500 personnel scheduled for February shipment. A shipping strike was expected in February and the January over-shipment accordingly fell in line with the Theater policy of clearing personnel as evenly and rapidly as possible over a six-month period. During January the 94th and 100th Infantry Divisions, and the Second Armored Division left, and the total of troops redeployed since V-E Day reached 2,656,507, with the adjusted service rating score reduced to approximately 59 points.(49)

e. On 1 February the pipeline contained 43,981 personnel(50), and

the alerting of additional units brought the total for February shipment to 85,000.(51) The anticipated February shipping lift was not met owing to various adverse factors including labor difficulties, strikes, and operational failures.(52) In all, 88,491 persons left the Theater for demobilization(53), together with an additional 15,002 nonredeployment personnel, including war brides.(54) This exceeded the January shipping plan by 3,491, but it left a carry-over of approximately 10,000 including some of the 71st Infantry Division. This accumulation was caused by the excessive number of troops ordered into the pipeline, but it was estimated that these would clear the Theater early in March.(55) The total of troops redeployed since V-E Day rose to 2,744,998(56), while the adjusted service rating score dropped to 53 points.(57) In March, a favorable shipping position was regained by the shipment of 4,115 nonredeployment personnel(58) and 20,000 other personnel due to be shipped in April.(59) The number of redeployment personnel shipped was 130,642, raising the total number of persons redeployed since V-E Day to 2,875,640. The adjusted service rating score dropped to 49 points and the length of service qualification to approximately 40 months. Major units leaving the Theater included the 71st and 102nd Infantry Divisions.(60).

131. Close-Out of Redeployment Installations, April to June.

a. Though some units consisting of approximately 2,700 personnel did not sail until 3 April, the port of Antwerp and its staging facilities closed on 31 March 1946 for personnel shipments. Two ports

were now available to the European Theater, Le Havre and Bremerhaven.(61)

b. In March 1946, three depots remained in the Theater: the 2nd at Namur, Belgium, the 3rd at Marburg, Germany, and the 17th at Bamberg. Although the primary mission of replacement depots was the processing of incoming troops for assignment to units in the Theater, these depots also handled a certain amount of outbound personnel. A survey was completed on 3 May 1946 of the processing of outbound personnel at the three depots. The purpose of the survey was to reduce the outbound processing time, and the conclusion reached was that a saving of from four to six days could be made by concentrating all outbound processing at the port of embarkation. A further survey was made in conjunction with the G-4 Division to investigate the feasibility of locating the 3rd Replacement Depot at Bremerhaven after 1 July 1946. This plan left one replacement depot at the port with a few satellite installations in the occupied zone for the distribution of replacements. It was agreed that the plan was entirely feasible. The capacity of the Bremerhaven Staging Area was determined to be 10,000 normal capacity and 14,000 emergency capacity. The 2nd Replacement Depot at Namur, Belgium, was closed to troops on 18 May and was inactivated effective 31 May 1946. Troops formerly processed at Namur were processed at Le Havre. The 3rd Replacement Depot assumed control of the Bremerhaven Staging Area on 15 June 1946. The technical operation and the redeployment of personnel of the 3rd Replacement Depot were the responsibility

of Theater Headquarters while supply and administration of the depot were undertaken by the Continental Base Section.(62)

c. Close-out of Le Havre. Effective 28 June 1946 no further persons, except war brides, travelling under Army jurisdiction were authorized to go to Le Havre for embarkation. Bremerhaven would handle all military personnel shipments both in and outbound for the Continent. The accumulation of 2,000 officers and 8,684 enlisted men, and 166 miscellaneous personnel awaiting shipment at Le Havre was liquidated on 9 July 1946 and the port was closed for further shipment of military personnel. The war brides who were in the staging area were outphased from the port during the early part of July. All future shipments from the Continent were to be made through the Continental Staging Area, which was shifted to Bremerhaven.(63)

132. Redeployment Operations, April through June.

a. Since in March it became evident that by 1 May there would be a shortage of units suitable for use as carrier units, the decision was made to discontinue the use of carrier units. After 1 May all personnel would be returned to the Zone of the Interior in packets instead of in Category IV units. In view of this change of procedure, and also because the publications and redeployment directives were outmoded or bulky with amendments, it was decided to consolidate all existing directives and amendments into one publication, which superseded three Standing Operating Procedures and the basic plan.(64)

b. April saw the departure of 83rd Infantry Division, that portion of the 1st Armored Division which had not been redesignated and assigned to the United States Zone Constabulary, and the remaining units of the 4th Armored Division.(65) A total of 69,214 redeployment personnel were shipped, making a total of 2,944,854 since V-E Day.(66) The number of other personnel shipped was 4,086, not including war brides.(67) All personnel under the 30 April discharge criteria /cal, with the exception of personnel in confinement, those held as witnesses in courts-martial cases, those in hospital, on leave, or attending school, cleared the Theater by 26 April 1946.(68)

c. During May, 45,305 redeployment personnel leaving the Theater brought the total which had been redeployed since V-E Day to 2,990,159. An additional 4,334 nonredemption personnel were shipped during May.(69)

d. The threatened maritime strike of 15 June in the United States caused a delay in signing on of crews for Army troop ships, resulting in the loss of between one and two weeks shipping. The accumulation of personnel awaiting shipment at Le Havre and Bremerhaven was reduced by delaying the call of units to the Bremerhaven staging area so that their arrival would be postponed until July when shipping schedules were expected to return to normal.(70) The total shipment of redeployment personnel for the month was 54,826.(71) A further 3,451 of nonredemption personnel were shipped; also all personnel

eligible under 15 January criteria for 30 June, with the exceptions as cited above in subparagraph b, left by 30 June.(72)

e. During the quarterly period of April through June, 169,345 troops were returned to the Zone of the Interior for demobilization. Since V-E Day, 3,044,985 individuals, or 99.2 percent of the Theater strength of 8 May 1945 had been redeployed. In addition there were 88,133 persons or 2.8 percent of V-E Day strength returned to the United States as nonredployment casualties. The largest single method of returning personnel had been the Category IV units, which carried back 1,281,212 men. Category II units had taken back to the United States 681,838 men for planned shipment to the Pacific or to be held in reserve. Another 98,534 men were sent directly to the Pacific. Of the 1,071,534 casualties that were returned, 983,401 were redeployees. A breakdown of the types of casualties and categories under which men were returned to the Zone of the Interior is given in the following two tables and Chart. A breakdown is also given of Theater strength by adjusted service rating score during the 1946 January through June period to illustrate the speed and efficiency with which the 15 January criteria was accomplished.(73)

	April	May	June	Total 1 April 30 Jun 46	Total 8 May 45 30 Jun 46
Category II units (indirect & reserve)					
Services					206,721
Arms					306,979
Air					162,387
Total					676,087
Category II units (direct)					
Services					99,458
Arms					4,892
Air					0
Total					104,350
Category IV units (demobi- lization)					
Services	20,365			20,365	447,902
Arms	19,268			19,268	721,613
Air	0			0	111,632
Total Unit	39,633			39,633	1,281,147
Casuals					
Redeployment casuals					
Above critical score	17,433	13,029	7,967	38,429	
Reassignment	855	950	3,602	5,407	
Patients	635	548	633	1,816	
Overage	267	23	6	296	
Length of Service	8,808	25,011	28,822	62,641	
Emergency	416	319	1,027	1,762	
Other	1,167	5,425	12,769	19,361	
Total	29,581	45,305	54,826	129,712	953,401
Total Redeployed	69,214	45,305	54,826	169,345	3,044,985

Non-Redeployment Casuals					
General Prisoners	400	172		572	-
TD or DS	44	69	164	277	-
TD - RR & R	1,266	637	612	2,515	-
Troops not charged to Theater	178	76	116	370	-
Civilian & Allied					
Military	886	1,999	1,168	4,053	-
Navy & Miscellaneous	505	734	947	2,186	-
Volunteers	777	847	444	1,868	-
Total Non-redeployment Casuals	4,086	4,334	3,451	11,841	88,133
TOTAL CASUALS	33,637	49,639	58,277	141,553	1,071,534
TOTAL Shipped	73,370	49,639	58,277	181,186	3,133,118

THEATER STRENGTH BY ASR SCORE

	1 Jan	1 Feb	1 March	1 April	1 May	1 June
Enlisted						
0-39		168,386	180,580	179,398	178,146	137,373
(0-44)						
40-44	197,386	53,664	49,251	24,025	6,773	102
(45-up) 3						
45-49	78,682	68,845	45,319	4,424	696	22
(45-up) 2,3						
50-Up	165,120	58,759	9,400			
Pipeline	65,020	43,981	68,419	45,290	22,287	6,944
Miscellaneous	30,162	17,555	10,057	9,644	7,719	6,368
Vol. & RA	36,245	51,258	70,426	93,099	127,086	143,624
Total	572,615	462,448	433,452	355,880	342,707	294,433
Officers						
0-64		18,835	17,488	16,180	13,938	10,280
65-66		1,638	1,350	864	479	29
(0-69)						
67-69	26,502	2,483	1,691	(67-up) 1,186	(67-up) 2 462	(67-up) 2 35
70-Up	8,083	3,005	1,519			
Pipeline	2,431	3,634	2,891	3,069	1,622	1,146
Miscellaneous	4,611	2,068	1,331	1,996	1,890	1,506
RA & Vol.	8,547	15,414	15,849	16,597	17,303	17,537
Total	50,174	47,977	42,319	39,892	35,694	30,533

1 - Includes overage personnel.

2 - Represents personnel eligible for redeployment by reason of ASR but who are not available for shipment, such as personnel being held pending CM, AWOL, witness for CM, hospitalization, VD, essential MOE, confinement etc.

3 - Includes overage and AUS fathers.

133. General Effects of Redeployment. (74)

a. From V-E Day to V-J Day the major effect of the point system and readjustment procedures was a breakdown of efficiency and the rise of a situation which made it impossible either to preserve efficient units or to properly train more units. All units had some turnover of personnel; some had as much as a 100 percent turnover. While so large a personnel change had not been expected, plans had been made to take care of a moderate turnover had things worked out as expected. The training command, which at first seemed feasible was out of the question after the first week of May 1945 because of two unforeseen circumstances. First, on the day of the German surrender the War Department found it necessary to speed up redeployment by approximately 50 percent. Secondly, readjustment, as originally conceived, was to take approximately 30 days; it became a never ending and continual process. The combination of these two factors made the plans for a training command obsolete and literally made efficient training impossible. Units were often started on their long journey to the Pacific unqualified to perform their primary missions. V-J Day saved the Army from a most difficult situation. This was recognized in Washington, where a colonel in the G-3 Division of the Army Ground Forces said:

The capitulation of Hirohito on 14 August saved our necks. With things being as they were it would have been absolutely impossible for us to have sent well-trained teams to the Pacific for participation in the scheduled invasion of Japan. (75)

b. After V-J Day a new element complicated the Army's job in the European Theater. There was a serious breakdown in morale and discipline among the troops. Evidence of this is seen in the fact that it became necessary to place "off limits" some of the towns near the staging and assembly areas; and also in the numerous redeployment demonstrations throughout the Theater in January of 1946. Such acts damaged seriously the prestige of the Army, which, only a year before, had been hailed as one of the greatest of all times.

c. After V-J Day the disintegration of the Army in Europe continued. Units in the Theater reached an all-time low in efficiency due to the constant withdrawal of trained personnel for redeployment. All types of units, in their Reports of Operations submitted to the Historical Division of Theater Headquarters, repeatedly emphasized that their missions were incompletely or poorly carried out because of the continual personnel loss. It was not only the actual withdrawal of personnel that destroyed efficiency, but also an attitude on the part of both officers and men, who lost individual and unit esprit during the weeks before their own anticipated redeployment. In November the Theater reported to the War Department that redeployment and readjustment had created a difficult situation in the Theater. Units had high percentages of personnel poorly trained in their basic duties. Most units that could be considered operational were understrength. The widespread dispersion of units and occupational duties had made training difficult

and had precluded combined training. Trained balanced forces of infantry, armor, air and supporting combat troops did not exist. As a result, in November of 1945, the forces in the Theater would have been unable to perform any serious offensive operations; their ability to carry on limited defensive operations was slightly better. The capability of the Army in Europe to perform occupational duties and control the German population and to suppress local uprisings was rated as satisfactory. (76)

d. One year after the above report was made, Colonel (then Brigadier General) George S. Eyster, who directed redeployment in the European Theater, wrote a report on redeployment in which similar conclusions were reached:

1. Movement of personnel was so rapid that the majority of men and women who planned and initially directed the movement were redeployed themselves before 1 January 1946. The undersigned, being one of the few survivors, and who planned and directed the operation from its inception, believes that the 'point system' on which the redeployment program was based:

- (a) Swiftly destroyed the combat efficiency of the US Armed Forces in this Theater.

- (b) Caused to be shipped to the Pacific Ocean Area US units generally incapable of satisfactorily performing their unit missions unless subjected to a minimum of three months training prior to further entry into combat.

- (c) Was the greatest single cause for the breakdown in discipline which followed V-J Day.

- (d) Rendered ineffective the administrative control on which discipline is based and turned the Armies into vast Replacement Centers.

2. It is believed that the 'point system' should not be considered as the fundamental basis for the planning of any future large demobilization of the US Armed Forces. George S. Eyster Brigadier General, GSC AG of S, G-3.(77)

e. The Redeployment Coordinating Group, a staff section of Theater Headquarters, which, from 17 April 1945 until 28 February 1946 made inspections of redeployment installations and kept the Chief of Staff informed on all redeployment matters, made similar conclusions in its final Report of Operations. The conclusions and recommendations read as follows:

a. The 'point system' of redeployment, wherein the army in effect was reduced to a mass of individuals for demobilization purposes, was unsatisfactory and an administrative impossibility. Any system based on this principle must have so many exceptions, as was demonstrated by this demobilization, and must necessarily result in movement of individuals between units such a large number of times, that it cannot succeed without confusion and complaint, as well as destroying the effectiveness and efficiency of all units concerned and breaking down the discipline of the army at a critical period.

b. The preparation of equipment for direct shipment to the Pacific Theater was never adequately accomplished, including motor vehicles and unit assemblies both of the ground and air forces. The early termination of the war with Japan saved a situation on direct shipment of equipment which would have been embarrassing to the Theater Commander of this Theater.

c. The documentation of personnel shipments by water that was required before a unit or packet embarked from the ports was too cumbersome and involved. It entailed so much clerical work that it was almost impossible to complete the various forms and lists as directed. This system should be the subject of special study. It is believed that if the number of rosters and other

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. ETOUSA, Army Talks, Extra Edition, 9 May 45.
2. USFET, G-3 Div, Reports on Redeployment, Nov 46.
3. Ibid.
4. ETOUSA, Briefing on Readjustment of Personnel, 10 May 45;
SOP No 60, ETOUSA, 10 Jun 45, subj: "Readjustment of Personnel after
Defeat of Germany."; SOP No 61, ETOUSA, 19 May 45, subj: "Preparation
for Overseas Movement, Redeployment."; WD, RH 1-2, "Procedure for
Readjustment Movement," 11 Apr 45.
5. WD Report on the Status of Demobilization and Postwar Planning,
30 Jun 44.
6. WD, RH 1-1, Plan for Readjustment of Military Personnel after
the Defeat of Germany, 30 Aug 44.
7. Stars and Stripes, Paris Edition, 8 Sep 44.
8. IMA.
9. Ibid.
10. IMA.
11. WD, RH 1-2, Procedure for Readjustment Movements, 15 Sep 44.
12. WD, RH 1-3, Athletic and Recreation Program, 15 Sep 44.
13. WD, RH 1-4 Army Education Program, 15 Sep 44.
14. Cable, 16 Sep 44, AGWAR to ETOUSA and Theaters concerned.
15. Ltr, WD, 4 Nov 44, file AG 400 (30 Oct 44) OB-S-E-M, subj:
War Department Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the
Army upon the Cessation of Hostilities in Europe," w/incl: Annex A
(War Department Supply Plan for Period I.) amended by ltr, WD, file AG 400
(25 Nov 44) OB-S-E-M, 29 Nov 44, subj: "War Department Policies and
Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the Army upon the Cessation of
Hostilities in Europe."

FOOTNOTES--Chapter I

16. Ltr, WD, 29 Nov 44, file AG 370.5 (24 Nov) OB-S-E-M, subj: "War Department Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the Army upon the Cessation of Hostilities in Europe," w/incl: Annex B, Redeployment Movements.

17. IRS, ETOUSA, G-4 Planning and Control, 23 Nov, to AG thru G-1, G-3, and Deputy G/S w/incl: ETOUSA, AG 387, circa 23 Nov 44, subj: "Planning Directives, Series 'I', No 4."

18. GO 118, ETOUSA, 27 Nov 44.

19. ETOUSA, 1 Dec 44, file AG 387, subj: "Planning Directives, Series 'I', No 4."

20. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

21. SHAEF, Operation ECLIPSE, 10 Nov 44: "Appreciation and Outline Plan," SHAEF, Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation Germany, 10 Nov 44, as amended by ltr, SHAEF, 27 Nov 44, file AG 381-700T-AGN, subj: "Military Occupation Handbook," ETOUSA Planning Directives, Series "H", 1 Dec 44.

22. WD, RR 1-1, Procedure for Readjustment of Military Personnel after the Defeat of Germany, 30 Aug 44; WD RR 1-2, Procedure for Readjustment Movements, 15 Sep 44; WD RR 1-3, Athletic and Recreation Program, 15 Sep 44; WD RR 1-4, AGWAR to ETOUSA and Theaters concerned, ltr, WD, 4 Nov 44, file AG 400 (30 Oct 44) OB-S-E-M, subj: "War Department Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the Army upon the Cessation of Hostilities in Europe," w/incl: Annex A (War Department Supply Plan for Period I), and amended by ltr, WD, 29 Nov 44, file AG 400 (25 Nov 44) OB-S-E-M, subj: "War Department Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the Army Upon the Cessation of Hostilities in Europe," ltr, WD, 29 Nov 44, file AG 370.5 (24 Nov 44) OB-S-E-M, subj: "War Department Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the Army Upon the Cessation of Hostilities in Europe," w/incl: Annex B, Redeployment Movements.

23. Ltr, ETOUSA, 6 Jan 45, file AG 387 HPG, subj: "Redeployment Planning Directive No 1." w/incl: Redeployment Planning Directive No 1.

24. Cable, 18 Dec 44, ETOUSA to AGWAR.

25. Cable, 24 Dec 44, AGWAR to ETOUSA; Cable, 5 Jan 45, ETOUSA to AGWAR.

26. Cable, 17 Jan 45, AGWAR to ETOUSA.

27. The assembly area in early planning correspondence and the Redeployment Planning Directive No 1, is called "Embarkation Center." During the February planning phase the name of Assembly Areas was adopted in lieu of Embarkation Center.

28. USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

29. GO 30, ETOUSA, 5 Mar 45.

30. Ltr ETOUSA, 7 Mar 45, file AG 387, OPGC, subj: "Redeployment Groups."

31. ETOUSA European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Readjustment and Redeployment, Mar 45.

32. (Cf. footnote 22, above): WD, RR 1-6, Personnel Standing Operating Procedure for Demobilization of Category IV Elements, 16 Feb 45; ltr, WD, 27 Feb 45, file AG, 320.2 (15 Feb 45) OB-S-E-M, subj: "Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the Army Upon the Cessation of Hostilities in Europe."

33. Stars and Stripes, Paris Edition, 5 Sep 44.

34. Memo, ETOUSA, 26 Mar 45, file AG 387, GC, subj: "Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment."

35. Ltr, ETOUSA, 17 Apr 45, file AG 387, RCOE, subj: "Responsibility for Redeployment Planning and Implementation."

36. GO 74, ETOUSA, 24 Apr 45, Sec I, Par 1.

37. GO 74, 24 Apr 45, Sec I, Par 2.

38. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45, 28 Feb 46.

39. WD, RR 1-2, Procedure for Readjustment Movements, 11 Apr 45; ltr, WD 7 Apr 45, file AG 400 (2 Apr 45) OB-S-E-M, subj: "War Department Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the Army Upon the Cessation of Hostilities in Europe." w/Incl Annex A (War Department Supply Plan for Period I); ltr, WD, 27 Feb 45, file AG 320.2 (15 Feb 45), OB-S-E-M, subj: "Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the Army Upon the Cessation of Hostilities," w/Incl Annex B, Redeployment Movements with 3 Incls as follows: ltr, WD, 9 Apr 45, file AG 370.5, (1 Apr 45) OB-S-E-M, subj: "Incl No 1 (Preparation for Inter-Theater Movements); ltr, WD, 17 Apr 45, file AG 370.5, (2 Apr 45) OB-S-E-M,

FOOTNOTES--Chapter I

subji: "Incl No 2 (Status Report on Units Scheduled for Redeployment)":
ltr, WD, 19 Apr 45, file AG 370.5 (10 Apr 45) OB-S-E-W, subji: "Incl
No 3 (Preparation for Movement of Replacements Between Overseas Commands.)"

40. Ltr, ETOUSA, 21 Apr 45, file AG 357 CPCC, : subji: "Tentative
Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment," w/incl Tentative Plan for
Redeployment and Readjustment.

41. Memo, ETOUSA, 25 Apr 45, Lt Gen Clay to Gen Eisenhower thru AG/
S G-3.

42. Ltr, WD, 2 May 45, file AG 320.2 (30 Apr 45) OB-S-E-W, subji:
"War Department Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the
Army Upon the Cessation of Hostilities in Europe," w/incl Annex B, First
Revision, 20 Apr 45: WD, RR 1-5, Procedure for the Readjustment of
Officers, Warrant Officers, and Flight Officers after the Defeat of
Germany, 30 Apr 45.

43. Cable, 10 May 45, ETOUSA, to all commands.

44. ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Rede-
ployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45.

45. SOP No 61, Preparation for Overseas Movement, Redeployment,
(Annex No 3 to European Theater of Operations for Redeployment and
Readjustment).

46. SOP No 63, ETOUSA, subji: Supply Procedure for Overseas Rede-
ployment. (Annex No 9 to European Theater of Operations, Redeployment
and Readjustment).

47. Cable, 2 Oct 44, AGWAR to ETOUSA.

48. Cable, 5 Jan 45, ETOUSA to AGWAR.

49. Cable, 17 Jan 45, Marshall to Eisenhower.

50. Redeployment Forecast-Atlantic Section, 20 Feb 45.

51. Ltr, ETOUSA, 5 Apr 45, file AG 370.01 TSC (OC), subji: "Rede-
ployment Flow-Chart," w/incl, Hq ETOUSA, Redeployment Flow-Chart, Apr 45.

52. ETOUSA, to Redeployment Flow Chart, Apr 45, (Annex A, Conver-
sion Program for AGY and ASP.)

FOOTNOTES--Chapter I

53. Ltr, WFOUSA, 17 Apr 45, file AG 370.01 (GC), subj: "Redeployment Forecast of Readiness," w/incl Redeployment of Readiness.

54. Ibid.

55. Cable, 16 Apr 45, Marshall to Eisenhower.

56. Cable, 16 Apr 45, Marshall to Eisenhower.

57. Cable, 17 Apr 45, Eisenhower to Marshall.

58. Ltr, WFOUSA, circa 19 Apr 45, General Eisenhower to Lt Gen J.O.H. Lee.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

1. Cable, EX-79439, 9 May 45, AOWAR to ETOUSA and addressees concerned, cable, EX-6232, 9 May 45, ETOUSA to Com Z, cable, EX-6233, 9 May 45, ETOUSA to Major Commands.
2. Cable, WX-79214, 8 May 45, WARI to ETOUSA and addressees concerned.
3. Cable, EX-44975, 15 May 45, Com Z to Major Commands.
4. Cir 51, ETOUSA, 1 May 45; WD, RR 1-1, 15 Feb 45; Cir 25, ETOUSA, 5 Mar 45, Cir 54, ETOUSA, 9 May 45 and WD RR 1-1, 15 Feb 45.
5. Cable, EX-76923, 7 Aug 45, USFET to Major Commands.
6. WD, RR 1-1, Personnel Plan for Readjustment of Military Personnel after the Defeat of Germany, 15 Feb 45, par 12d; WD, RR 1-5, Personnel Procedures for the Readjustment of Officers, Warrant Officers, and Flight Officers After the Defeat of Germany, 30 Apr 45, par 4e.
7. Ltr, ETOUSA, 8 May 45, file 229.9 MPOAO, subj: "Discharge of Enlisted Men."
8. WD, RR 1-1, Personnel Plan for Readjustment of Military Personnel After the Defeat of Germany, 15 Feb 45, par 2.
9. WD, Redeployment Forecast-Atlantic Section, 20 Feb 45.
10. Ltr, ETOUSA, 5 Jun 45, file AO 370, HQGO, subj: "Categorization of Units."
11. Ltr, ETOUSA, 9 Jun 45, file AO 370, subj: "Categorization of Units," Ltr, ETOUSA, 17 Jun 45, file AO 370, subj: "Categorization of Units," Ltr, ETOUSA, 22 Jun 45, file AO 370, subj: "Categorization of Units," Ltr, ETOUSA, 29 Jun 45, file AO 370, subj: "Categorization of Units," Ltr, ETOUSA, 22 Jul 45, file AO 370, subj: "Categorization of Units."
12. SOP No 60, ETOUSA, 10 Jun 45, subj: "Readjustment of Personnel After Defeat of Germany."
13. ETOUSA, SOP No 61, 19 May 45, subj: "Preparation for Overseas Movement, Redeployment," (Annex No 3 to European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment.)

14. SCF No 60, ETOUSA, 10 Jun 45, subj: "Readjustment of Personnel After Defeat of Germany."

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Cable, EX-59257, 19 Jun 45, ETOUSA to SHAEF.

19. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.

20. Cable, WX-18197, 7 Jun 45, AGWAR to SHAEF, FWD.

21. Cable, EX-55968, 11 Jun 45, Com Z to Major Commands.

22. Cable, EX-66560, 9 Jun 45, USFET to Major Commands.

23. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Feb 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.

24. Com Z, Notes on Command and Staff Conferences, 19 Jun 45.

25. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.

26. Cable, EX-49237, 25 May 45, ETOUSA to AGWAR.

27. Ibid.

28. ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45.

29. Cable, EX-60364, 22 Jun 45, ETOUSA to Major Commands; Cable, EX-73338, 27 Jul 45, USFET to Major Commands.

30. Cable, EX-72232, 24 Jul 45, USFET to Major Commands.

31. Cable, EX-76923, 7 Aug 45, USFET Rear to Major Commands.

32. Cable, WX-12525, 6 Jun 45, AGWAR to Com Z.

33. Cable, EX-66512, 9 Jul 45, USFET Rear to USFET Main.

34. Cable, EX-66557, 6 Jul 45, USFET to Major Commands.

35. Cable, EX-66994, 15 Jul 45, USFET to AGWAR.

36. Ltr, GFRG, 12 Jul 45, file AO 370, subj: "Theater Demobilization of Certain Category IV Units."

37. Cable, E-65894, 15 Jul 45, USFET to AGWAR.

38. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.

39. Cable, WARK-82456, 15 May 45, AGWAR to ETOUSA.

40. Ibid.

41. Cable, EX-57867, 16 Jun 45, Com 2 to SHAEF.

42. Cable, EX-64129, 2 Jul 45, USFET Rear to Major Commands.

43. Cable, EX-74413, 30 Jul 45, USFET to Major Commands.

44. ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45.

45. Cable, EX-66512, 9 Jul 45, USFET Rear to USFET Main.

46. SOP No 60, ETOUSA, 10 Jan 45, subj: "Readjustment of Personnel After Defeat of Germany."

47. Ltr, ETOUSA, 17 Apr 45, file AO 370.01 TSC (GC), subj: "Redeployment Forecast of Readiness."

48. Basic documents for the entire Section: ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45; SOP No 61, ETOUSA, subj: "Preparation for Overseas Movement, Redeployment," (Annex No 3 to European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment); Staff Memo 25, ETOUSA, 31 May 45, subj: "General Staff Procedure for Redeployment and Readjustment;" Redeployment Circular III-3, 18 Jul 45, subj: "Redeployment Movement Procedure and Responsibilities."

49. WD, Bureau of Public Relations, Press Branch, Remarks by General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, on "Demobilization of the Army," made to members of Congress in the Auditorium Library of Congress, 20 Sep 45.

50. ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45, Annex 16.

51. Cable, EX-52150, 1 Jun 45, Com Z to Delta Base Section.
52. ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45, Annex 16.
53. Ibid.
54. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations, V-E Day-15 Sep 45.
55. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations, V-E Day-15 Sep 45, Chart Annex by Office of Chief of Transportation, Control & Planning, 30 Jun 45.
56. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.
57. ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45, Annex 16.
58. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.
59. Chaner Base Section, Report of Operations, 8 May 45-20 Feb 46.
60. USFET, G-3, Report of Operations V-E Day-15 Sep 45, Chart Annex by Office of Transportation, Control and Planning, 30 Jun 45.
61. ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45; MS USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
62. Ibid.
63. USFET, G-3, Report of Operations, V-E Day-15 Sep 45, Chart Annex by Office Chief of Transportation, Control and Planning, 30 Jun 45.
64. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.
65. ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45.
66. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
67. Assembly Area Command, Report of Operations 7 Apr-22 Sep 45; MS USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46; ETOUSA, European

Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid: USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.

70. Hq. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.

71. Ibid: Ltr, ETOUSA 12 May 45, file AG 370.5 MPGA, subj: "Return of Military Personnel from Europe--Green Project" Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 25 May 45, file AG 370.5 MPGD, subj: "Return of Personnel to the United States by expanded Air Lift (Green Pro)"

72. Ltr, ETOUSA, 15 Jul 45, subj: "Visit to UK Base."

73. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

74. Ibid.

75. SOP No. 61, ETOUSA, 19 May 45, subj: "Preparation for Overseas Movement, Redeployment," Annex No.3, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment.

76. Chap 1, sec III, par 9b.

77. GO 48, Com Z, 9 Apr 45.

78. Ibid.

79. Com Z, AAC, Redeployment, circa Jun 45.

80. ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45.

81. Com Z, AAC, Redeployment, circa Jun 45; Com Z, Progress Report, Jun 45; TSFET, AAC, Report of Operations, 7 Apr-22 Sep 45, Annex, "History of Mourmelon Sub-Area Command, 1-31 Jul 45."

82. Another of the city camps, San Francisco, was assigned for use to the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command. See TSFET, Office of the Chief Engineer, Construction Div, Monthly Report, Aug 45, "Division 1, Construction in Continental Western Europe."

83. Com 2, Progress Report, Jun 45.
84. Com 2, AAC, Redeployment, circa Jun 45.
85. TSFET, AAC, Report of Operations, 7 Apr-22 Sep 45.
86. Ibid., Com 2, Progress Report, Jun 45.
87. Cable EX-61526, 25 Jun 45, ETOUSA to AAC.
88. TSFET, AAC, Progress Report, 1 Aug 45.
89. TSFET, AAC Report of Operations, 7 Apr-22 Sep 45.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Cable EX-60364, 22 Jan 45, ETOUSA to AAC.
94. TSFET, AAC, Report of Operations, 7 Apr-22 Sep 45.
95. SO 262, TSFET, 21 Sep 45.
96. TSFET, AAC, Report of Operations, 7 Apr-22 Sep 45.
97. ETOUSA, EUROPEAN Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45.
98. Ibid.
99. Normandy Base Section, Progress Report, Jun 45.
100. ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45.
101. Ibid.
102. GO 51, Normandy Base Section, 25 Jun 45.
103. Com 2, Progress Report, Jun 45.
104. Cable, EX-44273, 16 May 45, Com 2 to EBS.

105. Chanor Base Section, Report of Operations, 8 May 45-20 Feb 46, Annex "G-3 Section History."

106. Com Z, Command and Staff Conferences, 6 May 45.

107. Ltr, WTCUSA, 28 Jun 45, subj: "Visit to Le Havre POB and Normandy Base Staging Area."

108. TSFET, AAG, Report of Operations, 7 Apr-22 Sep 45.

109. Com Z, Chanor Base Section, Report of Operations, 8 May 45-20 Feb 46.

110. TSFET, Progress Report, Sep 45.

111. TSFET, Progress Report, Dec 45.

112. Com Z, Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater of Operations, Vol VII, Part I, Chap III, Sec III, p. 115.

113. WTCUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45.

114. Com Z, Command and Staff Conference, 19 Jun 45.

115. Com Z, Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater of Operations, Vol VII, Pt I, Chap III, Sec V, p. 165.

116. TSFET, Historical Report of the Transportation Corps, in the European Theater of Operations, Vol VIII, Pt I, Chap III, Sec III, p. 34-35.

117. Com Z, Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater of Operations, Vol VII, Pt I, Chap III, Sec V, p. 182.

118. Ibid.

119. TSFET, Progress Report, Jul 45; USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46.

120. WTCUSA, European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, 15 May 45; Com Z, Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater of Operations, Vol VII, Pt I, Chap III, Sec I, p.109.

121. Com X, Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater of Operations, Vol VII, Pt 2, Annex I, Sec IV, p.46.

122. Ibid, p.59

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid, 35-36

125. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46. Ltr, ETOUSA, 28 Jun 45, subj: "Visit to Le Havre POB and Normandy Base Staging Area."

126. SCF 61, ETOUSA, 19 May 45, subj: "Preparation for Overseas Movement, Redeployment," (Annex No. 3 to European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment.)

127. ETOUSA, Redeployment Forecast of Readiness, 17 Apr 45.

128. WD, Redeployment Forecast-Atlantic Section, 20 Feb 45.

129. ETOUSA, Second Edition, Redeployment Forecast-Unit Schedule, 15 Jun 45.

130. WD, Second Edition, War Department Redeployment Forecast, Atlantic Section, 15 May 45.

131. USFET, USFET Redeployment Forecast Unit Schedule, 3rd Edition, 15 Aug 45.

132. WD, Third Edition Redeployment Forecast-Atlantic Section, 19 Jul 45.

133. Ltr, USFET, 21 Aug 45, file AG 370.01 TSC (GC), subj: Redeployment Forecast-Unit Schedule.

134. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Hq, USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."

138. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."

139. Ibid. Throughout this section figures for actual shipments are taken from Theater Headquarters, G-3 Division, Redeployment Branch, "Monthly Redeployment Progress" for October 1945, while the forecasts for June shipments are taken from the report by G-3 Division for June. Actual figures for shipments for May and June are taken from the October report rather than the June report because of the fact that, during early redeployment, statistics were difficult to keep and thus subject to inaccuracies. In order to obtain an accurate set of figures, statistics were worked over in September of 1945. These were published in the October "Monthly Redeployment Progress."

140. M2, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

141. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."

142. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."

143. Ibid.

144. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."

145. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Progress Report."

146. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Progress Report."

147. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.

148. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Progress Report."

149. M3, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

150. USFET, G-3 Div, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Progress Report."

151. USFET, G-3 Div, 31 Jul 45, "Monthly Progress Report."

152. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Progress Report."

153. Ibid.

154. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
155. Cable 47214, 10 Aug 45, VARX to Theaters concerned.
156. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.
157. Ibid.
158. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
159. Actual shipments for May, June, and July are taken from the Theater Headquarters, G-3 Division, Redeployment Branch "Monthly Redeployment Progress charts. The actual shipments for the first 10 days of August are taken from the Redeployment Coordinating Group Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B. Total actual shipments combine the two figures. The shipment forecast figures are taken from the G-3 Division "Monthly Redeployment Progress" charts for June and July 1945. The total forecast figure, including the first 10 days of August, is taken from the USFET Redeployment Coordinating Group Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter III

1. NS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
2. USFET, Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, Aug 45.
3. SOP No. 61, MTCUSA, 19 May 45, subj: "Preparation for Overseas Movement, Redeployment."
4. Cable, W-47214, 10 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET and Theaters concerned; cable WX-47209, 10 Aug 45, AGWAR from Marshall to USFET Main, personal to Eisenhower and MTCUSA, personal to McNarney.
5. Cable 1410, 14 Aug 45, AGWAR to Theaters concerned; cable WX-49784, 15 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET.
6. Cable EX-78754, 13 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
7. Ibid.
8. Cable, WX-49576, 14 Aug 45, AGWAR personal from Marshall to USFET Main, personal to Eisenhower.
9. NS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
10. Ibid.
11. Cable, EX-78781, 13 Aug 45, USFET to 3rd and 7th US Armies; cable, EX-79063, 14 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
12. Cable, EX-78781, 13 Aug 45, USFET to 3rd and 7th US Armies.
13. Cable, W-49576, 14 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET Main, personal to Eisenhower.
14. Cable, WX-50081, 15 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET, AMET, TEHRAN, IRAN, and MTCUSA.
15. Cable, EX-79948, 17 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
16. Cable, W-49544, 14 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET Main, personal to Eisenhower.
17. Cable, S-17802, 15 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.

18. NS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
19. Cable, BX-79500, 15 Aug 45, USFET to 3rd and 7th US Armies.
20. Ibid.
21. USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
22. USFET, Interim Directive for Redeployment and Readjustment Following the Defeat of Japan, 22 Aug 45.
23. USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
24. Ibid.
25. Cable, BX-81337, 23 Aug 45, TSFET to Base Sections and Bremen Port Command.
26. USFET, Interim Directive for Redeployment and Readjustment Following the Defeat of Japan, 22 Aug 45.
27. Cable, BX-80003, 18 Aug 45, USFET to Major Commands.
28. Ibid.
29. USFET, Interim Directive for Redeployment and Readjustment Following the Defeat of Japan, 22 Aug 45.
30. Ibid.
31. USFET, Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment, Aug 45.
32. GCP No. 60, 10 Jun 45, subj: "Readjustment of Personnel After Defeat of Germany."
33. USFET, USFET Redeployment Forecast - Unit Schedule, 3rd Edition, 15 Aug 45.
34. WD, Third Edition Redeployment Forecast - Atlantic Section, 19 Jul 45.
35. NS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.
38. Cable, EX-80955, 21 Aug 45, USFET Rear to USFET Main and others.
39. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Cable, S-20075, 28 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
43. USFET, USFET Redeployment Forecast, Unit Schedule, 3rd Edition, 15 Aug 45.
44. Cable, S-20075, 28 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
45. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
46. Ibid.
47. Cable, WX-57162, 30 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET.
48. Cable, S-20076, 28 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
49. Cable, WX-57162, 30 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET.
50. Ibid.
51. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
52. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Br, Monthly Progress Report, 31 Oct 45.
53. The figures in this table, while not consistent with later tabulations, constitute the best available figures for this type of breakdown for the 12 May - 30 September 1945. The figures were obtained from the Theater Headquarters, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, monthly Redeployment Progress Reports for June, July, and August 1945.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV

1. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Telephone Conference, Washington (Major General Craig & Maj Gen Henry) with Frankfurt (Brig Gen George S. Ryster), 2 Sep 45.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
10. Telephone Conference Washington (Major General Craig and Maj Gen Henry) with Frankfurt (Brig Gen George S. Ryster), 2 Sep 45.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Special TWX Conference, AOWAR and USFET, TT-4059, 3 Sep 45, subj: "Redeployment."
14. Ibid.
15. MS, USFET, G-3 Div Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
16. Special TWX Conference, AOWAR and USFET, TT-4059, 3 Sep 45, subj: "Redeployment."
17. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Cable, WX-60240, 6 Sep 45, AGWAR to all Theater Commanders, Major Commands and Chiefs of all War Department General and Special Staff Divisions.
29. Ibid.
30. Cable, WX-65803, 18 Sep 45, AGWAR to all Theater Commands and Chiefs of all War Department General Special Staff Divisions.
31. Cable, WX-71849, 30 Sep 45, AGWAR to US Forces European Theater Main, US Forces European Theater Rear, and Addresses concerned.
32. Ibid.
33. Cable, WX-13197, 7 Jun 45, AGWAR to SHAEP FWD; see Par 23.
34. NS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
35. Cable, WX-80193, 22 Aug 45, USFET Rear to USFET Main.
36. Ibid.
37. Cable, Rear, WX-82093, 22 Aug 45, USFET Rear to USFET Main.
38. Cable, WX-84880, 10 Sep 45, USFET Rear to Major Commands.
39. NS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.

42. Ibid; Cable, WX-67709, 21 Sep 45, AGWAR signed Varcoe to Major Commands.

43. NS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

44. The project was first known as the Ironside Project. Later it was called the Ironhorse Project (Cable EX-77626, 9 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.) The War Department directed that the project be redesignated MAUVH Project on 16 August, (Ltr, USFET, G-3, 16 Aug 45, subj: "Return of High Score Military Railway Service Transportation Corps Personnel.")

45. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report on Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Appendix B.

46. Cable, EX-76501, 5 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.

47. Cable, EX-76500, 5 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.

48. Cable, W-42603, 3 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET.

49. Cable, EX-76500, 5 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.

50. Cable, EX-87425, 26 Sep 45, USFET to AGWAR.

51. NS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

52. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 30 Sep 45, "Redeployment Progress Report."

53. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Redeployment Progress Report."

54. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Sep 45, "Redeployment Progress Report."

55. Ibid.

56. NS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

57. Ibid.

58. USFET, Directive for Redeployment and Readjustment Following Cessation of Hostilities, 6 Oct 45.

59. SOP No. 61, USFET, 4 Sep 45, subj: "Preparation for Overseas Movement, Redeployment."

60. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 30 Sep 45, "Redeployment Progress Report;" Because of the method and difficulties of keeping statistics at this period a comparison in the breakdown in this table with the figures given in Chart, Chapter 3, Section I, shows a slight discrepancy. Figures in this table are taken from the USFET G-3 Division, Troops and Redeployment Branch, "Redeployment Progress Report," for September 1945, while those for the Chart are taken from the USFET G-3 Division, Troops and Redeployment Branch Monthly "Redeployment Progress Report," for June 1946.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Cable, EX-57733, 25 Sep 45, USFET to Major Commands.

64. Ibid.

65. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

66. Ibid.

67. Cable, EX-59414, 6 Oct 45, USFET to Major Commands.

68. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Redeployment Progress Report."

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. USFET, USFET Redeployment Forecast-Unit Schedule, 4th Edition, 15 Nov 45.
89. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
90. Ibid.
91. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 30 Nov 45, "Redeployment Progress Report."
92. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Cable, WAR-S1908, 9 Nov 45, AGWAR to USFET Main, Personal to Eisenhower.
99. Ibid.
100. USFET, G-3 Div Report of Operations, 15 Oct-31 Dec 45.

101. Ibid.
102. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
103. Ibid.
104. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations, 15 Oct-31 Dec 45.
105. Ibid.
106. Cir 164, USFET, 18 Dec 45.
107. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Dec 45, "Redeployment Progress Report."
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid. Because of the method and difficulties of keeping statistics during redeployment, a comparison of the breakdown in this table with the figures given in Chart, Chapter 5, Section I, shows a slight discrepancy. Figures in this table are taken from the USFET G-3 Division, Troops and Redeployment Branch, Redeployment Progress Report for December 1945. Figures for the Chart are taken from the USFET G-3 Division, Troops and Redeployment Branch, "Redeployment Progress Report," for June 1946.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter V

1. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Dec 45, "Redeployment Progress Report."
2. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, Dec 45, "Redeployment Progress Report," p 20.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
6. USFET, USFET Redeployment Forecast-Unit Schedule, Fourth Edition, 15 Nov 45.
7. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
8. "Redeployment is Ended on Basis of Point Score," Stars and Stripes, Germany Edition, 6 Jan 46.
9. Ibid.
10. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Dec 45, "Redeployment Progress Report."
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. "Redeployment is Ended on Basis of Point Score," Stars and Stripes, Germany Edition, 6 Jan 46.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid. FWX Conference, Washington-Frankfurt, 8 Jan 46.
17. Ibid.
18. "10,000 GIs See General in Mass Protest at Manila," Stars and Stripes, Germany Edition, 8 Jan 46.

19. "Pacific Area Will Speed All 50s Home by Jan 31," Stars and Stripes, Germany Edition, 9 Jan 46.

20. Ibid.

21. "3,000 in Protest at USFET Area," Stars and Stripes, Germany Edition, 10 Jan 46; Ltr, Hq USFET, 10 Jan 46, subj: "Protest Meeting on Evening of 9 January 1946."

22. Ibid.

23. "Soldiers in UK Take Complaints to Senators," Stars and Stripes, Germany Edition, 13 Jan 46.

24. USFET, PRD, Release No 1026, 12 Jan 46, "Third Army Vets Protest Redeployment Slowdown."

25. "French Protest GI Meetings at Arc de Triomphe," Stars and Stripes, Germany Edition, 13 Jan 46.

26. Interview with Colonel W.S. Nye, Chief of G-3 Sec, Berlin District. For further information see the Inspector General file, Berlin Command.

27. "Report of Operations, G-1, TSFET, V-E Day to 28 February 1946," Vol IV, Sec XI, Ref G-2-XD-29.

28. Ibid.

29. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.

30. USFET, PRD, Release No 1045, 15 Jan 46.

31. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, Annex B.

32. Cable, WOL 3750, 15 Jan 46, AGMAR to USFET; USFET, PRD, 15 Jan 46, Release No. 1045.

33. USFET, PRD, 15 Jan 46, Release No. 1045.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. USFET, G-3 Div. Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
37. Ibid.
38. TSFET, G-3, Sec. Report of Operations, 1 Oct 45-28 Feb 46.
39. Ibid: USFET, G-3 Div. Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
40. USFET, G-3 Div. Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46. This includes the inspection report.
41. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46.
42. USFET, G-3 Div. Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
43. MS, USFET, G-3 Div. Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
44. Cable, WX-80434, 13 Mar 46, AOWAR to USFET.
45. MS, USFET, G-3 Div. Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
46. USFET, G-3 Div. Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Jan 46, "Redeployment Progress Report;" USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 28 Feb 46, "Redeployment Progress Report;" USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Mar 46, "Redeployment Progress Report;" Because of the method and difficulties of keeping statistics during this period a comparison of these figures with those on the chart, Section 1, Chapter 5, figures for that chart were obtained from the USFET G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, "Redeployment Progress Report," for Jan 1946.
47. USFET, G-3 Div. Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
48. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Jan 46, "Redeployment Progress Report."
49. Ibid: MS, USFET, G-3 Div. Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
50. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Jan 46, "Redeployment Progress Report."
51. USFET, G-3 Div. Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
52. Ibid.

53. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 28 Feb 46, "Redeployment Progress Report."

54. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.

55. Ibid.

56. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 28 Feb 46, "Redeployment Progress Report."

57. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.

58. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 Mar 46, "Redeployment Progress Report."

59. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.

60. Ibid.

61. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

62. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.

63. Ibid.

64. SOP 77, USFET, 10 Apr 46, subj: "Overseas Movement of Individuals." This publication superseded the following: (1) USFET, Directive for Redeployment and Readjustment Following Cessation of Hostilities, 6 Oct 45, (2) SOP No. 66, HPOUSA, 10 Jan 45, subj: "Readjustment of Personnel After Defeat of Germany," (3) SOP No. 61, USFET, 4 Sep 45, subj: "Preparation for Overseas Movement, Redeployment" (4) SOP No. 63, USFET, 15 Aug 45, subj: "Supply Procedures for Overseas Redeployment."

65. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

66. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 30 Apr 46, "Redeployment Progress Report."

67. Ibid.

68. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

69. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 31 May 46, "Redeployment Progress Report."

70. USFET, G-3 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.

71. USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, 30 Jun 46, "Redeployment Progress Report."

72. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

73. See charts and tables this chapter, based on the monthly Redeployment Progress Report, by USFET, G-3 Division, Troops and Redeployment Branch: Because of the difficulty in keeping statistics from 12 May through 30 September 1945 the breakdown in the tables and charts are not consistent with each other, but form the best statistical record available for the period. All figures used are taken from the Theater Headquarters, G-3 Division, Troops and Redeployment Branch monthly "Redeployment Progress Reports."

74. Unless otherwise footnoted the material in Section 2 is based on material presented elsewhere in this manuscript.

75. Army Ground Forces, Hist Redeployment Training, 1946.

76. Cable, S-31882, 17 Nov 45, USFET Main from Smith signed Patton to AGFAR personal for Hull.

77. MS, USFET, G-3 Div, Troops and Redeployment Branch, Nov 46, Report on Redeployment.

78. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46.

3 1695 00722 477

3 1695 00722 4777

DATE DUE

GAYLORD			PRINTED IN U.S.A.

GAYLORD

PRINTED IN U.S.A.

PROPERTY OF U.S. ARMY

